been radical religious interpretations of the conflict in Judaism. However, important
studies have concluded that radical religious interpretations of the conflict did not penetrate
Israel’s non-religious-nationalist majority.
The Israeli military, it should be noted, is
vastly secular, and ultra-orthodox men, for the most part, prefer to be exempted from
military service. This consideration, among others, attenuates the argument that religious
rationale is the main source of Israeli militancy and intransigence. Religious rationale
inside of Israel does play a role in prolonging the conflict, but it is not the only factor or the
only spoiler, as this book claims.
The main problem with the argument about flagging support for the peace process in Israel
in the mid-90s, however, is not that it treats Baruch Goldstein as an illustration of “a
threatening undercurrent of violence,” but rather that the Hamas and Islamic Jihad
members who terrorized Israeli society are not part of the equation. The reader is not given
to understand that in the five year period that followed the Oslo Accord (1993-1998),
nineteen suicide and other bombing attacks were carried out in shopping malls, cafes,
buses and markets. In several passages, the authors even go so far as to blame Israel for
Hamas’s suicide bombings, describing them as a pattern that was “caused” by “Israeli
provocations” (475, see also 480). It would have been worthwhile in this textbook—and
especially in the section that was supposed to present an Israeli perspective—to let the
reader understand this phenomenon from the perspective of Israelis. The psychological
impact of terrorism on Israeli society is a well-researched subject.
Moreover the
relationship between trauma and political views and voting patterns or between trauma and
views of the “other” are crucial components of conflict studies. Without an understanding
of how Israel experienced the terrorism, it is very difficult to understand why Israeli
support for the peace process dwindled during the Oslo years.
Throughout the sixth part, there is a conspicuous preference for the traditional Palestinian
narrative about where the blame should lie. The authors fall into a pattern of describing
Israel’s “violations” of agreements and “violation” of international law and they describe
how Palestinians were affected by these violations but the question of whether Palestinians
committed any violations is not examined (see for example, 474, 475, 481 and 508). From
Israel’s perspective Arafat violated the Oslo Accords with his incitement to violence and
his failure to halt terrorism. Cleveland and Bunton hold that Arafat was unable to rein in
terrorism but they neither explore the evidence for or against this claim, nor do they
examine the implications of such on the prospect of peace (475). It would have been
worthwhile and beneficial to expose the reader to the different debates about the
intersection between Arafat and terrorism as well as the conflicting statements that he
made which caused Israelis to doubt his sincerity. Sadly, this is missing. As a result of a
one-sided narrative, especially in this last section, Israel receives the lion’s share of
criticism for the failure of peace while Palestinian agency is down-played.
In sum, Cleveland and Bunton’s A History of the Modern Middle East is a mixed bag.
Earlier chapters are mostly free of rhetoric, word choices and oversimplifications that
See for example, Yitzhak Reiter, “Religion as a Barrier to Compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” in
Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, edited by Yaacov Bar-Siman Tov (Jerusalem Institute of Israel
Studies in cooperation with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Israel, 14 March 2011), pp. 228-263.
See for example, Dov Waxman, Living with terror, not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli
Society, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 5, No. 4-6 (2011).