Air Force OA-X Light Attack Aircraft/SOCOM Armed Overwatch

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Updated November 24, 2021

Air Force OA-X Light Attack Aircraft/SOCOM Armed

Overwatch Program

On October 24, 2019, the U.S. Air Force issued a final

request for proposals declaring its intent to acquire a new

type of aircraft. The OA-X light attack aircraft is a small,

two-seat turboprop airplane designed for operation in

relatively permissive environments. The start of a formal

program followed a series of Air Force “experiments” to

determine the utility of such an aircraft.

After the Air Force experiments ended, the program passed

to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the

“Armed Overwatch” program, with a goal of acquiring 75

aircraft for a somewhat different mission. In November,

2021, SOCOM issued its own request for proposals, with a

different set of competitors.

Why Light Attack?

During 2018, then-Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson

often expressed the purpose of a new light attack aircraft as

giving the Air Force an ability to free up more sophisticated

and expensive assets for other tasks, citing the example of

using high-end F-22 jets to destroy a drug laboratory in

Afghanistan as an inefficient use of resources. Per-hour

operating costs for light attack aircraft are typically about

2%-4% those of advanced fighters.

She and other officials also noted that the 2018 National

Defense Strategy put a greater emphasis on potential

conflicts against capably armed nation-states, further

stressing a need to minimize the use of high-end assets in

other types of conflict. (For more on that document, see

CRS Insight IN10855, The 2018 National Defense Strategy,

by Kathleen J. McInnis.)

Conversely, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates had

criticized the Air Force as focusing excessively on the kind

of high-end, near-peer conflicts envisioned in that strategy;

the light attack aircraft can be seen as making the Air Force

more relevant to low-end and counterinsurgency warfare.

History

In January, 2016, LtGen James Holmes (then Air Force

Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and

Requirements) told CRS the Air Force was considering

starting two programs related to ground-attack operations.

One, called OA-X, would examine existing, “off-the-shelf”

light attack aircraft to add a low-end capability for use in

relatively permissive air environments such as Afghanistan

and Iraq. The other, “AX-2,” would develop a replacement

for the existing A-10 Thunderbolt II. The Air Force

subsequently publicized these concepts, although they were

not included in the fiscal 2017 budget submission.

On July 31, 2017, the Air Force began what it called the

Capability Assessment of Non-Developmental Light Attack

Platforms, an “experiment” to determine the utility of an

OA-X, its ability to operate with coalition partners, and to

evaluate initial candidate aircraft. The first phase included

the Sierra Nevada/Embraer A-29, Textron/Beechcraft AT-

6B, and Air Tractor/L3 OA-802 turboprops, variants of

which are in service with other countries, and the

developmental Textron Scorpion jet. First-phase operations

continued through August 2017.

Figure 1. Sierra Nevada/Embraer A-29

Source: U.S. Department of Defense.

Note: Shown in Afghan service.

Figure 2. Textron/Beechcraft AT-6

Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Ethan D. Wagner.

Figure 3. Air Tractor/L3 OA-802

Source: L-3.

Air Force OA-X Light Attack Aircraft/SOCOM Armed Overwatch Program

https://crsreports.congress.gov

Figure 4. Textron Scorpion

Source: Darin LaCrone/Textron Airland.

The experiment’s second phase began May 7, 2018, with

the A-29 and AT-6B continuing in the program. The flying

portion of the program concluded in June 2018.

A presolicitation notice issued August 6, 2018, limited

participation in the proposed contract to Sierra Nevada and

Textron; did not specify a number of aircraft to be acquired

(Air Force estimates have varied from 20 to “a couple of

squadrons” to 300) nor a target unit price; and predicted a

formal solicitation in December 2018, with contract award

in the fourth quarter of 2019.

The October 24, 2019, request for proposals split the

proposed buy between A-29 and AT-6, with two to three

each. In response, two AT-6s and three A-29s were

delivered to the Air Force. The AT-6s are based at Moody

AFB, GA, for testing and development of operational

tactics; Air Force Special Operations Command has the A-

29s in an instructor pilot program for air advisers at

Hurlburt Field, FL. The Air Force has not yet discussed

why the buy was split between the two aircraft.

After initially considering five aircraft, SOCOM’s

November 2021 request for proposals included the AT-6

and AT-802U from the Air Force experiments, and the

Sierra Nevada/PZL Mielec MC-145. The aircraft selected

will replace SOCOM’s Sierra Nevada/Pilatus U-28s. The

FY2022 budget submission requested $170 million for six

armed overwatch aircraft.

Figure 5. Sierra Nevada/PZL Mielec MC-145B

Source: Sierra Nevada photo.

Congressional Action

The Administration’s FY2020 request for Aircraft

Procurement, Air Force included $35 million for light

attack aircraft. Although the Administration did not request

any funding specific to the OA-X experiment or subsequent

procurement in the FY2017-FY2019 budget submissions,

the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 2019 as enacted (P.L. 115-232) included $300

million to procure a fleet of OA-X planes and long-lead

materials. Neither the act nor its accompanying report

specified a quantity of aircraft.

The Administration’s FY2021 budget request proposed

$101 million to begin purchasing armed overwatch aircraft.

Congress, in Section 163 of the report accompanying the

William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (H.Rept. 116-617),

denied that request and prohibited funds from being used to

acquire armed overwatch aircraft through FY2023.

Section 162 of the report accompanying the Senate Armed

Services Committee version of the FY2022 National

Defense Authorization Act limited expenditures for armed

overwatch pending the receipt of reports required in the

FY2021 NDAA.

Potential Issues for Congress

Questions to consider in evaluating the OA-X/Armed

Overwatch program might include the following:

 What is the value of adding this capability to the Air

Force or SOCOM?

 Might this mission be better accomplished through other

means, such as remotely piloted aircraft (“drones”)?

 Does having such aircraft in U.S. service assist in

training and operating with partner nations? If so, what

is the value of that to the United States?

 Should the U.S. government be involved in promoting

sales of similar aircraft to other nations, and if so, how?

 Is a procurement restricted to a few specified

competitors fair and appropriate?

 Is it efficient or operationally preferable to operate more

than one type of light attack aircraft?

 Is the use of “experiments” rather than a formal

selection process a useful innovation in streamlining

acquisition, a circumvention of rules, or might it be

described some other way? Does that judgment change

when (as in this case) the procurement is intended for an

off-the-shelf, rather than developmental, acquisition?

 The Air Force has publicly stated it is experiencing a

shortage of trained pilots. Would creation of a light

attack fleet exacerbate that shortage or assist in the

training and absorption of new pilots?

Jeremiah Gertler, Specialist in Military Aviation

IF10954

Air Force OA-X Light Attack Aircraft/SOCOM Armed Overwatch Program

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10954 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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