The Strategic Concept from
the Operational Plan Outline
for the 2004 Afghanistan
Presidential Election:
“The creation and maintenance
of a security environment con-
ducive to the conduct of free,
general, secret, and direct voting
will be principally the responsi-
bility of the Police and Military
forces of Afghanistan operations
…. [The military] will conduct
cooperative security operations
with Afghan forces including
but not limited to area security
operations and the deployment
of quick reaction forces (QRF).
It is understood that security
conditions in regions, provinces
or districts vary widely.The
organization/grouping and
deployment/assigning of security
forces in relation to tasks in each
phase will be best coordinated
jointly by military and police
commanders at these levels.
Local coordination between the
security partners will determine
priorities of security coverage in
given areas of operations.”
First, an electoral security concept should be
developed as the strategic platform upon which
subsequent planning and administration takes place.
An electoral security concept is the strategic view
of threats and the security framework that outlines
stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities for responding
to them. Developing the concept represents a point
of depar ture in formulating the strategic response to
the threats that have been identified or anticipated.
In Guatemala, a security plan was developed by
the Ministr y of the Interior (MOI) and the militar y,
along with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and
exper ts provided by USAID. The plan outlined roles
and responsibilities for the National Civilian Police
(PNC) and Army, as well as priority areas and com-
mensurate plans for deployments, which were based
on analysis of violence and conflict in past electoral
cycles. Actions for the pre-election, election day and
post-election phases were included in the plan.
In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and Afghan security forces estab-
lished a three-cordon security concept, with ISAF
providing QRFs and other special functions; the
Afghan National Army (ANA) providing a general
atmosphere of security; and the Afghan National
Police (ANP) providing point and mobile secu-
rity (poll workers managing minor disputes within
the polling stations could be considered a four th
security cordon). The Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) coordinated election security plan-
ning and the associated asset deployments with
the IEC, ISAF and the National Directorate of
Security (NDS). The electoral security concept
is fur ther elaborated in the adjoining text box.
Second, coordination mechanisms should be es-
tablished to ensure integrated cooperation across
all stakeholders—at the national and subnational
levels—involved in electoral security administration.
Electoral security administration is a multi-stakehold-
er effor t with militar y, police, and civilian authorities
all playing unique roles to prevent, manage, and
mediate conflict throughout the electoral cycle. This
constitutes the process of electoral security admin-
istration. In each of the four countries examined
(Guatemala, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and Burundi),
state stakeholders faced operational challenges in
electoral security administration.To facilitate the
working relationships among stakeholders, organi-
zational management structures for coordination,
control, and communication have been formed. In
three of the four case studies (Afghanistan, Guatema-
la, and the Philippines), state stakeholders established
variants of what can be termed electoral security
coordination bodies, with associated mechanisms for
communication and joint action. Although models
var y in structure and purpose, three models of coor-
dination are employed by state stakeholders: 1) EMB
leadership model; 2) security force leadership model;
or 3) parallel models. Below are three examples of
how these different models have been implemented.
OPTION 1: EMB LEADERSHIP MODEL - In
Afghanistan, cross-agency coordination in electoral
security administration was addressed by establishing
an Electoral Security Working Group.The IEC ser ved
as the central coordinator for the working group,
which included representatives of the MOI, Minis-
tr y of Defense, NDS, the ANA, and ANP. Using risk
mapping, the ANSF informed the IEC which polling
stations it would be able to secure with ANP staff
as well as ANA deployment for perimeter security.
Based on this feedback from the ANSF and associat-
ed coordinating bodies, the IEC then made decisions
on which polling centers were to be closed for secu-
rity reasons.The working group included subnational
electoral and security stakeholders as well as those
at the national level (see below for best practices
in decentralizing election security administration).
OPTION 2: SECURITY FORCE LEADERSHIP
MODEL
- In the Philippines (2010), the Philippine
National Police (PNP) led electoral security opera-
tions and coordinated effor ts with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) and the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP). To ensure coordination with
the PNP and AFP, the COMELEC appointed liaison
officers to work with each institution on electoral
security planning and administration. The terms of
reference for the coordination were put forward in a
memorandum of understanding signed by the heads
of the par ticipating agencies. Joint Security Control
Centers (JSCCs)
22
were established at national and
subnational levels with representatives of each of
these three bodies. COMELEC representatives par-
ticipated in national and regional command confer-
ences with the PNP, AFP, and other law enforcement
agencies to plan and organize for electoral security.
OPTION 3: MIXED MODEL - In Guatemala,
state security forces collaborated to develop an
electoral security plan for the 2011 electoral cycle.
In contrast to other cases where the EMB led the
coordination, the Guatemalan EMB, the TSE, was
not directly charged with providing electoral secu-
rity administration; however, they coordinated the
planning process for provision of electoral security
with the PNC and other government ministries. A
high level coordination mechanism was established
in which the following actors par ticipated: the TSE’s
magistrates; Vice Ministers from Interior, Army, Com-
munications, Energy, and Foreign Affairs; and the
National Coordinator for the Reduction of Disasters.
A working group command center was established
on election day along with the command center
BEST PRACTICES IN ELECTORAL SECURITY
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