would be sufficient confinement or congestion of the cloud to give rise to overpressures. If the risk
of overpressures can be discounted, the major gas release scenarios could presumably still give rise
to a large flammable cloud and give rise to impacts at long distance in the event of a flash fire.
At the AGI we note that there is there is pressure reduction / flow equipment to reduce the gas
pressure. This is in a 16 m × 13 m building. Has the QRA considered the potential risk of a gas
release inside the building? This would presumably act as a confined region within which the
conditions for a VCE could arise.
Section 3 describes the QRA methodology, as well as a discussion on risk assessment methodologies.
The generic details on the approach to risk assessment – developing nodes, assigning probabilities
from the literature and based on dimensions and type of installation, the approach to direct and
delayed ignition, the use of the Probit functions for assessing the consequences of a release, etc. –
appear reasonable.
Section 5 maps out the QRA. This covers the onshore facilities and AGI. With respect to the FSRU, it
is noted that at this stage in the process, the details of the specific FSRU to be used are not available.
A typical FSRU design was therefore used for the assessment. This seems a reasonable approach at
this stage in the project. The approach should be reviewed and the QRA updated to reflect the
actual FSRU, once these details are available.
A similar approach is adopted for the LNGCs as the details of the specific LNGCs to be used are not
available and so a typical LNGC design was adopted for the QRA. Again, this is reasonable. The QRA
should be reviewed, and if necessary updated, periodically in line with good practice.
Section 6 describes the release cases. The sections of piping systems and equipment used for
calculation of inventories are listed in Table 6-1, Table 6-2, Table 6-3 and Table 6-4 which detail the
following overall process areas:
• 1. Onshore Installation: Natural gas pipeline from the FSRU on the jetty and onshore feeding
natural gas to the AGI and to the Power Station;
• 2. AGI – Conditioning of natural gas and connection to the Shannon Pipeline;
• 3. FSRU – Storage and vaporisation of LNG and supply of natural gas to the jetty;
• 4. LNGC – Transfer of LNG to the FSRU
The risk assessment does not include accident scenarios associated with the BESS. This is consistent
with the guidance as the BESS does not qualify as an installation under the COMAH Regulations. The
batteries will contain sulphuric acid, which is a dangerous substance under the CLP Regulation
(Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008 on the classification, labelling and packaging of substances and
mixtures), but it does not present any of the hazardous properties required for qualification under
COMAH. As such, it is consistent with the LUP approach that the accident scenarios are focused on
the other areas of the proposed development which do contain COMAH substances.
As noted in the report, the odorant tank presents a risk of a BLEVE. The contour plot in Figure 5-7
shows the impacts of such an event to the surroundings. The report states that the event would not
present significant offsite hazards and would not lead to a MATTE. The plot also shows that the
impacts extend only over a small area of the site. The report should clarify if this means that the
odorant tank does not present any credible or significant escalation hazard at the site (e.g. by
causing damage to a pipeline or other infrastructure in the vicinity).
We are conscious also that BESS developments can present a fire risk. As such, the operator is likely
to be required to conduct a fire risk assessment for this aspect of the development under the Fire
Services Act, which places a general duty to ensure fire safety at developments. Any such