2
Background:Mostbanksareunderperforminginthesmall‐dollarinstallmentloanspace,whilea
handfulofnon‐banksfillthegapbymisusingpartnershipswithsmallbanks
Inrecentyears,thankstoclearjointguidancefromregulators,anumberoflargerbankshavelaunched
well‐designedsmall‐dollarcreditproductsthatmeettheneedsoftheircustomersdirectly.
3
Somelarge
bankshavestartedinvestinginproductdevelopmentandsystemsinnovationtomakesuchsmall
installmentloansorlinesofcreditavailabletotheircustomers.However,themajorityofbanksarenot
yetofferingtheircustomerssmall‐dollarinstallmentloansandlinesofcrediteventhoughtheyarewell‐
positionedtodoso.Ifevenafewmoreofthecountry’slargestbanksbeganmakingreasonablesmall
installmentloanalternativesavailabletotheirdepositaccountcustomerswhocurrentlyrelyonpayday
loansorfrequentoverdrafts,financiallyfragileconsumerswouldsavebillionsofdollarsperyear.
4
Somesmallerbankshavealsoexpandedtheirsmallinstallmentloanofferings;butforsmallerbanks,the
costofdevelopingsystemstooriginateandservicesmallinstallmentloansisusuallyprohibitiveandthis
necessitatespartneringwiththird‐partyserviceproviders.Inmanycases,thesethird‐partyrelationships
arecomprehensivelymanagedandproduceclearbenefitsforbanksandtheircustomers.Potentially
beneficialpartnershipsbetweenbanksandnon‐banksoccurwhenanon‐bankserviceproviderjoins
withabanktohelpthebankserveitsowncustomerswithoutexposingthebankoritscustomersto
unacceptableorunmanageablethird‐partyrisk.Often,thenon‐bankpartnerprovidestechnological
platformsthatincreasethespeedandreducethecostofunderwriting,originating,orservicingloansto
thebank’scheckingaccountcustomers.Whiletheloansmayinsomecasescarryratesthatexceedwhat
anon‐banklendercouldchargeunderthelawsofthestatewherethecustomerresides,theprinciples
ofpreemptionapplybecausethebankisservingitsowncustomersacrossstatelines,holdingtheriskof
loss,consideringandmanagingallpotentialriskfromthirdpartiesinvolvedinthelendingtransactions,
andgenerallyoperatingwithintheestablishedandwell‐containedframeworkoffederalregulationand
supervision.
Butinothercases,absentclearguidanceandeffectivesupervisionbyfederalregulators,thirdparties
actinpotentiallydisreputableorillegalwaysandusebankpartnershipstomakesmall‐dollarloansto
consumerswhohavenorelationshipwiththebankotherthantheloanitself.
5
Thesethirdpartiesrely
onbankpartnershipsasashieldfromstateconsumerprotectionlawsorstateregulatoryoversight.
6
As
demonstratedbelow,thiscanalsooccurincaseswherethethirdpartiesholdrelatedstatelicensessuch
aspaydayloanorcheck‐cashinglicenses,andlendersusuallychargefee‐inclusiveratesabove100%or
createelaboratebusinessstructures,sometimesinvolvinghighadd‐onfeesviaadditionalthird‐party
relationshipsthatmayormaynotbeknowntothepartnerbank.Thesearrangementshavethe
potentialtocreateriskthattheirbankpartnersmaybeunabletoassessormanage,whileatthesame
3
ThePewCharitableTrusts,“BankRegulators'GuidanceAMoveintheRightDirection,butCarriesRisks”(2020),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news‐room/press‐releases‐and‐statements/2020/05/20/pew‐bank‐
regulators‐guidance‐a‐move‐in‐the‐right‐direction‐but‐carries‐risks.
4
Underbankedconsumersspendseveralhundredbilliondollarseachdecadeonfeesandinterestonproductslike
payday,autotitle,rent‐to‐own,pawn,andothersubprimeloans.Forexample,see:CenterforFinancialServices
Innovation,“FinanciallyUnderservedMarketSizeStudy”(2019),https://finhealthnetwork.org/research/2019‐
financially‐underserved‐market‐size‐study/.
5
Thisisnottosaythatrent‐a‐bankcustomersareunbanked.TheFDIChasfoundonlyabout5.4%ofAmerican
householdsareunbanked,andeverypaydayloancustomerhasacheckingaccountbecausethatisaprecondition
ofgettingtheloan.Instead,rent‐a‐bankpartnershipsoftentargetcustomerswhohavecheckingaccountsatother
banks.
6
Forexample,see“AGRacineSuesOnlineLenderforMakingPredatoryandDeceptiveLoansto4,000+District
Consumers”(2021),https://oag.dc.gov/release/ag‐racine‐sues‐online‐lender‐making‐predatory‐and.