auth
October 2023 ii
July 2023
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS)
Strategy & Policy ▪ National Preparedness and Incident Coordination
The continued spread of African swine fever (ASF) in Asia and Europe—and the detection in 2021 on the
Caribbean Island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti)—has placed the Western Hemisphere on
high alert. APHIS has since taken several key steps to fortify the United States in the event of an ASF
outbreak. These actions include the establishment of the ASF Protection Zone, increasing existing
surveillance and mitigations in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and initiating several new
proactive mitigation and prevention efforts in those territories. Simultaneously, APHIS accelerated ASF
preparedness efforts in virtually all critical areas: expanding ASF active surveillance in both domestic pigs
and feral swine, validating additional diagnostic sample types, increasing laboratory capacity, procuring
equipment for the National Veterinary Stockpile for swine depopulation and disposal, and further
developing numerous ancillary activities.
The updated version of the USDA APHIS ASF Response Plan: The Red Book (July 2023) reflects
knowledge gained from policy discussions and response guidance development, and lessons learned
from Federal/State/Industry exercises. This plan incorporates and supersedes previous versions of the
ASF Response Plan: The Red Book. Additionally, this version incorporates changes made in related
Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) materials.
The following list highlights important revisions made to this version of the ASF Response Plan.
Introduces the concept and benefit of the Protection Zone for Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands.
Acknowledges potential pathways of the ASF virus into the United States, given the Hispaniola
threat.
Includes a brief evaluation of the risk from Ornithodoros spp. tick as a vector in the United States.
Clarifies information included in the description of the persistence of the ASF virus.
Defines the incubation period for exposed individual pigs. Describes the time for lateral spread
and detection within an exposed herd or group.
Reflects an updated case definition.
Emphasizes the role of contact tracing in an epidemiologic investigation.
Addresses and integrates policy from APHIS’ response to the 2022 United States Animal Health
Association (USAHA) ASF resolutions for:
o Authorization for indemnity and depopulation response time;
o ASF detection in domestic pig as a trigger for a 72-Hour National Movement Standstill;
o Resumption of domestic movement options at ‘Hour 73’;
o Adopting standardized guidelines for harvesting establishments;
o Establish national standardized permitting guidance for Control Areas; and
o Restocking requirements in a Control Area.
Introduces the Meat Harvest, Off-site Rendering, and Spray Dried Blood / Plasma Facility Plans.
Introduces and describes the Domestic Pig and Feral Swine Incident Playbooks.
References the U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan.
Introduces the Certified Swine Sample Collector Program.
Corrects comments made and any errors identified in the prior version. Updates references
throughout, as necessary.
While this ASF Response Plan provides strategic guidance before an outbreak, there will be additional
policy guidance provided during an outbreak on specific response operation activities, particularly for the
unified Incident Command. Please note certain topics, like the availability of an ASF vaccine for swine or
October 2023 iv
specific response guidance in an active outbreak, have rapidly changing statuses. These types of issues
may be referenced briefly in The ASF Response Plan but treated more fully in associated guidance
documents. If ASF is detected, these additional policy guidance documents and information will be
distributed and available at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.
USDA APHIS acknowledges that preparing for and responding to an ASF outbreak is and will be a
complex effort requiring collaboration and cooperation from all stakeholders. USDA APHIS fully
anticipates updates as new capabilities and processes become available. As such, if you have comments
or suggestions on this document, please send an email to [email protected] with the
subject line: “Comments to Updated ASF Response Plan” for consideration and possible incorporation
into future versions.
The FAD PReP mission is to raise awareness, define expectations, and improve capabilities for FAD
preparedness and response. For more information, please go to www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep or email
Change Log
USDA APHIS ASF Response Plan: The Red Book (July 2023)
Revision (date) Page / Section Change
Rev.1(October25,2023)
1
Correctedmiscellaneoustypographical
andgrammaticalerrorsthroughout
“ 4‐30/4.11.3 2 RemovedreferencetoTable1‐1,incorrect
reference:
(Table 1-1 provides
information on ASFV susceptibility
according to WOAH).
“ 4‐17/Fig.4‐2 3 Removedcomment,irrelevant:
Stamping-out
is not pictured in these figures.
July 2023 iv
Preface
The Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)—
African Swine Fever Response Plan: The Red Book (July 2023) provides strategic
guidance for responding to an animal health emergency caused by African swine
fever (ASF) in the United States. Information in this plan may require further
discussion and development with stakeholders.
This ASF Response Plan is under ongoing review. This document is a major
revision of the previous version published in April 2020. The primary additions
and revisions are listed in the above introductory message. Please send questions
or comments to:
National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center
Veterinary Services
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
U.S. Department of Agriculture
E-mail: FAD.PReP[email protected]
While best efforts have been used in developing and preparing the ASF Response
Plan, the U.S. Government, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and other parties, such as employees
and contractors contributing to this document, neither warrant nor assume any
legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of
any information or procedure disclosed. The primary purpose of this ASF
Response Plan is to provide strategic guidance to government officials responding
to an ASF outbreak. It is only posted for public access as a reference.
The ASF Response Plan may refer to links of various other Federal and State
agencies and private organizations. These links are maintained solely for the
user’s information and convenience. If you link to such a site, please be aware
that you are then subject to the policies of that site. In addition, please note that
USDA does not control and cannot guarantee the relevance, timeliness, or
accuracy of these outside materials. Further, the inclusion of links or pointers to
items in hypertext is not intended to reflect their importance, nor is it intended to
constitute approval or endorsement of any views expressed, or products or
services offered, on these outside websites, or the organizations sponsoring the
websites.
Trade names are used solely for the purpose of providing specific information.
Mention of a trade name does not constitute a guarantee or warranty of the
product by USDA or an endorsement over other products not mentioned.
In accordance with Federal civil rights law and USDA civil rights regulations and
Preface
July 2023 v
policies, the USDA, its Agencies, offices, and employees, and institutions
participating in or administering USDA programs are prohibited from
discriminating based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex, gender identity
(including gender expression), sexual orientation, disability, age, marital status,
family/parental status, income derived from a public assistance program, political
beliefs, or reprisal or retaliation for prior civil rights activity, in any program or
activity conducted or funded by USDA (not all bases apply to all programs).
Remedies and complaint filing deadlines vary by program or incident.
Persons with disabilities who require alternative means of communication for
program information (e.g., Braille, large print, audiotape, American Sign
Language, etc.) should contact the responsible Agency or USDA's TARGET
Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TTY) or contact USDA through the Federal
Relay Service at (800) 877-8339. Additionally, program information may be
made available in languages other than English.
To file a program discrimination complaint, complete the USDA Program
Discrimination Complaint Form, AD-3027, found online at How to File a
Program Discrimination Complaint (www.usda.gov/oascr/how-to-file-a-program-
discrimination-complaint) and at any USDA office or write a letter addressed to
USDA and provide in the letter all of the information requested in the form. To
request a copy of the complaint form, call (866) 632-9992. Submit your
completed form or letter to USDA by: (1) mail: U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, 1400 Independence Avenue,
SW, Washington, D.C. 20250-9410; (2) fax: (202) 690-7442; or (3) email:
[email protected]. USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.
July 2023 vi
Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction and ASF Information ............................................ 1-1
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN ..................................................................... 1-1
1.2 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN ................................................................................. 1-1
1.3 HISTORICAL PRESENCE AND CURRENT ASF SITUATION .......................................... 1-2
1.3.1 Threat of ASF in the United States ....................................................... 1-3
1.3.2 Preparedness Planning ........................................................................ 1-3
1.3.2.1 THE PROTECTION ZONE .................................................................. 1-4
1.3.2.2 SWINE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND ....................................................... 1-4
1.3.2.3 KEY AREAS OF FOCUS FOR PREPAREDNESS ..................................... 1-5
1.3.2.4 NEW PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES .................................................... 1-6
1.4 NATURE OF THE DISEASE/VIRUS ........................................................................... 1-7
1.4.1 Overview ............................................................................................... 1-7
1.4.2 Introduction & Transmission ................................................................. 1-8
1.4.3 Incubation Period .................................................................................. 1-9
1.4.4 Clinical Signs ...................................................................................... 1-10
1.4.5 Morbidity and Mortality........................................................................ 1-11
1.4.6 Differential Diagnosis .......................................................................... 1-11
1.4.7 Persistence of ASFV........................................................................... 1-11
Chapter 2 Framework for ASF Preparedness and Response .................. 2-1
2.1 FOUNDATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE .................................................. 2-1
2.2 USDA AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................ 2-1
2.2.1 The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq. ............... 2-1
2.2.2 The Swine Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 3801 et seq. ................ 2-2
2.3 USDA APHIS VS GUIDANCE ............................................................................... 2-3
2.3.1 Procedures and Policy for an ASF Investigation, VS Guidance
12001.4 ................................................................................................ 2-3
2.3.2 Animal Health Policy in Relation to Feral Swine ................................... 2-3
2.4 USDA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OVERVIEW ................................................... 2-4
2.5 USDA APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT ................................................................. 2-4
Contents
July 2023 vii
2.5.1 Incident Management Structure ............................................................ 2-5
2.5.2 Field Organization ................................................................................ 2-5
Chapter 3 ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy ......................... 3-1
3.1 RESPONSE GOALS ............................................................................................... 3-1
3.2 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES ............................................................................. 3-1
3.3 CONTROL AND ERADICATION STRATEGIES ............................................................. 3-2
3.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy .................................. 3-2
3.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out ..................................... 3-3
3.3.3 Zones and Areas in Relation to Contact Tracing .................................. 3-4
3.3.4 Control and Eradication of ASF in Domestic Pigs ................................. 3-5
3.3.5 Control and Eradication of ASF in Feral Swine ..................................... 3-6
3.4 INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS ................................................................................. 3-7
3.4.1 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities .......................... 3-7
3.4.2 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign ........................................... 3-9
3.4.3 Regulatory Movement Controls .......................................................... 3-10
3.4.4 Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response ...................................... 3-12
3.5 MOVEMENT CONTROL POST STANDSTILL ............................................................ 3-14
3.6 HOUR 73: RESPONSE OPTIONS FOLLOWING A 72-HOUR NATIONAL MOVEMENT
STANDSTILL ................................................................................................... 3-14
Chapter 4 Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools ............... 4-1
4.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY ..................................................................................... 4-1
4.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE REPORTING ................................................. 4-2
4.2.1 Laboratory Definitions ........................................................................... 4-2
4.3 DIAGNOSTICS ...................................................................................................... 4-3
4.3.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing ........................................... 4-4
4.3.2 Surge Capacity ..................................................................................... 4-8
4.4 SURVEILLANCE DESIGN ........................................................................................ 4-8
4.4.1 Surveillance Goals and Objectives ....................................................... 4-8
4.4.2 Surveillance Activities Overview ........................................................... 4-9
4.4.3 Passive Surveillance .......................................................................... 4-10
4.4.4 Active Surveillance for Domestic Pigs ................................................ 4-10
4.4.5 Active Surveillance for Feral Swine .................................................... 4-11
Contents
July 2023 viii
4.5 EPIDEMIOLOGY .................................................................................................. 4-11
4.5.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations ......................................... 4-12
4.5.2 Visualizing Zones and Areas for Domestic Pigs & Feral Swine .......... 4-16
4.5.3 Epidemiological Investigation and Contact Tracing ............................ 4-18
4.6 DOMESTIC RESPONSE: QUARANTINE AND MOVEMENT CONTROL ........................... 4-19
4.6.1 Control Area Movement ...................................................................... 4-20
4.7 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS .................................................................................. 4-22
4.7.1 COB Permits for Live Animal and Semen Movements ....................... 4-22
4.7.1.1 ASF COB PERMIT AND PMIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL
AREAS ............................................................................................ 4-23
4.8 INFORMATION, REPORTING AND TASK MANAGEMENT ............................................ 4-25
4.8.1 Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS) .................. 4-25
4.8.2 Reporting ............................................................................................ 4-26
4.8.3 Information Management Systems and Tools .................................... 4-26
4.9 HEALTH & SAFETY AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ................................ 4-27
4.9.1 Mental Health Concerns ..................................................................... 4-27
4.10 BIOSECURITY .................................................................................................. 4-28
4.11 3D ACTIVITIES ................................................................................................. 4-28
4.11.1 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia ................................................. 4-28
4.11.2 Disposal ............................................................................................ 4-29
4.11.3 Cleaning and Disinfection/Virus Elimination ..................................... 4-30
4.11.4 National Veterinary Stockpile Operations ......................................... 4-30
4.12 APHIS WILDLIFE SERVICES ............................................................................. 4-31
4.12.1 Feral Swine Management ................................................................. 4-31
4.12.2 Vectors ............................................................................................. 4-33
4.13 INDEMNITY AND COMPENSATION ....................................................................... 4-33
4.13.1 Authority ........................................................................................... 4-33
4.13.2 Procedures ....................................................................................... 4-34
4.14 ANIMAL WELFARE ............................................................................................ 4-34
4.15 VACCINATION .................................................................................................. 4-34
Chapter 5 Recovery ................................................................................. 5-1
5.1 CRITERIA FOR PROOF OF FREEDOM ...................................................................... 5-1
5.2 WOAH TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE ........................................................ 5-1
Contents
July 2023 ix
5.2.1 Article 15.1.4 Country or Zone Free from ASF ..................................... 5-1
5.2.2 Article 15.1.7 Recovery of Free Status ................................................. 5-2
5.3 RESTOCKING ....................................................................................................... 5-3
Figures
Figure 3-1. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out................... 3-4
Figure 3-2. Example of Contact Tracing in an ASF Outbreak ................................. 3-4
Figure 3-3. Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response ...................................... 3-13
Figure 4-1. Diagnostic Test Flow for Initial Investigation of ASF in the United
States ................................................................................................................ 4-7
Figure 4-2. Examples of Zones, Areas, and Premises for Domestic Pigs and
Feral Swine in an ASF Outbreak Response .................................................... 4-17
Tables
Table 1-1. Clinical Signs Caused by the Different Forms of ASF .......................... 1-10
Table 1-2. Resistance of ASFV to Physical and Chemical Action ......................... 1-12
Table 4-1. Sample Collection for Diagnostic Testing .............................................. 4-5
Table 4-2. Diagnostic Tests Performed for ASFV at NVSL-FADDL ........................ 4-6
Table 4-3. Summary of ASF Premises Designations for Domestic Pig
Production Premises ....................................................................................... 4-12
Table 4-4. Summary of ASF Zone and Area Designations ................................... 4-13
Table 4-5. Minimum Size of Zones and Areas ...................................................... 4-13
Table 4-6. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ASF ........... 4-14
Table 4-7. Movement Controls: Permit Types during an FAD Incident ................. 4-21
Appendicies
Appendix A Glossary
Appendix B Example Overview Emergency Management Response System
2.0 Workflow
Appendix C Abbreviations
Appendix D Selected References and Resources
July 2023 1-1
Chapter 1
Introduction and ASF Information
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO RESPONSE PLAN
Due to the potential threat of African swine fever (ASF) in the United States from
ongoing transmission throughout East Asia, parts of Europe and the Caribbean
Island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti), this ASF Response Plan:
The Red Book is updated as of July 2023. This version supersedes the previous
version of the African Swine Fever Response Plan. The objectives of this plan are
to identify the (1) policies and strategies needed to respond to an ASF outbreak in
swine and (2) capabilities and critical activities that are involved in responding to
that outbreak and (3) the timeframes for these activities. In an outbreak situation,
these critical activities are under the authority of a unified State and Federal
Incident Command per the National Incident Management System (NIMS).
This ASF Response Plan provides current information on ASF and its relevance to
the United States. It does not replace existing regional, State, Tribal, local, or
industry preparedness and response plans relating to ASF. Regional, State, Tribal,
local and industry plans should be aimed at more specific issues in an ASF
response. In particular, States should develop response plans focused on the
specific characteristics of the State and the State’s swine industry. Industry should
develop response plans focused on the specific characteristics of their commercial
operations and business practices.
1.2 SCOPE OF RESPONSE PLAN
This ASF Response Plan provides strategic guidance for the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) and responders at all levels in the event of an ASF outbreak occurring in
domestic or feral swine.
This document does not cover, in detail, incident coordination or general foreign
animal disease (FAD) response. For more information on these aspects, please
refer to the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination
(FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease Framework:
Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0). These documents cover general
roles and responsibilities as well as general FAD response strategies, respectively.
These documents and other Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response
Plan (FAD PReP) materials are available here:
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.
Introduction and ASF Information
July 2023 1-2
Additionally, this document does not provide in detail every response policy or
response procedure for an outbreak. (e.g., specific virus elimination guidance,
stamping-out policies, indemnity processes, etc.), or address international
movement (export) considerations/ requirements. Past experience demonstrates
this type of information is more effectively communicated as distinct, short,
concise documents or information published on the FAD PReP website that can
be distributed and updated rapidly. There will be additional policy guidance
provided during an outbreak on specific response operation activities. In the event
of an ASF outbreak in the United States, these policy guidance documents and
updates will be posted on the ASF FAD PReP website.
1.3 HISTORICAL PRESENCE AND CURRENT ASF
SITUATION
ASF—first described in Kenya in the 1920s—is a contagious hemorrhagic disease
of wild/feral and domestic pigs. It is often characterized by high morbidity and
mortality rates. There is no effective treatment for ASF-infected swine, and
vaccine candidates are still being researched and evaluated. ASF is a notifiable
disease to the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), which began
collecting data on ASF in 2005. The disease does not pose a risk to human health
or food safety.
ASF is currently widespread and endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, parts of West
Africa, and the island of Sardinia. Beginning in 2007, ASF was confirmed in
several East European countries, then it started appearing in European Union
countries in 2014. The year 2018 brought the emergence of the virus in China.
Not only does ASF continue to spread in the Europe, Asia, and the Pacific
regions—both in domestic pigs and wild boars—the virus is also difficult to
eradicate. Some successes have been reported. The Czech Republic eradicated
ASF after a 2018 outbreak, only to see its return a few years later. Belgium
eradicated ASF in 2020; Spain and Portugal in the mid-1990s; Hispaniola
following outbreaks from 1977–1980.
In 2021, ASF was again detected in the Western Hemisphere on the Caribbean
Island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti). As a consequence of this
detection, the USDA established a Protection Zone (PZ) for the United States
Territory of Puerto Rico (PR) and U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). The PZ is
consistent with the WOAH Terrestrial Code Chapter 4.4, Zoning and
Compartmentalization.
ASF has never been reported in the United States, Canada, Australia, or New
Zealand.
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July 2023 1-3
1.3.1 Threat of ASF in the United States
ASF is a critical threat to the United States due to the recent global spread,
millions of susceptible swine in the United States, including feral swine, and the
potential for severe economic impacts – estimated at several billion dollars.
Although significant and promising advances were recently made in developing
an ASF vaccine, there is still no commercially available, effective vaccine
approved for emergency use in the United States. This makes prevention of
disease entry critically important, and thorough preparation for an emergency
response is vital.
In March 2019, USDA APHIS conducted the following ASF threat assessments:
all of which are available online under Animal Disease Information for Swine:
o A qualitative assessment of the likelihood of ASF virus entry to the United
States.
1
o A non-animal origin feed ingredient risk evaluation framework.
2
o A literature review of non-animal origin feed ingredients and the
transmission of viral pathogens of swine.
3
Among the findings of these evaluations is international travel and trade pose a
substantial risk for viral incursion into the country. Illegal entry of swine products
and byproducts presents the largest potential pathway for entry of ASF virus
(ASFV) into the United States.
1.3.2 Preparedness Planning
With the continued expansion of ASF throughout Asia, Europe, and most recently
Hispaniola in the Western Hemisphere APHIS preparedness efforts remain a
priority. USDA continues to work closely with other Federal and State agencies,
the swine industry, producers, and international partners to prepare for and
prevent an occurrence in North America. Since 2018, USDA has participated in a
series of tri-lateral (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) ASF Forums and
initiated an ASF-specific exercise program to coordinate efforts. Preparedness and
response exercises help ensure our Nation’s readiness and provides an ideal, no-
fault learning environment to discuss, practice, and implement plans, procedures,
1
APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Qualitative assessment of the likelihood of African Swine
Fever Virus entry to the United States: entry assessment. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/asf-entry.pdf
.
2
APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Non-animal origin feed ingredient risk evaluation
framework: scoping. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/nofi-scope.pdf
.
3
APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Literature Review: Non-animal Origin Feed Ingredients and
the Transmission of Viral Pathogens of Swine. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/non-anim
al-origin-
feed-ingredients-transmission-of-viral-pathogens.pdf.
Int
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July 2023 1-4
and processes in advance of an actual event. The 2021 detection of the ASFV in
the Western Hemisphere created yet another sense of urgency.
1.3.2.1 THE PROTECTION ZONE
As a consequence of the September 2021 detection of ASF in Hispaniola, the
USDA established a PZ for the U.S. territories of PR and USVI in the Caribbean.
The PZ is designed to minimize risk and allow the continental United States
(CONUS) to maintain its free status if an ASF outbreak were to occur in the PZ.
International standards require, and the U.S. implemented, biosecurity and
sanitary measures in the PZ. APHIS VS also intensified movement control,
animal identification, and animal traceability to ensure that animals in the PZ are
clearly distinguishable from other populations. Additionally, APHIS VS
implemented increased surveillance in the PZ and the rest of the country,
including surveillance of wildlife.
One aspect of the Federal Order (FO) establishing the PZ was the suspension of
interstate movement of all live swine, swine germplasm, and the placement of
restrictions and transit permit requirements on swine products, and swine
byproducts from PR and USVI. To support this, APHIS Plant Protection and
Quarantine (PPQ) leveraged the predeparture program to screen passengers and
small parcel cargo moving from PR and USVI to CONUS for prohibited swine
products. PPQ has also engaged express couriers and the United States Postal
Service to establish a joint program to inspect mail for prohibited animal and
plant products destined for CONUS.
The newly established PZ can be added to the longstanding, interlocking
safeguards USDA has instituted through its regulatory authorities to prevent ASF
from entering the country.
1.3.2.2 SWINE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
Although the U.S. may glean lessons from Europe and Asia with regard to ASF
preparedness, our domestic pig sector and feral swine populations are distinct
from those regions and require unique planning and approaches.
According to USDA’s National Agriculture Statistical Service, most (70%) of the
swine operations in the U.S. are small hobby operations, with 25 or fewer swine
on the premises. However, greater than 90% of the swine inventory were located
on hog operations with more than 2,000 head of swine. The States of Iowa, North
Carolina, Minnesota, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, and
Kansas accounted for nearly 87 percent of all pigs in the U.S. inventory.
An estimated one million swine are being transported in trucks daily to various
locations, including slaughter and further production and approximately 500,000
hogs are slaughtered each day.
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July 2023 1-5
1.3.2.3 KEY AREAS OF FOCUS FOR PREPAREDNESS
APHIS continues to work in earnest with states and the swine industry to develop
and refine plans in case of a U.S. ASF outbreak. Through this collaborative
planning process, we are able to better understand the factors specific to the U.S.
swine industry that may pose response challenges.
1.3.2.3.1 Site Biosecurity
Biosecurity is key to preventing disease introduction and spread. Biosecurity
includes the use of certain management practices to prevent the introduction of
new disease and the spread of existing disease on swine operations. Examples of
these practices include limiting opportunities for feral swine and domestic pigs to
mingle; cleaning and disinfecting all equipment and vehicles entering or leaving a
production site; and controlling human and vehicle entry between and within
operations. Producers are responsible for developing and adhering to site-specific
biosecurity plans to protect their own investments. Zoos and wildlife parks with
exotic swine species are responsible for developing and adhering to their
biosecurity plans.
Guidance and best practices are available through industry-led efforts such as the
Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan and U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan (US
SHIP).
1.3.2.3.2 Truck Sanitation
Various diseases, including porcine epidemic diarrhea virus, certain strains of
Senecavirus A, and other endemic diseases have been able to spread among the
U.S. swine herd within months of introduction. Among the factors scientific
studies attribute rapid disease spread to is the practice of transporting hogs in
vehicles that are not cleaned and disinfected between loads. Locations of concern
include all swine points of concentration, including slaughter plants, feed mills,
and other collection points that contaminated vehicles may frequent and track
virus.
1.3.2.3.3 Swine Traceability
In the event of an ASF disease outbreak on the U.S. mainland, trading partners
will need to accept U.S. measures for traceability of swine commodities (live pigs
and pork products) before engagement in regionalization or zoning agreements
and resuming exports.
Early in 2022, the U.S. swine industry identified traceability as a priority for ASF
preparedness. USDA APHIS is collaborating with stakeholders to develop a new
framework for swine traceability. The agency is also open to non-regulatory
options for activities that may be implemented sooner than the Federal
rulemaking process allows.
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July 2023 1-6
1.3.2.4 NEW PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES
1.3.2.4.1 U.S. Swine Health Improvement Program
An APHIS-funded pilot project promoting certification of healthy swine herds
called the US SHIP is underway. The US SHIP program is intended to target ASF
and classical swine fever through the creation of standards focusing on
biosecurity, traceability, and surveillance principles. Currently, technical advisory
committees comprised of U.S. pork industry subject matter experts are further
developing technical standards necessary for “safeguarding, certifying, and
bettering the health of U.S. swine.” Pork producers and packing facilities in
participating States that meet specified program requirements can enroll in the
pilot program on a voluntary basis. As of early 2023, 32 States are active in the
US SHIP program, including the top-producing swine States; and more than 50%
of the United States’ swine inventory is enrolled in the program with over 9000
participants. Industry has maintained a strong interest in seeing the program
established as an official USDA program through the rulemaking process. As the
pilot progresses, APHIS continues to assess the potential for making that
transition.
For additional details and status of the US SHIP program, see
https://www.usswinehealthimprovementplan.com.
1.3.2.4.2 National Standardized Permitting Guidance for Control Areas
The swine industry identified the need for the development of consistent national
criteria for intrastate and interstate swine movements from Control Areas in
advance of an ASF outbreak. USDA APHIS collaborated with the USAHA Swine
Committee to establish the biosecurity, surveillance and testing requirements for
permitted movements. The resulting permitting guidance for various types of
swine movements within, into, and out of a Control Area are available on the ASF
FAD PReP website.
1.3.2.4.3 ASF Meat Harvest, Rendering, and Spray Dried Blood / Plasma Facility
Response Plans
The ASF Meat Harvest Facility Response Plans were created to address response
needs unique to harvest establishments and related industries during an ASF
outbreak. These plans were developed in coordination with APHIS and the North
American Meat Institute (NAMI)-led Slaughter Plant Working Group (SPWG)
with participation from various Federal, State, and industry partners.
The culmination of the SPWG’s efforts were the development of three ASF
response plans to target specific scenarios for: 1) Meat Harvest Facilities in the
Free Area with a Contact Premises status, 2) Meat Harvest Facilities located
within a Control Area that do not have an Infected Premises status, and finally 3)
Meat Harvest Facilities with an Infected/Positive premises status when ASF
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presumptive or confirmed positive swine have been detected at the facility. Each
of these templates are intended to serve as a response guide for harvest facilities
during an ASF response.
Further, in collaboration with the North American Renderers’ Association and
North American Spray Dried Blood & Plasma Producers, the SPWG created two
additional ASF Response plans specific to Off-Site Rendering and Spray Dried
Blood / Plasma facilities.
These plans are a critical industry resource for implementing biosecurity practices
aimed at preventing or recovering from an onsite ASF infection. They provide
virus elimination standards following an ASF detection onsite and outline
biosecurity practices to ensure continuity of business for these facility types. To
find these templates, please go to the ASF FAD PReP website.
1.4 NATURE OF THE DISEASE/VIRUS
This is a brief introduction to ASFV, which is a complex virus with variable
clinical presentations. Further detail can be found in the FAD PReP ASF SOP:
Overview of Etiology and Ecology.
1.4.1 Overview
ASFV belongs to the Asfivirus genus of the Asfarviridae family and is an
enveloped virus with a double-stranded DNA genome. ASFV is unique, as it is
the only known arthropod-borne DNA virus. Currently, there is no vaccine
approved for emergency use in the United States.
There are 24 different genotypes and 8 serogroups of ASFV. Infection with ASFV
presents in four different clinical forms (peracute, acute, subacute, and chronic),
which are based on strain virulence, immune status, clinical signs, and gross
lesions.
Susceptible species include all members of the pig family (Suidae): domesticated
swine, feral swine, European wild boar, warthogs, bush pigs, and giant forest
hogs. While susceptible, warthogs and bush pigs are resistant to signs of clinical
disease. Some members of the Suidae family native to the Americas, such as
peccaries (Tayassu spp.), are believed to be resistant to infection.
4
4
Based on historical information, see Dardiri, A.H., Yedloutschnig, R.J., & Taylor, W.D.
(1969). Clinical and serologic response of American white-collared peccaries to African swine
fever, foot-and-mouth disease, vesicular stomatitis, vesicular exanthema of swine, hog cholera,
and rinderpest viruses. Proc Annual Meeting U.S. Animal Health Assoc. 73, 437–52.
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1.4.2 Introduction & Transmission
There are three primary modes of transmission for ASFV: direct contact, indirect
contact (fomites), and vector-borne. Direct pig-to-pig transmission occurs when
infected pigs come into contact with susceptible pigs through contact with
infectious blood, swine germplasm, excretions and secretions (e.g., saliva,
respiratory secretions, urine and feces), or pig carcasses. There is lack of evidence
that an infected pig can become a carrier and shed ASFV without showing clinical
signs.
5,6
Indirect transmission can occur through contaminated pig products or
fomites. ASFV can survive for months in pork meat, fat, and skin, and serve as a
route of transmission, e.g., through the practice of “garbage-feeding” where swine
become infected when fed contaminated food waste that has not been cooked
appropriately to inactivate the virus. Potential transmission has experimentally
been demonstrated through contaminated feed. It is also possible that ASFV can
be transmitted mechanically. A 2018 study found that, while ingested ASFV-
spiked stable flies could infect some pigs, it is unlikely that ingestion of blood-fed
flies is a common route for transmission of ASFV between wild boars or between
pigs within a stable.
7
Soft ticks (Ornithodoros spp.) are competent vectors for ASFV transmission,
passing the virus to swine hosts when taking their blood meal. In sub-Saharan
Africa, ASF is maintained through the sylvatic cycle—recurring transfer between
bushpigs, warthogs, and giant forest hogs of Africa and Ornithodoros species
ticks that live in their wallows and burrows. These pigs are inapparently infected
and act as reservoir hosts for ASFV.
8
Infected ticks are also able to transmit
ASFV to other ticks (sexual), to their offspring (transovarial), and/or from one life
cycle to another (transstadial). However, even where the sylvatic cycle exists in
East and Central African countries, the majority of ASF outbreaks are not
associated with ticks or wild suids.
9
ASFV has been shown to persist in some Ornithodoros species for more than 5
years.
10
While some Ornithodoros species are present in the United States, it is
5
Guinat, C., Gogin, A., Blome, S., Keil, G., Pollin, R., Pfeiffer, D.U., and Dixon, L. (2016).
Transmission routes of African swine fever virus to domestic pigs: current knowledge and future
research directions. Veterinary Record.178, 262-267. Doi: 10.1136/vr.103593.
6
Karl Ståhl, K., Sternberg-Lewerin, S., Blome, S., Viltrop, A., Penrith, M., Chenais, W.
(2019). Lack of evidence for long term carriers of African swine fever virus - a systematic review,
Virus Research, Vol 272.
7
Olesen, A.S., Lohse, L., Hansen, M.F., Boklund, A., Halasa, T., Belsham, G.J., … Bodker,
R. (2018). Infection of pigs with African swine fever virus via ingestion of stable flies (Stomoxys
calcitrans). Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65, 1152–1157. Doi: 10.1111/tbed.12918.
8
WOAH. (2021). African Swine Fever. Technical Disease Card.
https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/oie-african-swine-fever-technical-disease-card.pdf
9
Sánchez-Vizcaíno JM, Mur L, Bastos AD, Penrith ML. New insights into the role of ticks in
African swine fever epidemiology. Rev Sci Tech. 2015 Aug;34(2):503-11.
10
Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., Mur, L., Martinez-Lopez, B. (2012). African Swine Fever: An
Epidemiological Update. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59(Suppl. 1), 27–35.
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July 2023 1-9
unlikely they would play a significant role in transmission given the absence of a
primary wild suid reservoir host population to maintain a sylvatic cycle. Wild
boar populations have been implicated in sustained transmission of ASFV,
particularly in parts of the European Union.
11
There has only been one outbreak in
Europe where the O. erraticus tick, an Ornithodoros species not found in the
United States, played a role in viral transmission among outdoor swine farms on
the Iberian Peninsula.
12
However, Ornithodoros species of ticks do not appear to
be critical to the maintenance of ASFV in European wild boar populations.
Importantly, ticks did not play a role in ASFV transmission despite the presence
of O. puertorincensis in Haiti and the Dominican Republic during an ASF
outbreak that lasted from 1978 to 1983.
13
Ornithodoros ticks are discussed in
Section 4.12.2.
In other areas of the world, ASFV has been introduced and transmitted by illegal
movement of infected swine and contaminated products (and their contact with
naïve swine).
1.4.3 Incubation Period
The incubation period varies by exposure dose, route of transmission, and viral
strain ranging from 3–21 days. The WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code states
that the incubation period in Sus scrofa (domestic and wild swine) is 15 days.
14
A
shorter incubation period (3-4 days) is typically observed with the acute form of
disease.
When considering the incubation period for ASF, it is important to consider both
the incubation period for ASF virus in an individual pig exposed (generally 2 – 7
days
15,16
), as well as the time to detect ASF in a group or herd of pigs with respect
to clinical signs. Since ASF infection in pigs can resemble other common pig
diseases and transmission is slow within a herd, early detection through clinical
11
European Food Safety Authority. (2018). Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever
in the European Union. European Food Safety Authority Journal. 16(11), 5494.
12
Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., Mur, L., Martinez-Lopez, B. (2012). African Swine Fever: An
Epidemiological Update. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 59(Suppl. 1), 27–35.
13
Brown, V. and Bevins, S. (2018). A review of African swine fever and the potential for
introduction into the United States and the possibility of subsequent establishment in feral swine
and native ticks. Front. Vet. Sci., 06. Vol 5.
14
WOAH. (2022). Article 15.1.1. Terrestrial Animal Health Code.
https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/s
tandards/codes-and-manuals/terrestrial-code-online
access/?id=169&L=1&htmfile=chapitre_asf.htm.
15
Malladi S, Ssematimba A, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer T, Goldsmith T, Walz E,
Cardona CJ, Culhane MR. Predicting the time to detect moderately virulent African swine fever
virus in finisher swine herds using a stochastic disease transmission model. BMC Vet Res. 2022
Mar 2;18(1):84. doi: 10.1186/s12917-022-03188-6.
16
Guinat, C., Porphyre, T., Gogin, A., Dixon, L., Pfeiffer, D. U., & Gubbins, S. (2018).
Inferring within-herd transmission parameters for African swine fever virus using mortality data
from outbreaks in the Russian Federation. Transboundary and emerging diseases, 65(2), e264–
e271. https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.12748.
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July 2023 1-10
signs or passive surveillance can take an extended period of time (>20 days
17
) for
groups or herds of pigs.
1.4.4 Clinical Signs
Clinical signs vary by virus strain and disease form caused by the virus (peracute,
acute, subacute, and chronic). In swine affected with the peracute form of ASF,
death is often the first indication of disease. Swine affected with the acute form
may develop fever (105–107.6°F/40.5–42°C), anorexia, listlessness, cyanosis,
incoordination, increased pulse and respiratory rate, leukopenia, and
thrombocytopenia (at 48–72 hours), vomiting, diarrhea, and abortion in pregnant
sows.
Swine affected with subacute forms of ASF present with less intense, but similar
clinical signs including slight fever, reduced appetite, and depression. Abortion in
pregnant sows is also possible. Swine infected with the chronic form of the virus
typically exhibit appetite loss, transient low fever, respiratory signs, necrosis of
the skin, chronic skin ulcers, and swelling of the joints. They also can experience
recurring episodes of disease, which could eventually lead to death.
18
Table 1-1
summarizes these signs.
Table 1-1. Clinical Signs Caused by the Different Forms of ASF
17
Ssematimba A, Malladi S, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer TC, Goldsmith T, Cardona
CJ, Corzo CA, Culhane MR. African swine fever detection and transmission estimates using
homogeneous versus heterogeneous model formulation in stochastic simulations within pig
premises. Open Vet J. 2022 Nov-Dec;12(6):787-796. doi: 10.5455/OVJ.2022.v12.i6.2.
18
Petrov, A. et al. (2018). No evidence for long-term carrier status of pigs after African swine
fever virus infection. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65(5), 1318–1328.
Peracute
Acute
Subacute
Chronic
Virulence of
strain
High
High
Moderate to low
Low
Immune
status
Death before
seroconversion
Many die before seroconversion
Seropositive
Seropositive
Clinical signs
Often found
moribund or
dead
Febrile (40.5°C–41.5°C), leukopenia,
anorexia, blood in feces, reluctant to
move, abortion in sows, erythemic
skin progressing to cyanosis near
death
Variable but typically similar
to, though less severe than,
acute ASF
Mild fever for 2–3 weeks;
pregnant sows may abort;
reddened then dark,
raised, dry, and necrotic
skin lesions, especially
over pressure points
Gross
lesions
Death occurs
before distinct
lesions form
Spleen enlarged (up to 3 times
normal), dark and friable; multiple
hemorrhages of internal organs,
especially kidneys and heart;
hemorrhagic lymph nodes; edema of
gall bladder and lungs; congestion of
meninges and choroid plexus
Lesions are similar but milder
than acute ASF; spleen may
be 1.5 times normal size;
lymph nodes enlarge but only
mildly hemorrhagic; few
petechia on kidneys
Fibrinous pleuritis, pleural
adhesions, caseous
pneumonia, hyperplastic
lymphoreticular tissues,
nonseptic fibrinous
pericarditis, necrotic skin
lesions
Adapted from: Kleiboeker, S.B. (2002). Swine fever: Classical swine fever and African swine fever. Vet Clin Food Anim 18, 431–451.
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1.4.5 Morbidity and Mortality
For all forms of the disease, morbidity rates are very high. Mortality rates vary by
form. For the peracute form, mortality can reach 100 percent and occur in the
absence of any clinical signs within 7–10 days after exposure to the virus. The
acute form is also associated with mortality rates that approach 100 percent, often
with death occurring within 6–13 days post inoculation. The mortality rate for the
subacute form is dependent on the age of the affected populations; younger pigs
have higher rates (70–80 percent), while older pigs experience significantly lower
rates (less than 20 percent). For those affected by the chronic form of ASF,
mortality is typically low.
1.4.6 Differential Diagnosis
Detection of ASF upon introduction is complex, due to its current clinical
presentations throughout the world and resemblance to various production
diseases present within the United States. When considering a potential diagnosis
of ASF in the United States, the following diseases should also be included in the
differential diagnosis:
19
Classical swine fever,
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome,
Erysipelas,
Salmonellosis,
Aujeszky’s disease (or pseudorabies) in younger swine,
Pasteurellosis, and
Other septicemic conditions.
1.4.7 Persistence of ASFV
ASFV is a very resilient virus that can withstand low temperatures, fluctuations in
pH, and remain viable for long periods in tissues and bodily fluids. Table 1-2
provides a breakdown of ASFV resistance to physical and chemical action based
on the WOAH ASF Disease Card. These factors must be considered when
determining appropriate response strategies, including disinfection
20
techniques.
19
WOAH. (2021). African Swine Fever. Technical Disease Card.
https://www.woah.org/app/uploads/2021/03/oie-african-swine-fever-technical-disease-card.pdf.
20
www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergency-management/CT_disinfectants
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Table 1-2. Resistance of ASFV to Physical and Chemical Action
Source: WOAH Technical Disease Card for African Swine Fever, 2021.
Action Resistance
Temperature
Highly resistant to low temperatures. Heat inactivated by 56°C
or 132.8°F/70 minutes; 60°C or 140°F/20 minutes. This
WOAH guidance must be adapted and validated for field
conditions where use of these temperatures may not be
feasible.
pH
Inactivated by pH < 3.9 or > 11.5 in serum-free medium.
Serum increases the resistance of the virus, e.g., at pH
13.4—resistance lasts up to 21 hours without serum, and 7
days with serum.
Chemicals/disinfectants Susceptible to ether and chloroform. Inactivated by 8/1000
sodium hydroxide (30 minutes), hypochlorites— between 0.03
percent and 0.5 percent chlorine (30 minutes), 3/1000
formalin (30 minutes), 3 percent ortho-phenylphenol (30
minutes) and iodine compounds. Note: disinfectant activity
may vary depending on the pH, time of storage and organic
content.
Survival Remains viable for long periods in blood, feces, and tissues;
especially infected uncooked or undercooked pork products.
Can multiply in vectors (Ornithodoros sp.).
October 2023
2-1
Chapter 2
Framework for ASF Preparedness and
Response
2.1 FOUNDATION OF PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
FAD PReP, including this ASF-specific plan, provides information and specific
guidance on response requirements for an outbreak in the United States. FAD PReP
documents are consistent with emergency preparedness and response principles
found in the National Response Framework (NRF) and in the NIMS.
As mentioned early in Chapter 1, this document does not provide, in detail, general
incident coordination and FAD response. For more information on aspects
discussed in Chapter 2, please refer to the APHIS Foreign Animal Disease
Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP Manual 1-0) and the APHIS
Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Response Strategies (FAD PReP Manual 2-0).
2.2 USDA AUTHORITIES
2.2.1 The Animal Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 8301
et seq.
The Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA), 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., authorizes
the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict the importation, entry, or further movement
in the United States or order the destruction or removal of animals and related
conveyances and facilities to prevent the introduction or dissemination of
livestock pests or diseases. It authorizes related activities with respect to
exportation, interstate movement, cooperative agreements, enforcement and
penalties, seizure, quarantine, and disease and pest eradication. The Act also
authorizes the Secretary to establish a veterinary accreditation program and enter
into reimbursable fee agreements for pre-clearance abroad of animals or articles
for movement into the United States.
Section 421 of the Homeland Security Act, 6 U.S. Code 231 transfers to the
Secretary of Homeland Security certain agricultural import and entry inspection
functions under the AHPA, including the authority to enforce the prohibitions or
restrictions imposed by USDA.
Additionally, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) gives the APHIS
Administrator authority to determine the existence of disease and the authority to
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prevent the spread of disease through the destruction and/or disinfection of
animals, eggs, and materials as appropriate. As such, it also authorizes APHIS to
appraise and indemnify animals and materials destroyed, provided certain
conditions are met; these conditions include complying with quarantines, adhering
to proper biosecurity protocols, and accurately designating payments between
contract growers and owners of animals (9 CFR 53).
2.2.1.1 EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY
The AHPA also authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture—after notice to review
and consultation with certain State or Tribal officials—to declare that an
extraordinary emergency exists because of the presence of a pest or disease of
livestock and because this presence threatens the livestock of the United States (7
U.S. Code 8306). This provides the Secretary with additional authority to hold,
seize, treat, apply other remedial actions to destroy (including preventively
slaughter) or otherwise dispose of any animal, article, facility, or means of
conveyance; and prohibit or restrict the movement or use within a State, or any
portion of a State, of any animal or article, means of conveyance, or facility. Per
this same section (7 U.S. Code 8306(d)(1)), the Secretary is required to
compensate the owner of any animal, article, facility, or means of conveyance the
Secretary requires to be destroyed unless certain conditions are met (these
exceptions are listed in 7 U.S. Code 8306(d)(3). If the owner fails to comply with
such an order, the Secretary may take similar action and recover from the owner
the costs of such action (7 U.S. Code 8306(c)).
The written declaration of Extraordinary Emergency lists specific activities
USDA plans to bring to the State(s). It is not used as a high-handed usurpation of
State authority; rather, it can support the State where its authorities are unclear. In
an ASF outbreak, USDA will consider declaring an Extraordinary Emergency to
allow States to enforce a 72-hour National Movement Standstill of live swine.
Another use may be to readily access and conduct response activities on lands
where feral swine are known or suspected to be infected with ASF; especially in
States which have a patchwork of laws administered through multiple agencies or
departments—Agriculture, Fish & Wildlife, Natural Resources, Game, etc.
Additionally, the federal authority to access private properties with feral swine
may be needed, and the declaration could be written to include that.
2.2.2 The Swine Health Protection Act, 7 U.S. Code 3801 et
seq.
The Swine Health Protection Act (SHPA), 7 U.S. Code 3801 et seq., authorizes
the Secretary of Agriculture in cooperation with States and other jurisdictions to
regulate the treatment and feeding of garbage to swine. Untreated garbage serves
as media where numerous infectious diseases, such as ASF, could be transmitted
via improperly treated garbage. The SHPA and regulations found in 9 CFR 166
contain provisions that prohibit persons from feeding waste unless properly
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July 2023 2-3
treated to kill disease organisms. Those who feed waste are required to hold a
valid license except under certain circumstances outlined in 9 CFR 166. In
addition, § 166.2(c) states that these regulations shall not be construed to repeal or
supersede State law that prohibit the feeding of garbage to swine.
2.3 USDA APHIS VS GUIDANCE
2.3.1 Procedures and Policy for an ASF Investigation, VS
Guidance 12001.4
21
VS Guidance Document 12001.4: Procedures and Policy for Investigation of
Potential FAD/EDI provides guidance for the investigation of potential
FAD/emerging disease incidents. There is also a FAD PReP Ready Reference
Guide on VS Guidance 12001.4 to assist responders during the initial disease
investigation.
2.3.2 Animal Health Policy in Relation to Feral Swine
When APHIS policy supports eradication of an infectious agent/disease/vector,
APHIS VS will seek measures, through 1) movement and testing requirements; 2)
herd plans; and 3) emergency response plans to keep feral swine and domestic
pigs apart and to eradicate ASF from potential reservoirs when eradication is
deemed technically feasible. If eradication is not technically feasible at the time,
measures must be taken to keep these potential reservoirs (feral swine) separate
from domestic pigs. APHIS Wildlife Services (WS) will monitor feral swine for
ASF by testing serum and whole blood samples collected in conjunction with
routine activities to reduce crop damage. As sick and dead feral swine are located
due to non-traumatic events (e.g., disease starvation, old age) APHIS VS will test
for ASF by viral antigen through FAD investigations. APHIS WS will collaborate
with the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) and State Animal Health Official
(SAHO) to initiate related FAD investigations. Consistent surveillance and
monitoring activities through APHIS VS’ Swine Hemorrhagic Fevers Integrated
Surveillance Plan will increase the likelihood of early detection for ASF by
rapidly locating and testing sick and dead feral swine.
APHIS recognizes that depending on the State(s), the authority and responsibility
for managing feral swine may vary. Primary authority may either be under fish
and wildlife management agencies, agriculture agencies, or there is no clear
authority designated. However, VS has statutory authority under the AHPA to
implement disease control and/or eradication actions for wildlife and feral swine
under certain conditions.
Should wildlife or feral swine be affected by the control and eradication measures
proposed by the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary will consult with the
State agency having authority for protection and management of such wildlife.
21
12
001.4 refers to the latest sequential version as of the published date of this response plan.
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2.4 USDA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OVERVIEW
Understanding the roles and responsibilities of Federal departments or agencies
involved in responding to a FAD incident helps with the effectiveness of a
coordinated emergency response. USDA APHIS responds to animal and
agricultural health issues under USDA statutory authority and is the primary
agency responsible for coordinating response efforts to assist State and local
governments, farmer's associations and similar organizations during an FAD
incident affecting domestic livestock or poultry in accordance with 7 CFR
371.4(b)(5). Incidents will be handled in cooperation with States, Tribes, and
local governments.
Federal response to the detection of an FAD such as ASF is based on the response
structure of NIMS as outlined in the NRF, which defines Federal departmental
responsibilities for sector-specific responses. During an ASF outbreak, the USDA
may request Federal-to-Federal (FFS)
22
support from other Federal departments
and agencies.
If the President declares an emergency or major disaster, or if the Secretary of
Agriculture requests the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead
coordination, the Secretary of Homeland Security and DHS assume the lead for
coordinating Federal resources. USDA maintains the lead of overall incident
management. If an ASF outbreak occurs in the United States, the planning
assumption is that the Secretary of Agriculture will declare an extraordinary
emergency.
2.5 USDA APHIS INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
In an ASF incident or outbreak, USDA APHIS provides National Incident
Management Teams (NIMT), coordinates the incident response, manages public
messages, and takes measures to control and eradicate ASF. It is critical that
effective and efficient whole community situation management and clear
communication pathways are employed for a successful response effort.
Synchronized management and organizational structure support control and
eradication actions taken during an ASF outbreak. Accordingly, APHIS employs
NIMS and the Incident Command System (ICS) organizational structures to
manage an ASF response. ICS is designed to enable efficient and effective
domestic incident management by integrating facilities, equipment, personnel,
procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational
structure.
22
FFS refers to the circumstance in which a Federal department or agency requests Federal
resource support under the NRF that is not addressed by the Stafford Act or another mechanism.
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Details for implementing ASF response activities for domestic pig and feral swine
in the field will be available on the ASF FAD PReP website.
2.5.1 Incident Management Structure
The APHIS Administrator is the Federal executive responsible for implementing
APHIS policy during an ASF outbreak; the Administrator is supported by the
APHIS Management Team (AMT) and the Emergency Preparedness Committee
(EPC).
During any significant APHIS-led emergency response, the lead Program Area
Deputy Administrator or Associate Deputy Administrator(s), and/or Director of
the Emergency, Management, Safety, and Security Division (EMSSD) (who is
also the Chair of the APHIS EPC) are authorized to approach the APHIS Office
of the Administrator (OA) to recommend that an APHIS Multiagency
Coordination (MAC) group be stood up to support ongoing response. Many of the
MAC functions may be delegated to the VS Deputy Administrator (VSDA), who
is the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) of the United States. The VSDA is
supported by the VS Executive Team (VSET) to coordinate policy.
An APHIS National Incident Coordination Group (ICG), led by an Incident
Coordinator and a Deputy Incident Coordinator, is immediately established to
oversee the functions and response activities associated with the incident. This
ICG is flexible and scalable to the size and scope of the incident and works
closely with unified Incident Command (IC) field personnel, in a unified Incident
Management Team (IMT). The ICG also coordinates with any MAC Group that is
established at the APHIS or USDA level, based on the specific incident. For
example, in the 2022-2023 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreak in the
United States, the APHIS MAC Group was formed due to the size, scope, and
impact of the incident.
In addition to policy and incident coordination, the APHIS Administrator, AMT,
the VSDA, and VSET communicate, collaborate, and coordinate with relevant
industry associations, the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials and
National Association of State Departments of Agriculture, public health agencies
(Federal and State), and other partners in a whole community approach.
2.5.2 Field Organization
At the beginning of an incident, the SAHO or designee, and the VS AVIC, or
designee, initially serve as Co-Incident Commanders in a unified IC Structure.
The AVIC will be relieved when a State and/or APHIS IMT is stood up, and an
Incident Command Post (ICP) is established. In a large ASF incident, there may
be multiple ICPs and full VS NIMTs may not be dispatched to each location; to-
date, VS has five standing NIMTs. In any situation, ICPs will remain a unified
State-Federal IC organizational structure.
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July 2023 2-6
If the outbreak involves more than one incident, more than one IC is likely to be
established. An Area Command (AC) may also be established. In this case,
individual Incident Commanders responsible for potentially multiple unified
IMTs would report to the AC. AC organizational structures may not be
established or appropriate in all incidents; in many cases, the ICG will perform
the same functions as an AC. For more information on a single incident and
multiple incident coordination along with a full NIMT configurations, see APHIS
Foreign Animal Disease Framework: Roles and Coordination (FAD PReP
Manual 1-0).
July 2023 3-1
Chapter 3
ASF Outbreak Response Goals and Strategy
3.1 RESPONSE GOALS
The APHIS goals of an ASF response are to (1) detect, control, and contain ASF
in swine as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate ASF using strategies that seek to
stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and to protect public
health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches
and systems to facilitate continuity of business (COB) for non-infected animals
and non-contaminated animal products.
Achieving these three goals will allow individual livestock facilities, States,
Tribes, regions, and industries to resume normal production as quickly as
possible. They will also allow the United States to regain ASF-free status without
the response effort causing more disruption and damage than the outbreak itself.
3.2 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES
The control and eradication of ASF in swine is based on four epidemiological
principles:
1. Prevent contact between ASFV and swine. This is accomplished
through:
a. quarantine of infected swine and movement controls in the Control
Area (Infected Zone [IZ] + Buffer Zone [BZ]),
b. aggressive contact tracing of the Infected Premises, including
premises epidemiologically-linked through a network relationship,
where appropriate, and
c. enhanced biosecurity procedures that include preventing contact
between feral swine and domestic pigs.
2. Stop the production of ASFV by infected or exposed swine. This is
accomplished by mass depopulation (and disposal) of infected and
potentially infected swine; prioritization may increase effectiveness.
3. Prevent the transmission of ASFV by vectors.
4. Prevent ASFV from becoming established in feral swine populations.
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3.3 CONTROL AND ERADICATION STRATEGIES
The United States’ control and eradication strategy for ASF in swine is based on
international standards and USDA APHIS FAD PReP response standards.
1. Quarantine Infected Premises.
2. Establish Control Areas (movement controls) around Infected Premises.
3. Conduct aggressive contact tracing of Infected Premises, including premises
epi-linked through a network relationship, where appropriate.
4. Conduct stamping-out to eradicate ASF virus.
5. Conduct surveillance in Control Areas and Free Areas.
6. Implement enhanced biosecurity.
7. Consider vaccination; however, there is currently no vaccine approved for
emergency use in the United States for ASFV in swine.
APHIS acknowledges there may be significant challenges in controlling and
eradicating ASF, depending on the outbreak (e.g., if feral swine are infected). In
any instance, movement control measures are critical since ASF is easily spread
by infected swine and contaminated fomites. It is essential movement controls are
science- and risk-based to minimize disruption to normal business and to facilitate
the appropriate allocation of incident resources. To assist in doing so, contact
tracing will be emphasized in addition to the standard Control Area movement
controls. Contact Premises outside of the Control Area will be aggressively
investigated in order to rapidly detect new cases.
3.3.1 Defining Stamping-Out as a Response Strategy
For ASF, stamping-out is the depopulation of clinically affected swine and, as
appropriate, swine exposed to the virus. Depopulation and disposal of Infected
Premises or Pigs must be conducted in a biosecure manner to prevent further
disease spread. Box 3-1 lists the key elements of stamping-out. Further detail on
Depopulation, Disposal, and Decontamination (3D) activities are discussed in
Section 4.11.
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October 2023 3-3
Box 3-1. ASF Stamping-Out Strategy
3.3.1.1 WOAH DEFINITION OF STAMPING-OUT
“Stamping-out” is defined in the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2022)
Glossary, as:
a policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the
authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: (a) the killing of the
animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected in the
herd or flock and, where appropriate, those in other herds or flocks which
have been exposed to infection by direct animal to animal contact, or by
indirect contact with the causal pathogenic agent; animals should be killed
in accordance with Chapter 7.6
; (b) the disposal of carcasses and, where
relevant, animal products by rendering, burning or burial, or by any other
method described in Chapter 4.13; (c) the cleansing and disinfection of
establishments through procedures defined in Chapter 4.14.
3.3.2 Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out
Figure 3-1 illustrates an example of a stamping-out strategy where an Infected
Premises or an infected feral swine are depopulated. See Section 4.5.1 for further
information on zones and areas for an ASF outbreak response.
Stamping-Out Critical Goals
• After the identification of an Infected Premises or Pig, all infected swine will be
depopulated in the safest
and most humane way possible.
• As a general goal, APHIS recommends that depopulation and disposal activities be
completed as soon as possible after approval for indemnity payment. That said,
identifying a specific depopulation response time goal is not an absolute requirement.
• Assessing possible depopulation and disposal of swine on any farm location will require
proper planning and resources to ensure health and safety of the owner, grower and
responders, and proper planning and resources will be needed to ensure animal welfare.
In some cases, other swine, such as those on Contact Premises, may also be
depopulated.
• To be most effective in stopping disease transmission, it may be necessary to prioritize
depopulation (of premises or even within a single premises) based on clinical signs and
epidemiological information.
• Public concerns about stamping-out require a well-planned and proactive public
relations liaison campaign.
• Care should be taken to consider the mental health implications for owners and
responders.
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Figure 3-1. Example of Zones and Areas in Relation to Stamping-Out
3.3.3 Zones and Areas in Relation to Contact Tracing
Figure 3-2 illustrates an example of an epidemiologic network where contact
tracing from the first Infected Premises (IP1) identified an epidemiologically-
linked Contact Premises outside of the initial Control Area. This additional
Infected Premises (IP2) triggered a new Control Area that led to additional
Contact Premises. All high-risk direct Contact Premises that are traced from/to an
Infected Premises are subject to immediate investigation and State quarantines.
Figure 3-2. Example of Contact Tracing in an ASF Outbreak
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3.3.4 Control and Eradication of ASF in Domestic Pigs
In the event ASF is detected in domestic pigs,
23
the control and eradication
strategy is (as noted in Section 3.1):
1) Quarantine Infected Premises.
2) Establish Control Areas (movement controls) around Infected Premises.
3) Conduct aggressive contact tracing of Infected Premises, including
premises epi-linked through a network relationship, where appropriate.
4) Conduct stamping-out to eradicate ASF virus.
5) Conduct surveillance in Control Areas and Free Areas.
6) Implement enhanced biosecurity.
This section will focus on control strategies in domestic pigs, for further
information on stamping-out refer to Section 3.3.2 and Section 4.11.1.
The primary control strategy in domestic pigs focuses on preventing ASFV from
coming in contact with susceptible swine. This is accomplished through the
establishment of Control Areas, supported by quarantine and movement controls,
along with enhanced biosecurity efforts. The size and number of Control Areas
will vary based upon the population(s) infected (commercial, backyard, or feral),
the epidemiological information available, and the risk of ASFV transmission
through swine, fomites, or vectors. In any situation, a positive ASF detection
would require a minimum Control Area with a 5-kilometer radius, consisting of a
3-kilometer IZ and a 2-kilometer BZ. In addition, there is a 5-kilometer
Surveillance Zone (SZ) in the Free Area surrounding the Control Area.
Ongoing literature on the sizes of these zones is being developed by APHIS VS
Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) and will be posted on the
ASF FAD PReP website, once available.
A full epidemiological assessment must be completed in order to determine the
extent of the outbreak, which includes the identification and prioritization of
epidemiologically-linked Contact Premises and surveillance for contact, sick and
dead feral swine. Feral swine found near ASF infected domestic pigs may be
depopulated. All domestic pig premises, infected or not, should take additional
biosecurity precautions to prevent contact between feral swine and domestic pigs.
23
See Appendix A for a complete list of definitions.
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3.3.5 Control and Eradication of ASF in Feral Swine
In the event ASF is detected in feral swine, the control and eradication strategy is:
1. Establish Control Areas around infected feral swine (location on the
landscape). Domestic pig premises in the feral swine Control Area will be
subject to movement controls.
2. Conduct aggressive epidemiological investigation.
3. Increase separation between feral swine and domestic pigs in the Control
Area.
The primary eradication strategy is the stamping-out of infected feral swine
followed by population reduction. This is essentially the same strategy as in
domestic pigs; however, implementation varies due to the differences between
production-based systems and feral swine. This section will focus on control
strategies in feral swine, for further information on stamping-out refer to Section
3.3.2 and Section 4.12.1.
Control of ASF in feral swine focuses on limiting viral spread and transmission
through the establishment of Control Areas that encompass the home range of the
infected feral swine. At a minimum, the Control Area surrounding the infected
feral swine will have a 5-kilometer radius, consisting of a 3-kilometer IZ and a 2-
kilometer BZ. In addition, there is a 5-kilometer SZ in the Free Area surrounding
the Control Area. A larger Control Area may be needed depending upon the
estimated home range of the feral swine.
Like ASF control in domestic pigs, Control Areas for feral swine are dependent
upon the epidemiological requirements of the outbreak. Feral swine will have
additional epidemiological considerations. They are free-ranging animals that
cannot be “quarantined” and primarily move within defined or estimated home
ranges. The home range of feral swine populations can vary widely and are
influenced by the availability of food and water resources, as well as by their sex.
ASF is thought to move slowly through wild boar populations in Europe, with
estimates suggesting rates of spread at 0.7 to 1.5 kilometers per month.
24,25
The
relatively slow rate of spread should allow the initial response to focus on intense
on-the-ground surveillance to determine the extent of infection within populations
24
Podgórski, T., and Śmietanka, K. (2018). Do wild boar movements drive the spread of
African swine fever? Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, 65(6), 1588–1596. Doi:
10.1111/tbed.12910.
25
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Boklund, A., Cay, B., Depner, K., Földi, Z.,
Guberti, V., ... & Šatrán, P. (2018). Epidemiological analyses of African swine fever in the
European Union (November 2017 until November 16(11), e05494. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5494.
2018). EFSA Journal,
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so that adequately-sized Control Areas can be established and adjusted as
necessary.
The establishment of Control Areas and zones will delineate where management
actions occur. Feral swine within Control Areas will be removed and tested in
accordance with incident depopulation efforts. Additional essential activities
include strategic population reduction, public outreach, targeted surveillance, and
surveillance for dead pigs. Any carcasses found within a Control Area will be
tested and disposed of properly in accordance with applicable State and Federal
environmental laws unless access to their location would require considerable
resources. Immediate carcass removal and proper disposal is key in preventing the
spread of ASFV through feral swine populations. Recent work suggests that more
than 50 percent of ASF transmission in wild boar can be carcass-based.
26
Analytical tools that estimate local feral swine population abundance in the
United States and optimal culling radius will be used to help refine control and
eradication strategies.
27,28,29
Chapter 4 provides further information on designations of feral swine zones, and
areas (Section 4.5.1), in addition to management activities (Section 4.13) that
occur within those designations to control and eradicate ASF.
3.4 INITIAL RESPONSE ACTIONS
3.4.1 Authorization for Response and Associated Activities
When the criteria for a presumptive positive ASF case have been met (see
Chapter 4 for case definitions), the APHIS Administrator or the VSDA (CVO of
the United States) can authorize APHIS personnel—in conjunction with State,
Tribal and unified IC personnel—to initiate certain response activities of the
index case (Infected Premises or Infected Pig), including an epidemiological
investigation of Contact Premises.
26
Pepin, K.M., et al. Unpublished.
27
Pepin, K. M., Brown, V. R., Yang, A., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., VerCauteren, K.
C., Miller, R. S., & Bevins, S. N. (2022). Optimising response to an introduction of African swine
fever in wild pigs. Transboundary and Emerging Diseases, 69, e3111– e3127.
28
Tabak, M. A., Piaggio, A. J., Miller, R. S., Sweitzer, R. A., & Ernest, H. B. (2017).
Anthropogenic factors predict movement of an invasive species. Ecosphere, 8(6), e01844. Doi:
10.1002/ecs2.1844.
29
Lewis, J. S., Corn, J. L., Mayer, J. J., Jordan, T. R., Farnsworth, M. L., Burdett, C. L., ... &
Miller, R. S. (2019). Historical, current, and potential population size estimates of invasive wild
pigs (Sus scrofa) in the United States. Biological Invasions, 21(7), 2373-2384. Doi:
10.1007/s10530-019-01983-1.
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reak Response Goals and Strategy
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Upon ASFV confirmation in domestic pigs by the National Veterinary Services
Laboratories (NVSL) Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL),
the Secretary of Agriculture will
Take immediate steps to declare an Extraordinary Emergency (refer
to Section 2.2.1.1) (if the ASFV confirmation involves domestic pigs);
Issue a 72-hour National Movement Standstill (if the ASFV
confirmation involves domestic pigs);
Authorize indemnity for depopulation of Infected Premises in
conjunction with APHIS, State, and Tribal animal health officials
according to the depopulation methods allowed by the American
Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA); and
Authorize payment for virus elimination at a uniform, flat rate, based
on the size of the affected premises.
In the event of an NVSL-confirmed detection of ASF virus not involving domestic
pigs but in feral swine only, USDA will not automatically execute a 72-hour
National Movement Standstill. Instead, USDA and affected State(s) will establish
initial Control Area(s) and Surveillance Zone(s) appropriate for the conditions of the
detection. However, if there is an epidemiological circumstance that associates
domestic pigs with the feral swine detection, USDA will implement a National
Movement Standstill. An example of such a circumstance will be a detection in feral
swine located or situated in a domestic pig epidemiological risk situation (such as
feral swine commingled on a domestic pig premises or feral swine commingled at a
buying station).
A confirmed positive ASF detection in domestic pig or feral swine will immediately
impact international movements (exports); APHIS and
Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) should be consulted to determine trade/ export impacts of any ASF
detection. For more information, see the APHIS Exports website
.
ASFV is transmitted to swine only through close contact (not aerosol transmission)
and is not zoonotic. Therefore, APHIS and State Animal Health Officials will focus
on initial quarantine, site biosecurity, and aggressive contact tracing as critical
priorities measures to contain the outbreak. The authorization for indemnity and
subsequent swine depopulation activities will occur after those initial steps.
The primary driver of indemnity policy will be the availability of sufficient funds
through the duration of an ASF outbreak. Additional considerations include the
regulatory requirement for confirmation, degree of confidence in any National
Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) non-negative ASF diagnostic test
result, and application of the APHIS Case Definition for ASF (see Section 4.2.1.2
) ,
which provides guidance for evaluating diagnostic test results and swine clinical
signs to assign a regulatory status of suspect case, presumptive positive case, or
confirmed positive case. Finally, indemnity authorization depends upon the
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submission of an indemnity request – including all required recordkeeping documents
(e.g., mortality sheets, herd inventory logs, etc.) for appraisal.
The following sections provide further detail on the initial response actions taken
for ASF outbreak.
3.4.2 Coordinated Public Awareness Campaign
If ASF is detected in the United States, a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be
established to organize, integrate, and coordinate information to ensure consistent
messaging across multiple jurisdictions and disciplines. APHIS Legislative and
Public Affairs (LPA)—the primary liaison for an ASF outbreak—and the USDA
Office of Communications will invite State, local, and industry communicators to
participate.
A public awareness campaign must be effectively coordinated with the creation
and distribution of audience-appropriate information. Effective communication
and messaging are among the most important critical activities to the overall ASF
effort.
ASF communication objectives must
furnish accurate, timely, and consistent information;
maintain credibility and instill public confidence in the government’s
ability to respond to an outbreak;
minimize public panic and fear; and
address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as
possible.
Box 3-2 provides key messages that should be emphasized and reinforced by
communications personnel during an ASF outbreak.
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Box 3-2. Key Communication Messages in an ASF Outbreak
Al
l personnel involved in an incident—from executive leadership to field
responders—must be cognizant of the impact of social media. While it can be a
useful tool in disseminating information or even gathering intelligence, it can also put
a spotlight on a single aspect or episode of an event that misrepresents the whole of
the effort. This threatens the intended public message, as well as the safety of
responders and the progress, if not the success, of the response operation.
Any Agency-initiated social media for the incident must be done thoughtfully and
coordinated through the on-site Public Information Officer and LPA. Responders
should never use personal social media accounts to discuss the incident.
3.4.3 Regulatory Movement Controls
Upon strong suspicion of ASF on a domestic pig premises during an FAD
investigation, a temporary hold order or quarantine will be immediately issued by
State authority, or Tribal authority. Confirmation of ASF by NVSL is not
necessary for States, or Tribes, to implement quarantines and/or movement
controls on individual premises during an investigation.
With NVSL confirmatory results, the SAHO will issue an official quarantine. A
Federal quarantine (under the AHPA and CFR authorities) may also be issued, if
requested by the SAHO or directed by the Secretary of Agriculture. The Incident
Commander will work with the Operations Section and the Planning Section to
Key Communication Messages
• We are responding quickly and decisively to eradicate the virus.
• ASF does not affect human health and cannot be transmitted from pigs to humans.
• ASF is not a food safety concern—properly prepared meat is safe to eat.
• We are safeguarding animal agriculture and the food supply.
Ad
ditional key messages for producers
• Protect your herd with good biosecurity practices and be vigilant in reporting signs of illness to
your veterinarian, or State or Federal animal health official.
• Update your biosecurity plan and implement an ongoing African swine fever training program for
personnel.
• Restrict access to production sites.
• Enhance employee biosecurity practices.
• Ensure strict movement-of-animal protocols.
• Prevent feed contamination and control wildlife, rodents, and flies.
• Put in place proper carcass disposal and manure management practices.
For
more information on fighting African swine fever, visit Protect Our Pigs
Tr
ade restrictions will be communicated via APHIS and FSIS. For more information, see the
APHIS Exports website.
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determine and establish zone, area, and premises designations during an ASF
outbreak. These designations are captured in the Emergency Management
Response System 2.0 (EMRS2)—the official system of record for permits and
permitted movements made into, within, and out of ASF Control Areas.
Each State has different quarantine authorities; therefore, each State’s animal
health emergency response plan should describe the implementation of
quarantines and movement controls. Due to the highly integrated nature of the
swine industry, it will also be necessary to consider swine interstate movements.
3.4.3.1 NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL
See ASF Response Policy USDA Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency & 72-
hour National Movement Standstill, dated July 10, 2023.
A National Movement Standstill is a complete stop in live swine movement or
dead pigs to rendering across the entire United States mainland. This does not
include pork meat or pork products, swine germplasm, or feed. It is primarily
intended to allow States, Tribes, and industry to gather initial critical information
for a unified approach to an ASF response, while inhibiting further virus
transmission before effective disease control measures can be successfully
implemented. Upon confirmation of ASF in domestic pigs, USDA will issue a
National Movement Standstill for 72 hours in the contiguous United States via
Federal Order. USDA APHIS will further provide notification to State animal
health officials, industry associations and through a press release, the APHIS
website (www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep), and the agency’s social media accounts.
In the event of an NVSL confirmed detection of ASFV in feral swine only (a
detection not involving domestic pigs), USDA will not automatically execute a
72-hour National Movement Standstill. USDA and affected State(s) will establish
Control Area(s) and Surveillance Zone(s). However, international movement will
be impacted. Trade restrictions will be communicated via APHIS and FSIS. For
more information, see the APHIS Exports website.
USDA will execute a 72-hour National Movement Standstill upon a detection of
ASFV in feral swine if there is an epidemiological circumstance requiring such
action. An example of such a circumstance will be a detection in feral pigs located
or situated in domestic pig epidemiological risk situation (such as feral pigs
commingled on a domestic pig premises or feral pigs commingled at a buying
station).
In the event of a National Movement Standstill, USDA will provide clear, concise
requirements for its implementation, and make the notice easily accessible to all
stakeholders. Specifications of issuance will at least be defined for:
a specific geographical area or boundary (e.g., National or other);
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a specific requirement that all live swine in transit at issuance must
reach a destination;
specific start and stop times indicating the duration of a standstill;
a specific list of what items are restricted from movement (e.g., live
swine; deadstock removal); and
a specific list of what items are exempt from movement restrictions
(e.g., negligible risk FSIS-inspected products).
The National Movement Standstill prohibits movement of live swine nationwide.
for both domestic movement and international movement (exports) (see National
Movement Standstill on the ASF FAD PReP website). Additionally, it prohibits
swine deadstock removal services, as this is considered a high-risk activity for
potential disease spread. In the interest of animal welfare, USDA does not require
or recommend that feed deliveries be prohibited in a movement standstill.
During the 72-hour period, APHIS and SAHOs will consider and allow critical
low risk movements. APHIS VS will collaborate with States and the private
sector to identify Control Areas, which will subsequently require permits for any
movements and on plans for resumption of movement in the Free Area. Prior to
the end of the 72-hour period, at approximately 48 hours, APHIS VS will confirm
the anticipated end of the standstill order, or announce any intention to extend it,
through the notification avenues referenced above (See Section 3.6 for additional
information on resumption of movement). Allowance for resumption of
international movements (exports) will be communicated via the APHIS Exports
website.
Quarantine and movement controls are critical to stopping disease transmission,
particularly for ASF. State, Tribal, and APHIS officials must carefully weigh the
risk of disease transmission against the need for critical movements (e.g., feed)
and business continuity. A National Movement Standstill only works if all parties
involved understand the reasons and goals for a movement standstill—and have
planned for it.
Note: Policy issued during an incident or outbreak will be posted on the ASF
FAD PreP website and will supersede these general specifications.
3.4.4 Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response
After the detection of ASF in the United States, specific actions must occur as
seen in Figure 3-3. These critical tasks are fundamental to the rapid control and
containment of ASF. Figure 3-3 delineates many of the most important tasks and
activities but is not all-inclusive. Each response effort is different and may create
unique challenges.
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Figure 3-3. Initial Critical Activities of an ASF Response
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3.5 MOVEMENT CONTROL POST STANDSTILL
The release of a National Movement Standstill does not mean that all USDA and
State movement restrictions have been lifted, signifying the resumption of normal
movement. States will have issued initial quarantines and established Control
Areas, as necessary, to contain and control disease spread. Live swine, dead
swine, and potential ASF fomite movements into, within, and out of a Control
Area will require a permit. The Incident Management Team and States will
evaluate and approve permits for live swine, dead swine, and potential ASF
fomite movements. Any permits for interstate commerce must be approved by the
origin and destination SAHOs.
While quarantine and movement controls are highly effective at limiting the
spread of disease, they also impede normal business operations. Varying
restrictions and requirements for live swine or product movement can be expected
by non-infected States; therefore, impacting non-infected operations. The
implementation of continuity of business (COB) plans is essential to assist with
the managed movement of non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal
products. All States, infected or not, should anticipate the influx of permit
requests once a standstill is lifted.
Information about allowance for international movements (exports) will be
communicated via APHIS and FSIS. For more information, see the APHIS
Exports website.
3.6 HOUR 73: RESPONSE OPTIONS FOLLOWING A
72-HOUR NATIONAL MOVEMENT STANDSTILL
See ASF Response Policy, Hour 73: Response Options for Resumption of Swine
Movements following 72-hour National Movement Standstill, dated May 15, 2023.
Upon conclusion of the 72-hour National Movement Standstill, at Hour 73,
slaughter establishments in the Free Area should be removed from any extended
national standstill order and allowed to resume operations. A stop movement of
swine to slaughter establishments in Free Areas beyond the initial 72-hour
National Movement Standstill would result in significant issues and harm for non-
infected production premises in Free Areas, including animal welfare concerns.
Thus, APHIS VS will execute one or more of the following Hour 73 options for
production premises dependent upon premises specific circumstances:
1. Continue National Movement Standstill for an additional period beyond Hour
73 exempting swine movement to slaughter establishments in Free Areas.
2. End the 72-hour National Movement Standstill at Hour 73.
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• Premises in Free Areas resume intrastate and interstate commerce at
Hour 73 without permits unless movement is into an established
control area.
• Premises in established Control Areas need permits for intrastate and
interstate commerce.
3. Establish a smaller geographical or jurisdictional movement standstill area
(such as part of a state, or an entire state, or a region) for intrastate and /or
interstate commerce at Hour 73.
• Premises in Free Areas resume intrastate and interstate commerce at
Hour 73 without permits unless movement is into an established
control area.
• Premises in established control areas need permits for intrastate and
interstate commerce.
Chapter 4 provides further information on quarantine and movement control,
COB, and permitting requirements during an ASF outbreak.
July 2023 4-1
Chapter 4
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and
Tools
FAD PReP documents identify critical activities and tools to be employed in the
event of an ASF outbreak. These critical activities and response tools assist in
controlling, containing, and eradicating ASF while facilitating COB in an
outbreak. This chapter describes key parts of these critical activities and tools.
Documents referenced in this chapter can be found at
www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.
To achieve the goals of an ASF response, critical activities and tools must be
implemented to successfully execute response strategies. Box 4-1 lists some
necessary critical activities and tools to effectively contain, control, and eradicate
ASF. A science- and risk-based approach that protects the public, animal health,
the environment, and stabilizes animal agriculture, the food supply, and the
economy is utilized.
Box 4-1. Overview of Critical Activities and Tools for an ASF Response
4.1 ETIOLOGY AND ECOLOGY
Information on the etiology and ecology of ASF helps promote a common
understanding of the disease agent among responders and other stakeholders (see
Chapter 1 for ASF information). The ASF Overview of Etiology and Ecology SOP
contains additional information.
Critical Activities and Tools for Containment, Control, and Eradication
• Public communication and messaging campaign (3.4.2)
• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls (4.6)
• Stringent and effective biosecurity measures (4.10)
• Rapid diagnosis and reporting (4.3)
• Epidemiological investigation and contact tracing (4.5)
• Increased surveillance in domestic and feral swine populations (4.4)
• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premises and non-contaminated
animal products (4.7, also Secure Pork Supply Plan)
• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (4.11)
• Effective and appropriate disposal measures (4.11)
• Virus elimination measures (4.11)
• Feral swine population reduction (4.12)
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4.2 LABORATORY DEFINITIONS AND CASE
REPORTING
Laboratory and case definitions provide a common point of reference for all
responders. Case definitions and laboratory criteria are developed according to the
Case Definition Development Process SOP which describes the general process
for developing and approving animal disease case definitions for use in animal
health surveillance and reporting. The ASF Case Definition is discussed below.
4.2.1 Laboratory Definitions
The following case definitions were published in March 2023. In any ASF
outbreak, case definitions may be edited after the first presumptive or confirmed
positive case (index case). The case definition will be reviewed throughout the
outbreak and modified based on additional information or the changing needs of
the eradication effort.
4.2.1.1 LABORATORY CRITERIA
1. Agent isolation and identification: Collect whole blood
([Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid (EDTA) and heparin), whole blood
swabs, spleen, lymph nodes, and tonsils. Keep samples as cold as
possible without freezing, unless using inactivating media. Tests
include real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR),
immunohistochemistry (IHC), and virus isolation (VI).
2. Agent Characterization: Genome sequencing is critical to differentiate
viral strains.
3. Serology: Antibody (Ab) detection in serum can be evaluated by
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (Ab ELISA), indirect fluorescent
antibody test (IFAT), and indirect immunoperoxidase test (IPT).
Antibodies typically develop 7-10 days postinfection and can persist
for life. Pigs infected with highly virulent ASFV strains can die before
antibody production occurs.
4.2.1.2 CASE DEFINITION AND REPORTING CRITERIA
1. Suspect case: A suid with
a. clinical signs consistent with ASF; OR
b. an epidemiologic link to ASFV; OR
c. a non-negative result by a serological antibody screening assay
conducted as part of a national surveillance activity.
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2. Presumptive positive case: A suspect case with a non-negative test
result for ASFV PCR from a National Animal Health Laboratory
Network (NAHLN) or other APHIS approved screening laboratory.
3. Confirmed positive case:
a. ASF virus has been isolated and sequenced at NVSL; OR
b. A suid with clinical signs consistent with ASF or an
epidemiologic link to ASFV or cause for suspicion of previous
association or contact with ASFV; AND
i. an ASF PCR
30
positive result with genomic sequencing
at NVSL; OR
ii. antibodies specific to ASFV are identified by Ab
ELISA and confirmed by IPT at NVSL.
Under the APHIS National List of Reportable Animal Diseases (NLRAD), ASF is
a U.S. FAD and a WOAH-notifiable disease. Suspect cases should be reported to
a State Animal Health Official (SAHO) or Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC)
who will decide if the report is credible and assign a Foreign Animal Disease
Diagnostician (FADD) to further investigate the possibility of ASF infection. For
more information on FAD investigation procedures please refer to VS Guidance
Document 12001.4: Policy for the Investigation of Potential Foreign Animal
Disease/Emerging Disease Incidents and the FAD Investigation Manual (FAD
PReP Manual 4-0).
4.3 DIAGNOSTICS
Effective and appropriate sample collection, diagnostic testing, surge capacity,
and reporting are critical in an effective ASF response. These activities may
require additional resources in the event of an ASF outbreak. In particular,
meeting the demand for sampling pigs for investigations, surveillance, and
movement will require additional personnel. Surge capacity will likely be needed
for diagnostic laboratory testing. Surveillance plan requirements must be fully
integrated with current diagnostic sample collection, sample testing, surge
capacity, and reporting capabilities.
During a suspected or actual ASF outbreak, the key goals for diagnostics are to
30
Once first identification has occurred at NVSL, ASF PCR positive result at a NAHLN
approved laboratory or NVSL.
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provide clear direction to responders on sample collection and
processing procedures, if modification from routine standards is
required,
meet the surge requirements for diagnostic testing at specific intervals,
starting at time zero and at 24-hour intervals as the response escalates,
utilize (Emergency Management Response System 2.0 [EMRS2]) to
prepare and create submission documents when available, and
report all diagnostic test results to appropriate personnel and
information management systems (EMRS2) as soon as possible and
within 4 hours of diagnostic test completion.
The FAD Investigation Manual (FAD PreP Manual 4-0) offers detailed
information on diagnostic sample collection, diagnostic testing, and reporting.
This document provides guidance on who is responsible for diagnostic testing,
sample packaging and shipping, and roles in FAD investigations.
See VS Guidance Document 12001.4 and the associated ready reference guide for
the policy and guidance on FAD investigations. The procedures outlined in this
document should be followed in all FAD investigations, including those in which
ASF is a differential diagnosis.
4.3.1 Sample Collection and Diagnostic Testing
Trained personnel and field collection kits are required to effectively collect
samples from swine. During an FAD outbreak, the quantity and frequency of
samples collected need to increase; the Certified Swine Sample Collector (CSSC)
training program ensures that the sample collection capacity is met to help ease
the workload on existing FADDs and swine veterinarians. Development of the
Federal-State-Industry CSSC training program was funded by USDA APHIS’
National Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Program for the initial first
two years, and Pork Checkoff for the third year. Program Standards are available
here.
Table 4-1 details what specimens should be collected for diagnostic testing at
NVSL-FADDL. Additional specific information on how to package and label
laboratory submissions is also available here.
Confirmatory diagnostic testing for ASF will be performed at NVSL FADDL,
with NVSL’s Diagnostic Virology Laboratory providing support during an
outbreak. Tests performed to determine the presence of ASFV include agent
detection through PCR, and VI; agent confirmation and characterization through
genome sequencing; and antibody detection through Ab ELISA, IFAT, and IPT
tests.
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Table 4-2 shows diagnostic tests performed by NVSL-FADDL, the required
specimen and the minimum time needed to obtain results. Figure 4-1 shows the
diagnostic test flow at NVSL-FADDL for ASF samples received. This
information is current as of this document’s publication, updates may be subject
to change. Consult NVSL-FADDL guidance on the APHIS website for
conducting sample collection.
Table 4-1. Sample Collection for Diagnostic Testing
Source: NVSL-FADDL Disease-Specific Guide to Sample Collection
SPECIMEN
MEDIUM
SHIPPING PRESERVATIVE
LIVE ANIMALS
Individual animals
Serum
Serum separator tube (8-
10ml)
Ice pack
Whole blood EDTA Purple top tube (8-10ml) Ice pack
Whole blood swab In 3 ml molecular transport
media (MTM) obtained from
NVSL
None
Tonsil scraping In 3 ml tris-buffered tryptose
broth (TBTB) transport
media obtained from NVSL
Ice pack
Pooled animals
Blood swabs Up to 5 animals, Use spun
swabs in MTM obtained from
NVSL. Do not store swabs in
MTM.
None
DECEASED ANIMALS
Individual animals
Fresh tissue: spleen, tonsil,
mandibular, gastrohepatic,
renal, or iliac lymph node
Separate Whirlpak per tissue
type
Ice pack
Whole blood swab
Spleen pulp swab
In 3 ml molecular transport
media (MTM) obtained from
NVSL
None
Set of tissues Formalin (10:1) Ice pack
Pooled animals
Blood swabs
Spleen pulp swabs
Up to 5 animals, Use spun
swabs in MTM obtained from
NVSL. Do not store swabs in
MTM.
None
Spleen or tonsil Must be collected
individually and pooled
under laboratory conditions
Ice pack
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Table 4-2. Diagnostic Tests Performed for ASFV at NVSL-FADDL
Note: Test time may vary depending on the number of samples or need to repeat the test. These are typical
times that can be expected. Further information for an initial investigation is provided in Figure 4-1.
Procedure
Specimen
Minimum test time
Ab ELISA
Serum
2-3 day
IPT Serum 2-3 day
Real time PCR
Blood, tissue (tonsil, lymph
node, spleen), swab (whole
blood, spleen pulp)
3 hours
Whole genome sequencing
Blood, tissue (tonsil, lymph
node, spleen), swab (whole
blood, spleen pulp)
2-4 days
VI
Blood, tissue (tonsil, lymph
node, spleen)
14-21 days (three 7-day
cycles)
July 2023 4-7
Figure 4-1. Diagnostic Test Flow for Initial Investigation of ASF in the United States
July 2023 4-8
4.3.2 Surge Capacity
NAHLN laboratories provide rapid standardized surveillance and response testing
for FADs. Currently, there are 49 laboratories approved for ASF testing. NAHLN
maintains and updates this list on their website,
31
along with a map to
geographically visualize laboratory capacity by State. APHIS realizes that, in an
ASF outbreak, collecting and testing diagnostic samples will require significant
resources. It is a priority to maintain this capacity and ensure that additional
NAHLN laboratories have this diagnostic capacity in the immediate future.
4.4 SURVEILLANCE DESIGN
The purpose of surveillance is to define the distribution of the disease, detect new
outbreaks, and establish disease-free zones. Surveillance activities can aid in
establishing priorities in terms of control and mitigation strategies and help
evaluate the efficacy of response efforts. They are also critical to maintaining
COB and providing evidence of disease freedom following an outbreak.
Surveillance personnel are involved in the case definition development, design of
surveillance sampling schemes, and the assessment and reporting of surveillance
findings. It is critical to coordinate between the personnel conducting surveillance
activities and those responsible for epidemiological investigations, quarantine and
movement control, and biosecurity.
This section provides a broad overview of ASF surveillance. Additional
surveillance guidance documents with further detail on surveillance procedures
and sampling schemes for domestic pigs during an outbreak will be posted on the
ASF FAD PReP website. APHIS VS CEAH subject matter experts will support
the unified IC to help define appropriate surveillance strategies during an
outbreak.
4.4.1 Surveillance Goals and Objectives
Surveillance is a critical activity during an outbreak of ASF. The following are the
goals of surveillance in response to an ASF outbreak in either domestic or feral
swine:
Implement a surveillance plan that will (1) define the present
distribution of ASF in domestic pig and feral swine and (2) detect
unknown Infected Premises
32
quickly.
31
For further information on NAHLN Laboratories, see
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhe
alth/lab-info-
services/nahln?urile=wcm:path:/APHIS_Content_Library/SA_Our_Focus/SA_Animal_Health/SA
_Lab_Information_Services/SA_NAHLN/response-guidance.
32
Refer to Section 4.5.1 for zone, area, and premises designations.
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Define the epidemiologic network for each Infected Premises.
Determine feral swine presence near domestic premises, and if present,
incorporate susceptible feral swine populations within the surveillance
plan; coordinate with APHIS WS, U.S. Department of Interior (DOI),
State wildlife agencies, and State agriculture departments.
Provide surveillance data summaries and analyses at intervals
specified by the unified IC.
Box 4-1. Surveillance Plan Objectives in an ASF Outbreak
4.4.2 Surveillance Activities Overview
There are three key periods of surveillance activities in an outbreak. The initial 72
hours post-ASF outbreak declaration, the control and eradication period (the time
until last case is detected and depopulated), and the completion of virus
elimination to declaration of disease freedom.
Surveillance activities begin with the development of a surveillance plan.
Surveillance plans may differ to address the objectives of the incident, time period
of the response, and the specifications of the zone, area, and premises
designations (see Section 4.5.1). Plans may also vary by outbreak type, field
capacity, and epidemiologic characteristics that can differ by region, host, and
virus. Surveillance activities and associated testing are based on the best scientific
information available at the time and may need to be modified as an outbreak
progresses.
Data collection for surveillance purposes can be either passive or active. Passive
surveillance is ongoing and begins with the producer, veterinarian, or laboratory
personnel suspecting a case of ASF and informing State or Federal animal health
officials. Active surveillance is initiated by regulatory officials requesting the
collection of animal health data using a defined protocol to perform actions that
are scheduled in advance. Decisions about whether information is collected, what
Surveillance Plan Objectives
• Detect ASF Infected Premises and infected feral swine quickly.
• Determine the size and distribution of the ASF outbreak.
• Determine zone and premises designations.
• Supply information to evaluate outbreak response activities.
• Provide surveillance and testing requirements for movement of live swine into,
out of, and within Control Area(s) that will include epidemiologic networks.
• Provide surveillance and testing information for pre-movement requirements.
• Provide evidence that Control Area(s) are free of disease.
• Provide evidence to demonstrate disease-freedom following eradication.
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information should be collected, and from which animals is made by the
investigator.
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4.4.3 Passive Surveillance
Passive surveillance is continuously conducted within the United States. Passive
surveillance relies on producers, veterinarians, and laboratory personnel to
voluntarily report suspect cases based on clinical signs and lesions compatible
with ASFV to State or Federal animal health officials. Passive surveillance for
ASFV applies to all swine. Feral swine that are found dead or visibly sick (ruling
out evidence of trauma, e.g., car strikes, etc.) will be tested and/or euthanized.
Any suspect cases, in either domestic or feral swine having clinical signs
compatible with ASF (e.g., abnormal health events and/or significantly decreased
production parameters), will trigger a FAD Investigation (per VS Guidance
Document 12001.4). In the event of an ASF detection, passive surveillance is
intensified through rapid and clear communication to all producers and
veterinarians.
APHIS WS works collaboratively with States that have established populations of
feral swine to reduce the number of feral swine and associated damages they
inflict to agriculture, property, natural and cultural resources, and human health.
As WS routinely monitors feral swine populations, they alert VS of any ASF
suspect cases.
4.4.4 Active Surveillance for Domestic Pigs
Due to the increased spread of ASF in Asia and Europe, USDA implemented a
targeted active surveillance program in 2019. The objectives of the program
include strengthening detection capabilities, enhancing outbreak preparedness,
and supporting claims of disease freedom for ASF and CSF. This plan, Swine
Hemorrhagic Fevers: African and Classical Swine Fever Integrated Surveillance
Plan, can be found on the USDA APHIS ASF website under technical documents.
Additionally, a public dashboard is available summarizing the sampling
performed since the plan was implemented.
During the initial stages of an ASF outbreak, surveillance is designed to provide
evidence so that informed decisions can be made in regards to zone sizing,
premises designation, and epidemiologic networks. In particular, all Suspect
Premises in the Control Area must be tested to determine whether they are
Infected Premises or At-Risk Premises. In addition, Contact Premises
epidemiologically-linked to Infected Premises, will be identified and prioritized
33
Active Surveillance is defined here by the International Conference on Animal Health
Surveillance (ICAHS) in the Animal Health Surveillance Terminology Final Report from Pre-
ICAHS Workshop, July 2013 (version 1.2).
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so that appropriate surveillance activities and movement controls can be
implemented quickly.
As the response progresses, surveillance is used to assess the disease status within
Control Areas, SZ, and epidemiologically-linked networks. Surveillance
assessments will determine if the initial parameters need to be re-evaluated or the
criteria has been met for Control Area release. Surveillance can also provide
evidence to demonstrate post-outbreak disease freedom.
Active surveillance also includes pre-movement testing. USDA APHIS is actively
collaborating with stakeholders to further develop and define parameters for pre-
movement testing.
4.4.4.1 OUTBREAK SELECTION CRITERIA AND SAMPLING METHODS
Individual pig sampling is the only validated method to detect ASFV. Currently,
approved sample types include whole blood and fresh tissue (spleen, lymph node,
and tonsil) (see Table 4-1). NVSL is diligently working to evaluate aggregate
methods, such as rope sampling. Dead pigs and those presenting with case
compatible clinical signs should be prioritized for sampling.
Updated guidance, as available, will be posted on the ASF FAD PReP website.
4.4.5 Active Surveillance for Feral Swine
In the event ASF is detected in feral swine populations, the initial surveillance
goal will be to determine the distribution of infection. Once determined, control
and eradication strategies can be implemented through established Control Areas
(refer to Section 4.5.1 for zone, area, and premises designations).
Feral swine within Control Areas will be removed and tested in accordance with
incident depopulation efforts. In the event a Control Area covers a large
geographical area, surveillance testing will be refined to achieve the most efficient
and effective approach. Surveillance activities outside of the Control Area and in
the SZ will focus on heightened surveillance through wildlife management
activities (see Section 4.12) where periodic sampling will occur. A sampling
scheme will be developed during an outbreak and will be adapted as needed
throughout the outbreak to account for availability of resources and to support the
designation of zones and areas. The ultimate goal is to eliminate ASF in feral
swine in order to prevent virus maintenance or spillover into domestic pigs.
4.5 EPIDEMIOLOGY
Epidemiological activities work to quickly and accurately identify cases of ASF,
locate other Contact Premises that may be infected, and investigate the source of
the outbreak. An epidemiologic investigation can classify premises so that
appropriate zones, areas, and premises designations can be applied. Additional
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activities involve the tracing of all contacts with affected animals and premises,
including movement of non-susceptible animals, humans, fomites, animal
products or byproducts, and equipment that may have come into contact with
ASFV.
4.5.1 Zones, Areas, and Premises Designations
A critical component of an ASF response is the designation of zones, areas, and
premises, which are used in quarantine and domestic movement control efforts.
The Incident Commander works with the Operations Section and Planning
Section to
1. determine appropriate zones, areas, and premises designations in the
event of an ASF outbreak, and
2. re-evaluate these designations as needed throughout the outbreak
based on the epidemiological situation.
Table 4-3 summarizes the premises designations that are employed in an ASF
outbreak response for domestic pig production premises. Table 4-4 summarizes
the zone and area designations that would be used in an ASF outbreak response.
Table 4-3. Summary of ASF Premises Designations for Domestic Pig Production Premises
Premises Definition Zone
Infected Premises/
Infected Pig(s) (IP)
Premises or pig location where a presumptive positive
case or confirmed positive case exists based on
laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, ASF case
definition, and international standards.
Infected Zone
Contact Premises (CP) Premises with swine that have been
epidemiologically-linked to an IP through exposure to
animals, animal products, fomites, or people. CPs
would be subject to contact tracing.
Infected Zone, Buffer
Zone, Free Area
Suspect Premises (SP) Premises under investigation due to the presence of
swine reported to have clinical signs compatible with
ASF. This is intended to be a short-term premises
designation.
Infected Zone, Buffer
Zone, Surveillance Zone
At-Risk Premises (ARP)
Premises with swine, but none of those swine have
clinical signs compatible with ASF. ARPs are not IPs,
CPs, or SPs. ARPs may seek to move susceptible
animals or products within the Control Area by permit.
Only ARPs are eligible to become MPs.
Infected Zone, Buffer
Zone
Monitored Premises (MP)
Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an IP,
CP, or SP. Only ARPs are eligible to become MPs.
MPs meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move
susceptible animals or products out of the Control
Area by permit. MPs provide biosecurity, surveillance
and herd health status information to the IMT.
Infected Zone, Buffer
Zone
Free Premises (FP) Premises outside of a Control Area and not a CP or
SP.
Surveillance Zone, Free
Area
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Table 4-4. Summary of ASF Zone and Area Designations
Zone/Area Definition
Infected Zone (IZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises or Infected Pig(s).
Buffer Zone (BZ) Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.
Control Area (CA) Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone.
Surveillance Zone (SZ)
Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area. The Surveillance Zone is
part of the Free Area.
Free Area (FA) Area not included in any Control Area. Includes the Surveillance Zone.
4.5.1.1 CONSIDERATIONS FOR ZONES AND AREAS
In an incident, the unified IC establishes an Infected Zone (IZ) and a Buffer Zone
(BZ) for each ASF Infected Premises. This Control Area (the IZ and the BZ) may
change as the outbreak progresses. In an ASF incident, additional considerations
are needed to incorporate the specific characteristics of the swine industry, as well
as considerations for feral swine since they, too, are susceptible to ASF. Zone,
area, and premises designations may include epidemiologically-linked Contact
Premises that are not all in the same, or contiguous geographical area, and areas
that reflect home ranges of feral swine populations.
The perimeter of the Control Area should be at least 5 km (~3.12 miles) beyond
the perimeter of the closest Infected Premises or Infected Pig. The size of the
Control Area depends on the circumstances of the outbreak, including
transmission pathways and estimates of transmission risk, swine movement
patterns and concentration points, distribution of feral swine in proximity, natural
terrain, jurisdictional boundaries, and other factors. The boundaries of the Control
Area can be modified or redefined when tracing and other epidemiological
information becomes available.
Table 4-5 provides a description of the minimum sizes of areas and zones for
domestic pig production premises and feral swine found on the landscape; and
Table 4-6 describes the epidemiologic factors used to determine the size of zones
and Control Areas.
Table 4-5. Minimum Size of Zones and Areas
Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details
Infected Zone (IZ) Perimeter should be at least 3 km (~1.86 miles) beyond perimeters of presumptive
or confirmed Infected Premises or Infected Pigs based on epidemiological
circumstances. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.
Buffer Zone (BZ)
Perimeter should be at least 2 km (~1.24 miles) beyond the perimeter of the IZ.
Width is generally not less than the minimum radius of the associated IZ, but may
be much larger. This zone may be redefined as the outbreak continues.
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Zone or Area Minimum Size and Details
Control Area (CA) Perimeter should be at least 5 km (~3.12 miles) beyond the perimeter of the closest
Infected Premises or Infected Pig. Please see Table 4-6 for factors that influence
the size of the Control Area. This area may be redefined as the outbreak continues.
Surveillance Zone (SZ) Width should be at least 5–10 km (~3.12 miles to ~6.21 miles) beyond the Control
Area.
Table 4-6. Factors to Consider in Determining Control Area Size for ASF
Factors Additional Details
Jurisdictional areas Effectiveness and efficiency of administration
Multi-jurisdictional considerations: local, State, Tribal, and multistate
Physical boundaries Areas defined by geographic features
Areas defined by manmade structures
Areas defined by distance between premises
ASF epidemiology Reproductive rate
Incubation period
Ease of transmission
Infectious dose
Modes of transmission (contact with secretions, excretions, fomites, vectors)
Survivability in the environment
Ease of diagnosis (for example, no pathognomonic signs; requires diagnostic
laboratory testing)
Infected Premises
characteristics
Number of contacts
Transmission pathways and transmission risk
Extent of animal movement
Number of animals
Species of animals
Production stage
Movement of traffic and personnel to and from premises (fomite spread)
Biosecurity measures in place at time of outbreak
Contact Premises
characteristics
Number and types of premises
Susceptible animal populations and population density
Animal movements
Critical movements (e.g., feed)
Movement of traffic (fomites) and personnel to and from premises (fomite
spread)
Biosecurity measures in place prior to outbreak
Environment Types of premises in area or region
Land use in area or region
Estimated feral swine home range
General area, region, or
agricultural sector biosecurity
Biosecurity practices in place prior to outbreak
Biosecurity practices implemented once outbreak detected
Number of backyard
premises
Types of premises, animal movements, and network of animal and fomite
movements
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Factors Additional Details
Feral Swine Presence/absence of populations
Population density
Estimates of home range size
Number of ASF positive carcasses
Presence of feral swine markets or slaughter facilities
4.5.1.1.1 Additional Considerations for Feral Swine
Additional factors for zones and areas must be considered in the event feral swine
are infected with ASFV. Feral swine are free ranging animals that primarily move
within defined home ranges. The size of these home ranges vary based on
resources, climate, habitat, and other factors.
Since an ASF outbreak in feral swine would almost certainly involve more than
one pig, the IZ would likely be larger than the 3 kilometer minimum
recommendation around a single index case. The initial IZ would encompass all
ASF-positive feral swine cases and expand beyond the home range size for the
affected population(s) of feral swine. Since feral swine home ranges vary widely,
the exact size of the Control Area(s) will be determined by State/Federal wildlife
experts after initial assessment. The average is approximately 1.5 to 3 square
kilometers.
34
Research on feral swine contact networks indicate that contact, and by extension,
disease transmission, is uncommon between feral swine that are more than 2
kilometers apart on the landscape. The resulting IZ would therefore extend at least
3 kilometers out in all directions from the feral swine index case
35
with
adaptations for natural and manmade landscape features. Some regions have
additional feral swine data available
36
that could be used in the event of an
outbreak to refine both home range estimates and the size of the IZ.
The BZ will expand proportionally with increases in the IZ so that it always
provides a buffer equivalent to at least 2 kilometers surrounding the IZ. The BZ
will indicate an area of increased ASF risk where no positive feral swine have
been detected. Additionally, there will be a SZ of at least 5 kilometers
surrounding the BZ. These zones will be adapted as the incident progresses, in
addition to changes in epidemiology.
34
Kay, S. L., Fischer, J. W., Monaghan, A. J., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., Campbell, T. A.,
... & Wisely, S. M. (2017). Quantifying drivers of wild pig movement across multiple spatial and
temporal scales. Movement ecology, 5(1), 14. Doi: 10.1186/s40462-017-0105-1.
35
Pepin, K. M., Davis, A. J., Beasley, J., Boughton, R., Campbell, T., Cooper, S. M., ... &
Wyckoff, C. (2016). Contact heterogeneities in feral swine: implications for disease management
and future research. Ecosphere, 7(3), e01230. Doi: 10.1002/ecs2.1230.
36
Kay, S. L., Fischer, J. W., Monaghan, A. J., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., Campbell, T. A.,
... & Wisely, S. M. (2017). Quantifying drivers of wild pig movement across multiple spatial and
temporal scales. Movement ecology, 5(1), 14. Doi: 10.1186/s40462-017-0105-1.
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4.5.2 Visualizing Zones and Areas for Domestic Pigs & Feral
Swine
Figure 4-2 illustrates examples of zones, areas, and premises designations for both
domestic pigs and feral swine. Adjustments will be needed during an outbreak
based on the evolving epidemiological and incident situation.
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Figure 4-2. Examples of Zones, Areas, and Premises for Domestic Pigs and Feral Swine in an ASF
Outbreak Response
Domestic Pigs
Zones and Areas
Premises
Note: The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area.
Feral Swine
Zones and Areas
Pigs*
* The minimum Infected Zone is 3 kilometers; however, when multiple pigs are found nearby on the landscape the
Infected Zone will be adjusted to incorporate all pigs, which potentially can result in a larger Infected Zone.
Note: The Surveillance Zone is part of the Free Area.
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4.5.3 Epidemiological Investigation and Contact Tracing
An epidemiologic investigation can identify the index case, determine risk factors
for transmission, and support the development of mitigation strategies. During an
ASF outbreak, an epidemiological questionnaire will be utilized by the unified IC
to assist in determining the scale and scope of the outbreak. The investigation and
associated questionnaire will incorporate wildlife contact, particularly for feral
swine, as well as an assessment to determine whether Ornithodoros spp. ticks are
implicated in, or present a risk for, ongoing transmission. Evidence from recent
outbreaks in previously ASF-free countries suggest that ticks may not play an
epidemiologically significant role (if any role) in sustained transmission; other
modes of direct and indirect transmission pathways should be the focus of control
and containment activities.
Intensive contact tracing activities will also be required during an ASF outbreak
to identify all Contact Premises. Contact tracing should identify all domestic pig
movement onto and off an Infected Premises that occurred within the last 30 days
of onset of clinical signs (i.e., two WOAH incubation periods for ASFV). In
addition, all premises or locations having a shared indirect contact during the last
15 days with the Infected Premises will also be traced and subject to surveillance
requirements.
Contact tracing is used in combination with traditional Control Areas to assist in
limiting the spread of ASFV. Unlike traditional Control Areas that focus on local
spread surrounding an Infected Premises, Contact tracing directly addresses
movement and its role in disease transmission. As a result, additional cases can be
identified quickly, and incident resources can be utilized more efficiently.
Regulatory officials and producers are expected to work together during an
outbreak to identify Contact Premises—premises that have potentially been
exposed to ASFV due to an epidemiologic link to an Infected Premises.
Epidemiologic links that are most important to the spread of ASFV include the
movement of people, animals, and equipment between sites. These premises,
along with those in the Control Area, are most likely to be infected with ASF.
Section 3.3.3 provides an example of zones and areas in relation to contact
tracing.
Box 4-2 explains the fundamental importance of movement tracing in an ASF
response effort.
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Box 4-2. Importance of Contact Tracing in an ASF Outbreak
Administering epidemiological questionnaires and tracing activities are typically
conducted by a unified IC. Additional virtual support may be necessary from
other personnel that have epidemiology expertise. No two incidents are the same:
questionnaires, procedures, and priorities will be determined based on the specific
circumstances of the incident.
The Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOP as well as the National
Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines:
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing both provide more information. The
ASF Epidemiology Questionnaire can be found here.
4.6 DOMESTIC RESPONSE: QUARANTINE AND
MOVEMENT CONTROL
Quarantine and movement control measures are fundamental to any ASF response
effort, as movement of infected animals and contaminated fomites spread ASFV.
By restricting the movement of infected animals, animal products, and
contaminated fomites, quarantine and movement control can be a powerful tool in
controlling and eradicating an ASF outbreak.
Movement control is typically accomplished through a permit system for Control
Areas. Permitting allows entities to make necessary movements into, within, and
out of a Control Area without creating an unacceptable risk of disease spread.
Criteria required for movement will depend on the risk of that movement, and
may include biosecurity, cleaning and disinfection (C&D), and/or diagnostic
testing depending on the specific permit. EMRS2 is APHIS’ system of record for
permits and permitted movements made into, within, and out of ASF Control
Areas.
It is important that quarantine and movement controls, while critical to stopping
disease transmission, also consider competing priorities; in implementing
domestic measures, States, Tribes, and APHIS officials must weigh the risk of
disease transmission against the need for critical movements (e.g., feed) and
business continuity. Considerations should also be taken for the highly integrated
Contact Tracing
One of the single most important and urgent veterinary activities during an ASF
outbreak is to rapidly and diligently trace-back and trace-forward movements from an
Infected Premises. This contact tracing aids in the control of the spread of ASFV and
limits the impact of the outbreak. Contact tracing should capture all movements to and
from the premises including, but not limited to, susceptible swine, non-susceptible
species, animal products, vehicles, crops/grains, and personnel. Contact tracing also
includes consideration of all potential modes of transmission and possible contact with
feral swine.
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nature of the swine industry, where movements are often incorporated in networks
and cross State lines. Movement control procedures are based on the best
scientific information available at the time, and all personnel—premises owners,
managers, and responders—should adhere to these measures.
The NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control and the FAD PReP
Permitted Movement manual provides further information on measures considered
necessary to prevent the spread of ASF.
For international exports, no animal or animal (by-)products can be exported from
control zones. Exports of live animals and their by-products originating outside of
control zones may proceed only when allowed by the importing country. Current
country-specific requirements for the export of live animals and animal (by-)
products can be accessed from the APHIS Exports website. Country-specific
requirements for the export of pork meat/meat products can be accessed from the
FSIS Export Library Import & Export Library.
4.6.1 Control Area Movement
Domestic movement related to swine business into, within, and out of a Control
Area will either require a permit or tracking by the unified IC or producers. Any
movement of swine and conveyance brings some level of risk of ASFV
transmission from a known or unknown Infected Premises to non-infected
premises. The risk of moving swine and conveyances depends on the nature of the
item being moved and its ability to transmit or be contaminated with ASF.
For domestic movement of susceptible swine or potential fomites out of the
Control Area to a Free Area, the permit process occurs as described in the
document entitled Permitted Movement (FAD PReP Manual 6-0). This includes
approval from the origin State, and if interstate, the destination State.
Requirements for a permit may vary depending on the permit, which takes into
consideration the incident, National standards, State regulations, applicable
WOAH standards, and conditions and criteria for the permitted movement(s),
including requirements for biosecurity, surveillance and diagnostics. For
international movements (exports), no animal or animal (by-)products can be
exported from a control zone.
It is the State’s responsibility for ensuring producers in their State know what type
of movements require a permit, what requires no permit but reporting to the State
and/or the unified IC, and what requires enhanced record keeping by the producer.
It is important that criteria for movement during an ASF outbreak is
communicated in an accurate and timely manner.
See APHIS guidance on Movement Control and Permitted Movement for more
information.
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4.6.1.1 PERMIT REQUESTS AND TYPES
Permit requests are made to the State and/or Incident Management Teams
established for the response. The State may have their own permitting system.
APHIS uses the EMRS2 Customer Permit Gateway, also referred to as “the
Gateway”, for permits and permitted movements regarding a Control Area.
EMRS2 does not guarantee, certify, or otherwise assume that all requirements for
a permit have been met. EMRS2 only facilitates the issuance of permits; it
remains critical that all responsible parties ensure and remain vigilant that any
requirements are met, as necessary, for the issuance of permits.
A critical component of the APHIS VS ASF response strategy will rely on the
establishment of control areas around infected domestic premises or infected feral
swine locations to 1) prevent the virus from coming into contact with susceptible
swine, 2) support response efforts by quarantine and movement controls with
enhanced biosecurity, and 3) emphasize contact tracing. Movement controls
provide entities the ability to make necessary movements without creating an
unacceptable risk of disease spread.
Table 4-7. Movement Controls: Permit Types during an FAD Incident
Specific Permits
Continuity of Business Permits
Provide control and containment of the FAD
outbreak for infected premises.
Facilitate continuity of business for non-infected
premises which are inside the Control Area.
Provide biocontainment (keeping the
disease on infected premises) and bio
exclusion (keeping the disease out of non-
infected premises).
For movements from at-risk premises or monitored
premises.
Allow critical or essential movements:
1) to ensure animal welfare (e.g., feed
trucks)
2) related to response activities like
depopulation and disposal
Two types of COB permits:
1) Operational – for the non-infected premises to
continue operations during an outbreak (e.g.,
equipment, service crews, and carcasses).
2) Production – used for movements of animals and
animal products into the supply chain for feeding,
growing, processing, or to market.
Specific requirements for ASF COB permits are described in Section 4.7.
Permits and permitted movement outside the scope of the Control Area (in other
words, not going into, within, or out of a Control Area) during an ASF outbreak
are not captured in EMRS2 and should continue under regular authorities
(Federal, State, and/or Tribal), using existing processes, procedures, and
guidance. For a large scale ASF outbreak, States, APHIS, and industry continue to
develop improved permit procedures and processes for Control Areas, pre-
movement testing, and surveillance in the Free Area.
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For general information and guidance on permitting, please refer to the document
Permitted Movement FAD PReP (Manual 6-0). For more information on the
permitted movement process, please refer to the ready reference guide here.
Current country-specific requirements for the export of live animals and animal
(by-)products can be accessed from the APHIS website.
4.7 CONTINUITY OF BUSINESS
COB manages movement for non-infected premises and non-contaminated animal
products in a regulatory Control Area and facilitates movement, into, within, and
out of a Control Area. COB provides science- and risk-based approaches and
systems as a critical activity in an ASF response. This helps to facilitate
agriculture and food industries in maintaining typical business, or returning to
business during a disease response, while the risk of disease spread is effectively
managed. COB planning can help to minimize unintended consequences on
producers and consumers impacted by ASF while still achieving the goals of
disease response.
During an ASF outbreak, COB plans will be implemented to facilitate the
managed movement of commodities and animals from At-Risk Premises and
Monitored Premises existing within regulatory Control Areas, helping the swine
industry to continue business operations. To ensure effective implementation of
COB plans, they must be developed and exercised in advance of any outbreak.
The NAHEMS Guidelines: Continuity of Business covers topics such as
preparedness and response goals,
key roles and responsibilities in COB planning,
details of COB as part of an FAD response, and
potential components required for a COB plan.
For more information on COB for an ASF outbreak, please refer to the Secure
Pork Supply Plan located at www.securepork.org.
4.7.1 COB Permits for Live Animal and Semen Movements
Producers and federal and state officials recognize it is to all stakeholders’ benefit
to create consistency and transparency through the development of national
standardized permitting
requirements for domestic movements. As of this
publication, national guidance for domestic pigs/semen transfer movements and
domestic pigs to slaughter is being finalized and will be placed on the FAD PReP
website. Following is a description of the core principles of the permitting and
testing requirements.
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The permit requirements listed below mitigate uncertainty in the likelihood of
infection and disease spread associated with swine movement, with consideration
including the following: frequency of movement of the specified swine type, the
number of different destination premises swine from the same originating
premises are moved to, the potential extent of continued disease spread, and
variation in industry practices.
In addition, the permit requirements introduce a pre-movement isolation period as
a mitigation measure for each movement type to reduce the risk of disease
exposure on a premises in the days leading up to the swine movement. Based on a
within-herd ASF transmission model
37
, a pre-movement isolation period (PMIP)
combined with pre-movement diagnostic testing decreases the risk of moving
infected but undetected pigs from a premises, compared to implementing testing
alone. The PMIP time period and testing frequency for each movement type was
determined based on a protocol that balances increasing the probability of
detecting ASF if present on the premises with logistical and operational needs for
different swine production types to support continuity of business.
4.7.1.1 ASF COB PERMIT AND PMIP REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL AREAS
For specific movements, please see the posted document referenced above.
Permit Requirements
1. The premises must meet the criteria for a Monitored Premises designation and
have a premises identification number. A Monitored Premises objectively
demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect
Premises
2. The pre-movement isolation period is 5 days (for transfer movements; 3 days
for movements to slaughter), during which biosecurity is heightened.
3. Strict biosecurity requirements are listed for people or items crossing the line
of separation and cleaning & disinfection of vehicles or items entering the
site.
4. Movements on/off premises with appropriate biosecurity are described as
Allowed—e.g., feed, essential personnel, emergency needs—or Prohibited—
e.g., live animals, mortality/ manure/ garbage removal, visitors, movement of
non-critical equipment.
37
Ssematimba et al. 2002 “African swine fever detection and transmission estimates using
homogenous versus heterogenous model formulation in stochastic simulations within pig
premises.” Open Vet J, Vol 12(6): 787-796
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Testing priority (example for gilt transfer movement)
1. Dead pigs
2. Sick pigs
3. Pigs in hospital/sick pens
4. General population
Testing at 3 days pre-movement and at 1 day pre-movement
Test all dead swine in each barn up to 31 samples. If testing of dead swine
does not produce 31 samples for the barn, sample animals in accordance
with the priority list above to meet the balance.
Traceability of testing
All samples must either be collected by an accredited veterinarian, or a
Certified Swine Sample Collector approved by the appropriate state
animal health official. The request for permit must include identification
of who collected the sample.
Movement requirements
a. All trucks hauling live swine must be cleaned and disinfected after
delivery of swine. Cleaning and disinfection includes, but may not
be limited to, anything that has been in direct or indirect contact
with the swine (does include driver).
b. All movements under a permit must be completed within 48 hours
and reported to the state animal health official that approved the
permit.
5-day PMIP and test schedule—Most transfer movements
3-day PMIP and test schedule—Movements to slaughter
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4.8 INFORMATION, REPORTING AND TASK MANAGEMENT
Information, reporting, and task management during an ASF incident or outbreak
ensures that responders, stakeholders, and decision-makers have access to
accurate and timely critical emergency response information. Ideally, Federal,
State, Tribal, and local information management systems are compatible for
information and data sharing.
EMRS2 is the official USDA APHIS system of record in an ASF outbreak. It
contains critical information, such as Infected Premises data, and provides
automation for essential response processes (e.g., resources, and permitting). It is
essential that EMRS2 contain accurate premises data prior to an incident to
facilitate response efforts and devote resources to critical response tasks. States
are strongly encouraged to import data before an ASF outbreak occurs.
38
During an animal health emergency or disease response, APHIS VS will perform
a cadre of information, reporting, and task management activities consisting of
incident coordination, response planning for high-priority FADs, reporting, and
inter-agency coordination. The APHIS VS National Preparedness and Incident
Coordination Center will develop, update, and coordinate concepts of operations,
response plans, procedures, and guidance for an ASF response making
information and task management duties essential for Federal, State, and local
response activities.
4.8.1 Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS)
In an ASF outbreak, the goal is to have EMRS2 task management processes
performed in 12-hour or shorter intervals. Timely submission of information will
ensure an effective response. Information must be entered in both an accurate and
consistent manner across widespread field operations; this is especially important
when there is more than one ICP. If possible, it may be necessary and/or
beneficial to centralize certain data-entry capabilities, particularly when field
resources are stretched. Using EMRS2, USDA and State/Tribal officials will be
able to manage an infected premises and its Control Area from the investigation
period through quarantine release and Control Area release, with full transparency
about where a premises stands in the response and recovery process. Appendix B
provides an example workflow illustrating a broad overview of EMRS2 task
management activities undertaken when response activities occur.
Field personnel should be provided with access to mobile technology devices
necessary for collecting, monitoring, and sharing information. EMRS2Go is a
mobile application which enables rapid and straightforward data entry into
38
States can refer to the EMRS2 webpage for more information, and more specifically, the
guidance, Premises Data Transfer to EMRS2 from External/State Based Systems, which is located
here:
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/emergency-
management/sa_emrs/ct_emrs.
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EMRS2 from the field. Rapidly functional, robust, and scalable information
technology infrastructure is needed during an ASF outbreak.
4.8.2 Reporting
Reporting plays an important role, not only in directing disease mitigation
activities in the field for the unified IC, but also in resource allocation, budgeting,
and internal and external communication regarding the incident. Reporting does
not replace or supplant “communications.” Instead, reporting offers information
and data on the incident that can be used for situational awareness and
communications materials, such as websites and press releases.
Information entered in EMRS2 is used for internal and external situation reports
produced daily, weekly, and as requested. It is also used to produce specific
reports on key aspects of the response, such as permitting or deployments. Both
the NIMT and ICG rely on EMRS2 for producing accurate reports during an
outbreak. It is imperative in an ASF outbreak that information management and
data integrity is a priority.
Incident reports as required daily, weekly, or as requested by the VSDA for
internal and external reporting purposes will consist of situation reports, summary
list of infected premises, epidemiological, permitting and movements,
conveyances, and deployment. Geographic Information System (GIS) maps,
including ICG maps and public summary map books, are essential tools to ensure
a rapid and coordinated National, regional, or local response effort.
4.8.3 Information Management Systems and Tools
In an ASF outbreak, there are key systems which help to facilitate response.
These include the following:
EMRS2, the USDA APHIS official system of record for FAD
investigations and response;
APHIS Response Information System (ARIS), managed by APHIS
Dispatch personnel, used for requesting and deploying qualified
personnel to the incident;
Laboratory Messaging System, which communicates (messages)
laboratory results from NVSL and some NAHLN laboratories,
including directly to EMRS2;
39
39
Not all NAHLN laboratories currently have messaging capabilities. This is a high priority
for USDA APHIS and the NAHLN laboratories.
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Third party systems, such as State or industry information technology
systems; and
Third party analysis tools, such as ArcGIS and Tableau, are utilized to
tailor incident information for enhanced communication, illustration,
and analyses.
For more information on these aspects, please refer to the APHIS Foreign Animal
Disease Framework: Incident Information Management and Reporting (FAD
PReP Manual 3-0).
4.9 HEALTH & SAFETY AND PERSONAL
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Though ASF is not a threat to public health, responders may be exposed to other
health hazards; prevention of adverse human health events related to emergency
response efforts is very important. For general information, please see the
NAHEMS Guidelines: Health and Safety and NAHEMS Guidelines: Personal
Protective Equipment. In an incident, refer any health and safety questions or
concerns to the Safety Officer or other designated response official.
APHIS EMSSD provides services that support agency and interagency emergency
management activities, and protect the health, safety, and security of APHIS and
other USDA personnel.
4.9.1 Mental Health Concerns
The health and safety of all personnel is affected by the mental state of those
involved in the ASF response effort. An ASF outbreak and associated response
activities could have a significant psychological effect on both responders and
owners of affected swine. Conducting or viewing depopulation and disposal
operations can certainly cause mental distress. Tensions may run high, especially
among small producers whose losses approach complete financial devastation and
ruin. Incident Commanders should encourage responders to access mental health
support; Safety Officers assigned to the ICPs are key resources for personnel.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has developed resources
specifically for emergency and disaster responders, State and local planners,
health professionals, and the general public at
https://emergency.cdc.gov/coping/index.asp; additional general mental health
information is here: www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth; a mobile disaster app for first
responders available here: https://store.samhsa.gov/product/samhsa-disaster.
APHIS employees can also find support through the Employee Assistance
Program found here: http://www.foh4you.com/.
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4.10 BIOSECURITY
Strict biosecurity measures are crucial to prevent or slow the spread of ASF.
40
Owners, producers, veterinarians, and responders should observe strict biosecurity
measures during an incident or suspected incident. Proper biosecurity during an
ASF outbreak has two key functions: containing the virus on Infected Premises
(biocontainment) and preventing the introduction of ASFV from the movement of
personnel and fomites to naïve premises (bioexclusion).
Preventing exposure of swine to ASFV in blood, fluids, carcasses, fomites and the
environment is critical in preventing ASF transmission; this includes employing
and enhancing vector control methods. Biocontainment and bioexclusion
measures can also be implemented within a premises to slow or limit the spread
between pens and buildings when ASF has been diagnosed; this can help facilitate
control and containment activities.
APHIS acknowledges that identifying and depopulating infected or exposed feral
swine may be difficult. As such, it is critical for producers to implement and
maintain biosecurity measures that prevent contact between feral swine and
domestic pigs. Producers should seriously reevaluate any outdoor production of
pigs on premises that are in proximity to an Infected Premises or feral swine.
An additional area of consideration is garbage feeding, which is regulated by
APHIS; States determine whether or not to allow regulated garbage feeding
within their State. During an ASF outbreak, APHIS and/or State officials may
implement additional requirements or inspections related to garbage feeding.
4.11 3D ACTIVITIES
3D activities include depopulation, disposal, and decontamination during an
outbreak. Due to the nature of ASFV, 3D options may be limited; therefore, the
supplemental 3D Guidance—Option Matrices and Considerations assists
responders in determining the 3D alternatives during an outbreak. Note, that data
are based on scientific research, and not necessarily based on field experience.
This guidance, the Carcass Management Dashboard, and other tools are available
on the APHIS Carcass Management website.
4.11.1 Mass Depopulation and Euthanasia
Mass depopulation and euthanasia are not synonymous, and APHIS recognizes a
clear distinction. Euthanasia involves transitioning an animal to death as
painlessly and stress-free as possible. Mass depopulation is a method that gives as
much consideration to the welfare of animals as practicable, given extenuating
circumstances. Mass depopulation will likely be employed in an ASF outbreak as
40
Existing biosecurity producer plans are available online, such as SHIP and SPS.
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a response measure to prevent or mitigate the spread of ASF through the
elimination of infected or potentially infected swine in order to protect agriculture
and the National economy. The United States recognizes this as a control and
eradication strategy, as defined by international standards and the WOAH as
“stamping-out” (refer to Section 3.3.1).
In an ASF outbreak, euthanasia or mass depopulation will be conducted in
accordance with the AVMA’s guidance
41
so that all affected swine are
depopulated safely, quickly, efficiently, and humanely as possible. In addition, the
emotional and psychological impact on animal owners, caretakers, their families,
and other personnel should be minimized.
The method of depopulation will depend on animal considerations, facility
characteristics, method characteristics (practicality, reliability, irreversibility, and
compatibility), personnel considerations, carcass considerations, equipment
considerations, and the environment where the animals are maintained. With
ASF, significant environmental contamination can result from blood and fluids
from infected swine—this should also be considered when selecting depopulation
(and disposal) methods. In all cases, euthanasia or depopulation activities must
incorporate excellent biosecurity practices to control the ASFV and prevent
further transmission.
As a general goal, APHIS recommends that depopulation and disposal activities
be completed as soon as possible after approval for indemnity payment. That said,
identifying a specific depopulation response time goal is not an absolute
requirement. Assessing possible depopulation and disposal of swine on any farm
location will require proper planning and resources to ensure health and safety of
the owner, grower and responders, and proper planning and resources will be
needed to ensure animal welfare.
4.11.2 Disposal
Proper disposal of animal carcasses and materials (e.g., bedding, feed) prevents or
mitigates spread of ASFV. The goal is to conduct operations in a timely, safe,
biosecure, acceptable, and environmentally responsible manner. Wastes requiring
disposal may include carcasses, animal products, contaminated manure, litter,
bedding, contaminated feed, contaminated personal protective equipment (PPE),
and contaminated materials and equipment that cannot be cleaned and disinfected.
Due to the persistent nature of ASFV, options for disposal are limited. For
example, composting may not be feasible when there are large amounts of
biomass; resources for rendering are currently limited. Burial poses significant
challenges with environmental contamination and the ability of the ASFV to
41
The AVMA Guidelines for the Depopulation of Animals support advance planning for
possible emergency situations and provide guidance for making decisions during an emergency:
https://www.avma.org/resources-tools/avma-policies/avma-guidelines-depopulation-animals
.
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persist in the environment. Each option has its own environmental, logistical, and
managerial challenges. APHIS and State officials and subject matter experts will
collaborate to determine best approaches.
Disposal may involve other State and Federal agencies: USDA may coordinate
with HHS, DHS, and/or the Environmental Protection Agency to provide
technical assistance and guidance, in alignment with Federal, State, and local
regulations.
Refer to the FAD PReP Disposal SOP and the NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal for
more details.
4.11.3 Cleaning and Disinfection/Virus Elimination
C&D is a general term describing a part of regular biosecurity operations (e.g., to
disinfect vehicles). Cleaning is the removal of gross contamination, organic
material, and debris via dry cleaning (sweeping) and/or wet cleaning (water and
soap or detergent); disinfection destroys or eliminates the pathogen through heat
or chemical means. A combination of methods may be required.
In a disease response context, virus elimination refers to the C&D activities that
are undertaken stepwise after depopulation and disposal in order to move towards
restocking. Virus elimination is C&D with the primary purpose to destroy or
eliminate ASFV on the premises as cost effectively as possible to prevent further
spread. A virus elimination plan includes the area/materials undergoing C&D,
methods, personnel, materials, supplies, equipment, and other relevant
considerations. When performing virus elimination procedures, it is important to
do so in the safest manner possible. The plan may also include the scientific
rationale for virus elimination parameters, the process by which the premises will
be evaluated and recorded as successfully cleaned and disinfected, specific
protocols, and procedures for handling damaged private property due to C&D
activities. Contingencies such as fallowing may be considered for premises that
cannot undergo the C&D process. Specific C&D guidance for meat harvest
establishments, rendering and spray dried blood / plasma facilities can be found in
the ASF Response Plans suite (see Section 1.3.2.4.3)
For more information on disinfectants approved for use against ASFV, see here.
The document at this link is updated as needed.
Further information can be found in the FAD PReP Cleaning and Disinfection
SOP and in the NAHEMS: Cleaning and Disinfection.
4.11.4 National Veterinary Stockpile Operations
The National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) provides key resources, equipment, and
services for animal disease outbreaks in the United States. NVS has, and
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continues to, prioritize ASF preparedness activities. It is in the process of building
an inventory of supplies and equipment, such as that listed below, to aid in a
response to an ASF outbreak.
• Diagnostic sampling supplies
• Mobile incinerators
• Electric stunners
• Captive bolt stunners and repair parts
• Manual and automated swine carcass carts
• Carcass bags
• Grinders
• Portable wash stations
• PPE
• Swine handling equipment, such as hog snares and sorting panels
NVS can be reached by email, [email protected]; or in an emergency situation, call
800-940-6524.
4.12 APHIS WILDLIFE SERVICES
USDA APHIS works in close collaboration, communication, and coordination
with DOI and other Federal, State, Tribal, and local wildlife agencies that have
primary jurisdictional authority and subject matter expertise for wildlife,
including feral swine. This collaboration, communication, and coordination
occurs in both the unified IC as well as in Multiagency Coordination Groups
when established.
The NAHEMS Guidelines: Wildlife Management and Vector Control for an FAD
Response in Domestic Livestock discusses personnel and equipment required for
wildlife management, quarantine and movement control for wildlife, wildlife risk
assessment, wildlife surveillance, and related activities.
4.12.1 Feral Swine Management
In any ASF response, epidemiologists and wildlife experts will need to quickly
assess the presence of feral swine populations in or near the area of infection.
ASFV can infect many different members of the Suidae family including wild
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boar which can be found in the United States. However, peccaries, which are also
found in North America, are believed to be resistant to infection with ASFV.
A wildlife management plan that addresses transmission of ASF in feral swine
will need to be developed as soon as possible after identification of the index case
in either domestic pigs or feral swine. This plan should aim to mitigate
transmission pathways, preventing the exposure of domestic pigs and naïve feral
swine populations to ASFV, ultimately preventing introduction to or eliminating
ASF from feral swine populations. The decision to implement control measures in
wildlife will be based on not only the risk assessment and surveillance, but also
the feasibility of conducting successful control measures. In all cases, the wildlife
management plan must be conducted within local laws and regulations, and
management activities to control and eradicate ASF in feral swine must be
conducted by trained personnel proficient in wildlife health, capture, restraint,
biosecurity, and humane euthanasia.
Additional operational details for implementing ASF response activities for feral
swine in the field will be available on ASF FAD PReP website.
4.12.1.1 MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES
Management activities are based on the initial epidemiological assessment and
may change as the outbreak evolves. ASF measures would include, but are not
exclusive to
Feral swine population surveys,
ASF surveillance in feral swine populations,
Control measures, including removal of carcasses from the landscape
as necessary,
enhanced biosecurity measures to separate feral swine and domestic
pigs,
stamping-out, and
population reduction.
These specific measures will be conducted depending on the zone and area
designation determined by the epidemiological assessment. Within the IZ, habitat
manipulation, such as fencing, may be employed to limit feral swine dispersal and
further dissemination of the virus. Feral swine reduction will occur systematically
in an attempt to limit disturbance.
42
42
Satran, P. (2019). African swine fever in the Czech Republic. Retrieved from
https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/reg-com_ahw_20190225_asf_cze.pdf.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools
July 2023 4-33
The BZ will also be subject to management activities, including feral swine
population reduction. Heightened surveillance activities will assist in the detection
of ASF in feral swine outside of the Control Area. The SZ will also employ
carcass detection methods, in addition to trail camera monitoring, and periodic
removal and sampling of feral swine populations for ASF testing. Outside of the
SZ, activities would focus on enhanced public outreach to encourage reporting of
sick or dead feral swine. Controlling and eliminating feral swine may be a
difficult, resource-intensive activity.
4.12.2 Vectors
ASF can be transmitted by soft ticks (Ornithodoros spp.). The Ornithodoros spp.
that have played a role in ASF persistence and reoccurrence of disease in Africa
and Europe (Iberian Peninsula) – namely O. porcinus (of the O. moubata species
complex) and O. erraticus – are not present in the United States.
43,44
Some
Ornithodoros spp. do exist in certain areas of the United States.
45
Currently, only
three Ornithodoros spp. that are endemic in the United States (O. coriaceus, O.
puertoricensis, and O. turicata) have experimentally been shown to become
infected with ASFV and transmit the virus to swine.
42
Depending on the species,
these ticks remained infected with ASFV between 23 and 506 days. Based on
records from the U.S. National Tick Collection database, only one collection
record between 1891 and 2004 documented Ornithodoros spp. as associated with
swine (O. coriaceus in Sonoma County, California).
42
APHIS and State officials
would need to assess if vectors are present in the Control Area and determine if
control measures are necessary and/or cost-effective.
4.13 INDEMNITY AND COMPENSATION
4.13.1 Authority
See AHPA, 7 U.S. Code 8301 et seq., for the authority to pay claims for animals,
articles, or means of conveyance that are destroyed.
9 CFR 53 provides more information on the regulatory authority governing
indemnity and compensation during an ASF outbreak.
43
Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M.; Mur, Lina; Bastos, Armanda D.S.; Penrith, Mary-Louise. 2015.
New insights into the role of ticks in African swine fever epidemiology. Rev. Sci. Tech. Off. Int.
Epiz. 34(2). 503-511.
44
Golnar, A. J., Martin, E., Wormington, J. D., Kading, R. C., Teel, P. D., Hamer, S. A., &
Hamer, G. L. (2019). Reviewing the Potential Vectors and Hosts of African Swine Fever Virus
Transmission in the United States. Vector borne and zoonotic diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.), 19(7),
512–524. https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2018.2387
.
45
Brown, V. and Bevins, S. (2018). A review of African swine fever and the potential for
introduction into the United States and the possibility of subsequent establishment in feral swine
and native ticks. Front. Vet. Sci., 06. Vol 5.
Specific ASF Response Critical Activities and Tools
July 2023 4-34
See Section 3.4.1 on APHIS’ authority for indemnity, upon confirmation of
ASFV.
4.13.2 Procedures
State and APHIS officials must approve depopulation prior to its occurrence in
order for producers to receive indemnity. This requires rapid communication
between producer, company, State officials, APHIS and laboratory officials.
Depopulation will occur after the USDA APHIS Appraisal & Indemnity Request
Form is signed by appropriate parties. Every attempt will be made to collect
inventory information and other required data as quickly as possible to ensure
rapid depopulation as epidemiological circumstances require.
Appraisal and compensation documents released by the ICG or the unified IC
during an incident specify personnel responsibilities, appraisal procedures,
assessment of compensation eligibility, payment of indemnity, and required forms
and reports during an ASF outbreak.
4.14 ANIMAL WELFARE
During an ASF outbreak, humane treatment must be provided to swine given the
specific circumstances of the outbreak as prescribed by veterinary authorities of
the affected States or Tribal nations. Humane care should be conducted during
any type of movement standstill, and for infected animals until they are
euthanized or depopulated. The Overview of Animal Welfare SOP contains
additional information.
4.15 VACCINATION
To date there is no treatment or commercially available, effective vaccine
available for ASFV that meets requirements for emergency use in the United
States, although significant advances in vaccine research continue to be made.
The USDA Agricultural Research Service continues to work to develop a vaccine
that is both safe and effective for use.
July 2023 5-1
Chapter 5
Recovery
5.1 CRITERIA FOR PROOF OF FREEDOM
WOAH does not grant official recognition for ASF-freedom, but as a member of
WOAH, the United States can self-declare the entire country, zone, or
compartment free of ASF. Please refer to the most current WOAH Terrestrial
Animal Health Code for provisions on ASF-freedom in a country or zone,
compartment, establishment of a containment zone free from ASF, recovery of
free status, and recommendations for importation of swine and swine products
from countries not free of ASF.
Trading partners will evaluate, on an individual or multilateral basis, all self-
declarations from the United States for ASF-freedom both after an incident and
for any regionalization activities that may occur during an incident. Trading
partners determine whether to lift or modify trade restrictions based on
information that is provided by the United States.
5.2 WOAH TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH CODE
For the purposes of the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2022), there is a
distinction between domestic and captive wild pigs, wild and feral swine, and
African wild suid species. Per Article 15.1.2, “commodities of suids can be traded
safely in accordance with the relevant articles of this chapter.”
5.2.1 Article 15.1.4 Country or Zone Free from ASF
1. Historical freedom
A country or zone may be considered free from ASF without pathogen-specific
surveillance if the provisions of Article 1.4.6 are complied with and commodities of
suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of this chapter.
2. Freedom in all suids
A country or zone which does not meet the conditions of point 1) above may be
considered free from ASF in all suids when it complies with all the criteria of Article
15.1.3, especially point 7, and when:
a. surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.1.28 to 15.1.33 has been in place
Recovery
July 2023 5-2
for the past three years;
b. there has been no case of infection with ASFV in domestic or captive wild
pigs during the past three years; this period can be reduced to 12 months
when the surveillance has demonstrated no evidence of presence or
involvement of Ornithodoros ticks;
c. commodities of suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of
this chapter.
3. Freedom in domestic and captive wild pigs
A country or zone which does not meet the conditions of point 1) or point 2(b), i.e.
when there are cases of infection with ASFV in feral or wild suids, may be
considered free from ASF in domestic and captive wild pigs when it complies with
all the criteria of Article 15.1.3, especially point 7, and when:
a. surveillance in accordance with Articles 15.1.28 to 15.1.33 has been in place
for the past three years;
b. there has been no case of infection with ASFV in domestic or captive wild
pigs during the past three years; this period can be reduced to 12 months
when the surveillance has demonstrated no evidence of presence or
involvement of Ornithodoros ticks;
c. commodities of suids are imported in accordance with the relevant articles of
this chapter.
5.2.2 Article 15.1.7 Recovery of Free Status
Should an outbreak of ASF occur in a previously free country or zone, its status may
be restored three months after the disinfection of the last infected establishment,
provided that:
1. a stamping-out policy has been implemented and, in the case where ticks are
suspected or known to be involved in the epidemiology of the infection, has
been followed by the use of sentinel pigs in the infected establishments for
two months;
2. surveillance in accordance with Article 15.1.31 has been carried out with
negative results.
Otherwise, the provisions of point 2) of Article 15.1.4 apply.
The WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2022), Chapter 15.1, can be found
here.
Recovery
July 2023 5-3
5.3 RESTOCKING
During an ASF incident in the United States, APHIS and/or State officials will
provide additional guidance for restocking previously Infected Premises,
including any sentinel pig activities that may be required. A primary goal of the
response is to ensure that response efforts do not cause more damage and
disruption than the disease outbreak itself; however, caution is urged in restocking
premises since re-infection strains resources and perpetuates the risk of ASF
transmission. Depending on outbreak-specific circumstances, APHIS may not
indemnify premises that are restocked without APHIS and State approval that
subsequently become re-infected.
The total time in which it takes a premises to go from an IP with sick pigs, to a
premises that has finished virus elimination, to a restocked premises is based on
many factors, including: the type of premises, epidemiology of the outbreak,
location of other ASF IPs, evidence provided to State and APHIS officials, and
method of disposal. Restocking on previously IPs may take place before the end
of the outbreak has been declared, under conditions established by the unified IC.
For more specific guidance on restocking after ASF-infection, please refer to the
ASF policy guidance and procedures that is provided on
www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.
July 2023 A-1
Appendix A
Glossary
For the purposes of [Chapter 15.1 Infection With African Swine Fever Virus in the
World Organisation of Animal Health (WOAH) Terrestrial Animal Health Code], a
distinction is made among:
• domestic and captive wild pigs, permanently captive or farmed free range,
used for the production of meat, or other commercial products or use, or for
breeding;
• wild and feral pigs
46
;
• African wild suid species.
All varieties of Sus scrofa are susceptible to the pathogenic effects of ASFV, while
the African wild suids are not and may act as reservoirs of the virus. Ticks of the
genus Ornithodoros are the only known natural arthropod hosts of the virus and act
as reservoirs and biological vectors.
Active Surveillance Surveillance where officials initiate the collection, collation, and
analysis of animal health data to define the extent of disease, to detect
new outbreaks, and to establish disease-free zones utilizing defined
surveillance protocols.
Animal product Blood or any of its components, bones, bristles, feathers, flesh, offal,
skins, and any by product containing any of those components that
originated from an animal or bird.
African swine fever
(ASF) (WOAH)
An infection of suids with ASFV (From the WOAH Terrestrial Code,
Chapter 15.1). ASFV has been isolated from samples from a suid; or
antigen or nucleic acid specific to ASFV has been identified in
samples for a suid showing clinical signs or pathological lesions
suggestive or ASF or epidemiologically-linked to a suspected or
confirmed case of ASF, or from a suid giving cause for suspicion of
previous association or contact with ASFV; or antibodies specific to
ASFV have been detected in samples from a suid showing clinical
signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASF, or
epidemiologically-linked to a suspected or confirmed case of ASF, or
giving cause for suspicion of previous association or contact with
ASFV.
46
Feral/wild/free-ranging suids are also referred to as non-captive swine.
Glossary
July 2023 A-2
Backyard swine Domestic swine raised for food production and confined to a housing
facility with access to the outdoors surrounded by a fence or other
barrier.
Breeder swine Sexually intact swine over 6 months of age (from 9 CFR 71).
Case Any pig infected by ASFV, with or without clinical signs.
Commercial swine Domestic swine raised for food production and confined to a housing
facility designed to prevent exposure to feral swine.
Continuity of
Business
The managed movement of non-infected animals and non-
contaminated animal products from non-infected premises in an ASF
outbreak.
Control Area
A Control Area (an Infected Zone and Buffer Zone) has individual
premises quarantine for Infected Premises, Suspect Premises, and
Contact Premises and movement restrictions for At-Risk Premises
and Monitored Premises.
Domestic pig Any swine species owned in a captive environment, whether the
confinement is in a building or behind a fence or other barrier.
Domestic pig may be further characterized as backyard swine or
commercial swine.
Etiology The causes or origin of disease, or the factors that produce or
predispose toward a certain disease or disorder.
Euthanasia (WOAH)
The act of inducing death using a method that causes a rapid and
irreversible loss of consciousness with minimum pain and distress to
animal.
FAD PReP (Foreign
Animal Disease
Preparedness and
Response Plan)
Documents used to identify overall strategies, veterinary functions,
organization, and countermeasures necessary to contain and control
an FAD outbreak. It is also used to integrate functions and
countermeasures with emergency management systems and
operations conducted in joint and unified command by Federal, State,
Tribal, and local personnel.
Feeder swine Swine under 6 months of age that are not slaughter swine (from 9
CFR 71).
Feral animal An animal of a domesticated species that lives without requiring
human supervision or control (from WOAH Terrestrial Code
Glossary).
Feral swine Free-roaming swine (from 9 CFR 78). Feral swine are not domestic
swine.
Fomites Inanimate objects that can transmit infectious agents from one animal
or person to another.
Foreign animal
disease
A transboundary animal disease not known to exist in the U.S. animal
population.
Glossary
July 2023 A-3
Germplasm Genetic material such as semen, embryos, tissues, and other DNA
sequences maintained for the purposes of swine breeding.
Incubation period
(WOAH)
For the purposes of the WOAH Terrestrial Code (2022) the
incubation period for Sus scrofa (domestic and wild swine) shall be
15 days. The incubation period is the longest period that elapses
between the introduction of the pathogenic agent into the animal and
the occurrence of the first clinical signs of the disease.
Index case The first or original case identified in a disease outbreak.
Lairage (WOAH) Pens, yards, and other holding areas used for accommodating animals
in order to give them necessary attention (such as water, feed, rest)
before they are moved on or used for a specific purpose including
slaughter.
Depopulation, Mass
depopulation
(AVMA)
Method by which large numbers of animals must be destroyed quickly
and efficiently with as much consideration given to the welfare of the
animals as practicable, but where the circumstances and tasks facing
those doing the depopulation are understood to be extenuating.
Movement control Refers to the movement of people, animals, animal products, vehicles,
and equipment in a specific area subject to certain criteria typically
accomplished through a permit system.
Movement standstill Temporary prohibition of the initiation of any new movement of
susceptible species in a defined area.
National Animal
Health Laboratory
Network (NAHLN)
NAHLN is a cooperative effort between two U.S. Department of
Agriculture agencies and the American Association of Veterinary
Laboratory Diagnosticians. It is a national network of State and
University laboratories, which use common testing methods and
software platforms to perform diagnostics and share information.
Non-susceptible
animal
Animal that does not develop a particular disease when exposed to the
causative infectious agent of that disease.
WOAH (World
Organization for
Animal Health)
Organization that collects and publishes information on animal
diseases from approximately 182 member countries and develops
standards for animal health.
Outbreak The occurrence of cases of a disease that are in excess of what is
normally expected in a given population.
Passive Surveillance The voluntary reporting of suspect cases by producers and
practitioners.
Personal protective
equipment (PPE)
Clothing and equipment to prevent occupational injuries and diseases
through control of exposure to potential hazards in the work place
after engineering and administrative controls have been implemented
to the fullest extent.
Glossary
July 2023 A-4
Preemptive
depopulation
Depopulation under the competent authority of susceptible animal
species in herds on premises that have been exposed to infection by
direct animal-to-animal contact or by indirect contact of a kind likely
to result in the transmission of ASFV prior to the expression of
clinical signs.
Premises A geographically and epidemiologically defined location, including a
ranch, farm, stable, or other establishment.
Quarantine Imposes restrictions on entering or leaving a premises, area, or region
where disease exists or is suspected.
Sensitivity (WOAH) The proportion of infected sampling units that are correctly identified
as positive.
Slaughter swine Swine being sold or moved for slaughter purposes only (from 9 CFR
71).
Specificity (WOAH) The proportion of uninfected sampling units that are correctly
identified as negative.
Stamping-out
(WOAH)
A policy designed to eliminate an outbreak by carrying out under the
authority of the Veterinary Authority the following: (a) the killing of
the animals which are affected and those suspected of being affected
in the herd or flock and, where appropriate, those in other herds or
flocks which have been exposed to infection by direct animal to
animal contact, or by indirect contact with the causal pathogenic
agent; animals should be killed in accordance with Chapter 7.6; (b)
the disposal of carcasses and, where relevant, animal products by
rendering, burning or burial, or by any other method described in
Chapter 4.13; (c) the cleansing and disinfection of establishments
through procedures defined in Chapter 4.14.
Susceptible animal Any animal that can be infected with and replicate the disease
pathogen of concern. The susceptible animals of primary concern to
this plan are swine.
Susceptible species See susceptible animal.
Targeted Surveillance A strategy that focuses on sampling premises or populations that may
be at risk including sick pigs, and elevated mortality events with the
purpose of enhancing vigilance for animal disease.
Trace-back The identification of the origin and movements of all animals, animal
products, conveyances, possible fomites, people, vehicles, and
possible vectors from an Infected Premises to establish the original
source of infection.
Trace-forward The tracing of all animals, people, and fomites that have left Infected
Premises and could have possibly transmitted ASF to a new premises.
These premises should be investigated, evaluated, and placed under
quarantine or other measures depending upon their risk.
Glossary
July 2023 A-5
Vector (WOAH) An insect or any living carrier that transports an infectious agent from
an infected individual to a susceptible individual or its food or
immediate surroundings. The organism may or may not pass through
a development cycle within the vector.
Virus Elimination The cleaning and disinfection activities that are undertaken after
depopulation and disposal with the primary purpose to destroy or
eliminate all viruses on the premises as cost effectively as possible.
Wildlife
All free-ranging animals, including native and exotic wildlife species,
as well as feral domestic animals in the United States.
Wildlife reservoir
A population of free ranging/free living species in which an infectious
agent/vector has become established, lives, and multiplies and is
therefore a potential source of infection/infestation to other domestic
and free ranging species.
June 2023 B-1
Appendix B
Example Overview Emergency Management
Response System 2.0 Workflow
Figure B-1 provides an example workflow illustrating a broad overview of the
Emergency Management Response System 2.0 (EMRS2) data entry activities
undertaken when ASF response activities occur. Disease management involves a
dizzying array of activities, which are recorded and managed within EMRS2.
Example Overview Emergency Management Response System 2.0 Workflow
July 2023 B-2
Figure B-1. EMRS2 Data Entry Example Workflow for an ASF Outbreak
July 2023 C-1
Appendix C
Abbreviations
3D
depopulation, decontamination, and disposal
AHPA
Animal Health Protection Act
Ab
antibody
Ab ELISA
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
AC
Area Command
ACIA
antigen capture immunoassay
AMT
APHIS Management Team
APHIS
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
ARIS
APHIS Response Information System
ARP
At-Risk Premises
AVMA
American Veterinary Medical Association
ASF
African swine fever
ASFV
African swine fever virus
AVIC
area veterinarian in charge
BZ
Buffer Zone
C&D
cleaning and disinfection
CEAH
Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
COB
continuity of business
CONUS
Continental United States
CSSC
Certified Swine Sample Collection
CVO
Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States (VS DA)
DFA
direct fluorescent antibody
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DNA
deoxyribonucleic acid
DOI
Department of Interior
EDTA
Ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid
ELISA
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
July 2023 C-2
EMRS2
Emergency Management Response System 2.0
EPC
emergency preparedness committee
FAD
foreign animal disease
FADD
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician
FAD PReP
Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan
FADDL
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory
FFS
Federal-to-Federal support
FRS
financial reimbursement specialist
FSIS
Food Safety and Inspection Service
GIS
Geographic Information System
HHS
Department of Health and Human Services
HPAI
highly pathogenic avian influenza
IC
Incident Command
ICG
Incident Coordination Group
ICP
Incident Command Post
ICS
Incident Command System
IFA
IFAT
immunofluorescence assays
indirect fluorescent antibody test
IMT
Incident Management Team
IP
Infected Premises
IPT
immunoperoxidase test
IZ
Infected Zone
JIC
Joint Information Center
LPA
Legislative and Public Affairs
MAC
Multiagency Coordination
NAHEMS
National Animal Health Emergency Management System
NAHLN
National Animal Health Laboratory Network
NAMI
North American Meat Institute
NIMS
National Incident Management System
NIMT
National Incident Management Team
NLRAD
National List of Reportable Animal Diseases
NPIC
National Preparedness and Incident Coordination
Abbreviations
July 2023 C-3
NRF
National Response Framework
NVS
National Veterinary Stockpile
NVSL
National Veterinary Services Laboratories
NVSL-Ames
National Veterinary Services Laboratories-Ames, IA
NVSL-FADDL
National Veterinary Services Laboratories-Foreign Animal Disease
Diagnostic Laboratory Plum Island, NY
PCR
polymerase chain reaction
PIO
public information officer
PMIP
pre-movement isolation period
PPE
personal protective equipment
PZ
Protection Zone
rRT-PCR
real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction
SAHO
State Animal Health Official
SDA
Surveillance Design and Analysis
SHPA
Swine Health Protection Act
SOP
standard operating procedure
SPS
Secure Pork Supply
SPWG
Slaughter Plant Working Group
SZ
Surveillance Zone
TBTB
tris-buffered tryptose broth
TDD
telecommunications device for the deaf
USAHA
United States Animal Health Association
USDA
U.S. Department of Agriculture
US SHIP
U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan
VI
virus isolation
VS
Veterinary Services
VSET
VS Executive Team
WOAH
World Organisation for Animal Health
WS
Wildlife Services
July 2023 D-1
Appendix D
Selected References and Resources
Note: all FAD PReP documents are also references to this USDA APHIS ASF Response
Plan: The Red Book, which are located at www.aphis.usda.gov/fadprep.
APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Literature Review: Non-animal Origin Feed Ingredients
and the Transmission of Viral Pathogens of Swine. Risk Assessment Team.
Retrieved from
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/non
-animal-origin-feed-ingredients-transmission-of-viral-pathogens.pdf.
APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Non-animal origin feed ingredient risk evaluation
framework: scoping. Risk Assessment Team. Retrieved from
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/nofi
-scope.pdf.
APHIS CEAH. (2019, March). Qualitative assessment of the likelihood of African Swine
Fever Virus entry to the United States: entry assessment. Risk Assessment Team.
Retrieved from
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/animal_diseases/swine/asf-
entry.pdf.
Brown, V. and Bevins, S. (2018). A review of African swine fever and the potential for
introduction into the United States and the possibility of subsequent establishment
in feral swine and native ticks. Front. Vet. Sci., 06. Vol 5.
Dardiri A.H., Yedloutschnig R.J., & Taylor W.D. (1969). Clinical and serologic response
of American white-collared peccaries to African swine fever, foot-and-mouth
disease, vesicular stomatitis, vesicular exanthema of swine, hog cholera, and
rinderpest viruses. Proc Annual Meeting U.S. Animal Health Assoc. 73, 437–52.
European Food Safety Authority. (2018). Epidemiological analyses of African swine
fever in the European Union. European Food Safety Authority Journal. 16(11),
e05494. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2018.5494.
Golnar, A. J., Martin, E., Wormington, J. D., Kading, R. C., Teel, P. D., Hamer, S. A., &
Hamer, G. L. (2019). Reviewing the Potential Vectors and Hosts of African
Swine Fever Virus Transmission in the United States. Vector borne and zoonotic
diseases (Larchmont, N.Y.), 19(7), 512–524.
https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2018.2387
Selected References and Resources
July 2023 D-2
Guinat, C., Porphyre, T., Gogin, A., Dixon, L., Pfeiffer, D. U., & Gubbins, S. (2018).
Inferring within-herd transmission parameters for African swine fever virus using
mortality data from outbreaks in the Russian Federation. Transboundary and
emerging diseases, 65(2), e264–e271. https://doi.org/10.1111/tbed.12748.
Guinat, C., Gogin, A., Blome, S., Keil, G., Pollin, R., Pfeiffer, D.U., and Dixon, L.
(2016). Transmission routes of African swine fever virus to domestic pigs: current
knowledge and future research directions. Veterinary Record.178, 262-267. Doi:
10.1136/vr.103593.
Karl Ståhl, K., Sternberg-Lewerin, S., Blome, S., Viltrop, A., Penrith, M., Chenais, W.
(2019). Lack of evidence for long term carriers of African swine fever virus - a
systematic review, Virus Research, Vol 272.
Kay, S. L., Fischer, J. W., Monaghan, A. J., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., Campbell, T.
A., ... & Wisely, S. M. (2017). Quantifying drivers of wild pig movement across
multiple spatial and temporal scales. Movement ecology, 5(1), 14. Doi:
10.1186/s40462-017-0105-1.
Kleiboeker, S.B. (2002). Swine fever: Classical swine fever and African swine fever. Vet
Clin Food Anim. 18, 431–451.
Lewis, J. S., Corn, J. L., Mayer, J. J., Jordan, T. R., Farnsworth, M. L., Burdett, C. L., ...
& Miller, R. S. (2019). Historical, current, and potential population size estimates
of invasive wild pigs (Sus scrofa) in the United States. Biological Invasions,
21(7), 2373-2384. Doi: 10.1007/s10530-019-01983-1.
Malladi S, Ssematimba A, Bonney PJ, St Charles KM, Boyer T, Goldsmith T, Walz E,
Cardona CJ, Culhane MR. Predicting the time to detect moderately virulent
African swine fever virus in finisher swine herds using a stochastic disease
transmission model. BMC Vet Res. 2022 Mar 2;18(1):84. doi: 10.1186/s12917-
022-03188-6.
Olesen, A.S., Lohse, L., Hansen, M.F., Boklund, A., Halasa, T., Belsham, G.J., …
Bodker, R. (2018). Infection of pigs with African swine fever virus via ingestion
of stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans). Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65,
1152–1157.
Pepin, K. M., Brown, V. R., Yang, A., Beasley, J. C., Boughton, R., VerCauteren, K.
C., Miller, R. S., & Bevins, S. N. (2022). Optimising response to an introduction
of African swine fever in wild pigs. Transboundary and Emerging
Diseases, 69, e3111– e3127.
Pepin, K. M., Davis, A. J., Beasley, J., Boughton, R., Campbell, T., Cooper, S. M., ... &
Wyckoff, C. (2016). Contact heterogeneities in feral swine: implications for
disease management and future research. Ecosphere, 7(3), e01230. Doi:
10.1002/ecs2.1230.
Selected References and Resources
July 2023 D-3
Petrov, A., Forth, J.H., Zani, L., Beer, M. & Blome, S. (2018). No evidence for long-term
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