• evaluating the use of “preferred lists”;
• restricting the retail investors to whom
certain products may be recommended;
• prescribing minimum knowledge and/
or training requirements for financial
professionals who may provide
recommendations or advice with regard to
certain products; and
• conducting periodic product reviews to
identify potential conflicts of interest,
whether the measures addressing conflicts
are working as intended, and to modify the
measures or product selection accordingly.”)
(citations omitted).
19 Id. at Question 5 (asking: “My firm has identified
all of its conflicts of interest. Once the firm
discloses the conflicts to retail investors, have
we satisfied our obligations under Reg BI and
the IA fiduciary standard?” and responding:
“No. Disclosure of conflicts alone does not
satisfy the obligation to act in a retail investor’s
best interest. Further, as discussed below,
certain conflicts should (and in some cases,
must) be addressed through mitigation.Where
such conflicts cannot be effectively addressed
through mitigation, firms may need to determine
whether to eliminate the conflict or refrain from
providing advice or recommendations that are
influenced by that conflict to avoid violating the
obligation to act in a retail investor’s best interest
in light of the investor’s objectives.Moreover,
even if conflicts are sufficiently addressed,
under both Reg BI and the IA fiduciary standard,
firms and their financial professionals can
provide recommendations or advice only when
they have a reasonable basis to believe that
the recommendation or advice is in the retail
investor’s best interest.”) (citations omitted);
Question 12.c. (“While firms should disclose the
existence and potential effects of such conflicts,
the staff reminds firms that disclosure of
conflicts alone does not satisfy a firm’s obligation
to act in the retail investor’s best interest.”).
20 Id. at Question 13 (“The staff believes that
identifying and addressing conflicts is not a “set
it and forget it” exercise. Firms should monitor
conflicts over time and assess periodically the
adequacy and effectiveness of their policies
and procedures to help ensure continued
compliance with Reg BI and the IA fiduciary
standard. Reasonably designed policies and
procedures that address conflicts may later
cease to be reasonably designed based on
subsequent events or information obtained,
such as through supervision (e.g.,exception
testing of recommendations), and the actual
experience of the firm.”).
21 See SEC Staff Bulletin on Care, supra note 11 at
Question 17 (“In the view of the staff, firms and
financial professionals should consider whether
less complex, less risky or lower cost alternatives
can achieve the same objectives for their retail
customers as part of their overall reasonable
basis analysis. Moreover, firms and their financial
professionals generally should apply “heightened
scrutiny” to whether a risky or complex product
is in the retail investor’s best interest.”); Question
18 (“Examples of products where heightened
scrutiny may be necessary include, but are
not limited to, inverse or leveraged exchange-
traded products, investments traded on margin,
derivatives, crypto asset securities, penny stocks,
private placements, asset-backed securities,
volatility-linked exchange-traded products, and
reverse-convertible notes.”).
22 Id at Question 19 (“In the staff’s view, firms that
make recommendations of, or provide advice
about, complex or risky products to retail
Regulatory Notice 9
December 5, 2023
23-20