Microsoft Word - Constitutional Concerns Related to Jury Trials During the COVID.docx

*Special thanks go to Weston Coward, a graduating law student, Georgetown University Law Center, for assisting in

the legal research that supports this paper.

Conducting jury trials and grand jury proceedings during the pandemic has posed significant practical

and legal challenges for courts. This memo identifies constitutional issues implicated when courts

have suspended jury trials or adjusted jury trial procedures to minimize risks to public health during

COVID-19. It is beyond the scope of this writing to describe laws state-by-state that define public

emergencies and authorize government officials to require certain unusual actions (for example,

wearing face coverings) or prohibit certain normal practices (for example, completely in-person jury

trials). Rather, the goal here is to set forth established legal standards that apply broadly to jury trials

in America. The authors hope the black letter law statements herein will help court leaders chart a

trustworthy path to resuming jury trials in their jurisdiction.

Contents

Right to a Speedy Trial ………………………………………………………………….…...………2

Right to a Public Trial ……………………………………………………………………..…….….3

Right to an Impartial Jury …………………………………………………………………..………5

Representative Jury Pools ………………………………………………………….…........…...…..5

Selecting Unbiased Petit Jurors ………………………………………………..…........………..…..7

Confrontation Clause ……………………………………………………………….…...…...……...8

Grand Juries ………………………………………….…………………………….…...……..…….9

Right to a Civil Jury Trial …………………………………………………………..…..…......…..10

Constitutional Concerns Related to

Jury Trials During the COVID-19

Pandemic

A Pandemic Resource from NCSC

March 29, 2021, Version #3

I. Right to a Speedy Jury Trial

Pandemic Issue:

With many courts ordering the suspension of jury trials (sometimes indefinitely), does freezing

trial dates violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial?

Black Letter Law:

The Constitution’s Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein

the crime shall have been committed.”

In Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the

right to a jury trial applies to states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court explained that

“[b]ecause we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme

of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal

cases which—were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee.”

The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial applies to “serious” crimes

(distinguished from petty offenses); generally interpreted to mean felonies in which the penalty

is one year or more in prison.

In Klopfer v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that the guarantee of a speedy trial applied

to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The Supreme Court has not

interpreted the right to a speedy trial to require that a case be brought within a specific number of

days. The Court explained in Barker v. Wingo that a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy

trial can only be determined on an ad hoc basis.

Note that several states have codified the

number of days in which defendants must be brought to trial. Courts must balance four factors

when determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial: (1) the

length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay (such as a public health emergency

); (3) the

defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.

None of these factors

are dispositive, and courts must also consider any other circumstances that are relevant to the

inquiry.

Whether the Constitutional speedy trial requirement applies to defendants not being held in

custody depends on whether charges are currently pending. In United States v. Loud Hawk, the

Supreme Court held that “when no indictment [or information] is outstanding, only the ‘actual

restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge . . . engage the particular

protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.”

This means that when the

actual restraints are removed and “defendants are not incarcerated or subjected to other

substantial restrictions on their liberty, a court should not weigh that time towards a claim under

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

Id. at 149.

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967).

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

While the current pandemic is active, speedy trial rules have been suspended all over the country. E.g., Stanley v.

Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 263 Cal.Rptr. 3d. 735 (2020).

Id.

Id. at 533.

United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 311 (1986) (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404

U.S. 307, 320 (1971)).

the Speedy Trial Clause.”

The Court explained that one of the goals of the speedy trial

guarantee is to “minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial,” and applying the

speedy trial guarantee to out-of-custody defendants does not further that goal.

However, the

speedy trial guarantee does apply to an out-of-custody defendant if there are “outstanding” or

“pending” charges.

The Speedy Trial Clause applies in that situation because the defendant is

still “the subject of public accusation” and his life is being disrupted by “the presence of

unresolved criminal charges.”

It is important to note, too, that an out-of-custody defendant might have a statutory right to a

speedy trial pursuant to state law. Though, the time frame for when the state has to conduct the

trial usually depends on whether or not the accused is in custody or free on bail.

Reasonable Path Going Forward:

It would appear that the public health emergency caused by the pandemic justifies postponement

of trials, but not cancellation.

II. Right to a Public Trial

Pandemic Issue:

Many public health agencies have required courts and other public enterprises to observe safety

precautions such as social distancing, face coverings, and sanitation protocols. These directives

have prompted courts to radically change the methods for accessing court proceedings. These

include conducting: (1) completely online trials, or (2) hybrid trials where some parts are online

(for example, jury selection) and some parts are live (such as receipt of witness testimony or jury

deliberations), or (3) completely in-person trials with radical adjustment of the physical layout of

court spaces. In any of these scenarios, the public at large is physically absent from all or large

parts of the trial. In purely remote trials, audio-visual platforms are devoted exclusively to

courtroom actors (parties, attorneys, witnesses, and court personnel). In hybrid or completely

live trials, social distancing requirements have caused court managers to convert courtroom

galleries (normally reserved for public observers and news media) into extended space for

courtroom actors. For example, the gallery becomes an extended jury box exclusively for jurors.

Members of the press and interested citizens are assigned to satellite spaces to “view” or listen to

the trial remotely. Does the exclusion of the public from the courtroom violate the defendant’s

right to a public trial? If so, does streaming the trial proceedings online provide an acceptable

alternative for public access?

Black Letter Law:

Id. at 312.

Id. at 311 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)).

Id. (quoting MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8).

Id. (quoting MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 8, 9).

Compare 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/103-5(a) (“Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall

be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody.”), with 725

Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/103-5(b) (“Every person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having

jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial.”).

The Sixth Amendment’s establishment of a public trial right was made applicable to the states in

In re Oliver.

There, the Court stated a public trial is “for the benefit of the accused” because

“the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned,” which has the effect of

“keep[ing] his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their

functions.”

However, like most constitutional rights, the right to a public trial is not absolute. In Waller v.

Georgia, the Supreme Court set forth the test that trial courts must use to determine whether a

courtroom closure is appropriate.

A closure is appropriate when:

[1] the party [or a court during a pandemic] seeking to close the

[proceeding] must advance an overriding interest that is likely to

be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to

protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable

alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make

findings adequate to support the closure.

At least some courts have interpreted the Waller test to require the application of strict scrutiny.

In the event of a partial closure, some courts have applied a less rigorous test than the one

outlined in Waller.

It should also be noted that the right to a public trial has been interpreted to apply to other

proceedings, including voir dire.

The Waller test also governs an inquiry into whether the

public can be excluded from voir dire.

The Supreme Court has also held that the press and the public have a similar right under the First

Amendment to attend criminal trials.

In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. For the

Cnty. of Riverside, the Supreme Court outlined the test that determines whether the courts can

restrict the public’s access to proceedings.

To establish a claim of a First Amendment right of

access to criminal proceedings, the requesting party must prove two elements. First, that “the

place and process have historically been open to the press and general public.”

Second, that

“public access plays a significant role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”

Then, “[i]f the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience and logic, a

qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.”

This right of access can only be

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948).

Id. at 270 n.25.

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).

Id. at 48.

See Commonwealth v. Chism, 65 N.E.3d 1171, 1178 (Mass. 2017) (referring to the “four-part strict scrutiny test

articulated in Waller”).

See Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir. 2001) (requiring a “substantial” reason for a partial closure)

See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010).

Id. at 213.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).

Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. for the Cnty. of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1 (1978).

Id. at 8.

Id.

Id. at 9.

overcome by an “overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher

values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”

A court must also articulate “findings

specific enough” for a reviewing court to determine whether the closure was proper.

As with other constitutional protections, the right to a public trial is not absolute. The North

Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Martinez

recently parsed what constitutes adequate waiver of

a public trial under state and federal caselaw. With the current public health crisis causing

edginess among some court actors and the general public about in-person gatherings, the case

may be worth consulting by courts and litigators.

Reasonable Path Going Forward:

Live streaming of trial proceedings during the pandemic likely satisfies the Waller test.

Streaming should provide clear video footage of judge, lawyers, and witnesses. Streaming of

jurors should be done in ways that protect their privacy and prevent intimidation. Since juror

demeanor is important in selecting a jury, images of jurors should only occur during voir dire

and not during the remainder of the trial. Each juror should only be identified by their badge

number. Any re-configuring of courthouse space or use of remote means to engage the media

and public at large should be accompanied by a clear, public statement by court management

that, in the words of the Press Enterprise court, the space adjustments and digital access is

“essential to preserve higher values (public safety, public trust, etc.) and is narrowly tailored to

serve [those] interest[s].” Independent legal advice should be engaged in the drafting of the

public statement.

III. Right to an Impartial Jury

Pandemic Issues:

The public health emergency challenges the creation of impartial juries in two major ways: (1)

summoning representative jury pools, and (2) selecting unbiased petit jurors. These are

discussed separately below.

(1) Representative Jury Pools

Healthcare experts have identified segments of the population that are especially vulnerable to

the effects of COVID-19. These include the elderly, those with pre-existing conditions, and

members of minority populations. They commonly are advised to take extra precautions such as

avoiding public gatherings. With many schools and businesses closed pursuant to public health

agency directives, parents and caretakers of vulnerable family members must stay in place with

their dependents. Accordingly, many endeavors such as schooling and job duties can only be

done remotely from home. The quality of remote communications is dependent, in varying

degrees, upon the quality of a citizen’s digital devices and internet access. These qualifiers are

largely dictated by the user’s financial means. In addition, during the current public health

emergency, first responders such as healthcare workers are constrained from leaving their jobs.

When courts undertake purely remote or hybrid jury trials, there is a risk jury summoning pools

will not be representative of a fair cross section of the community because distinct populations

Id.

Id. at 9–10.

State v. Martinez, __N.E. 2d ___, 2121 WL 1114623 (March 24, 20210.

cannot or will not participate in jury service due to health concerns, financial inability to have

broadband access, or essential job duties.

Black Letter Law:

The Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right

to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed.”

In Parker v. Gladden, the Supreme Court held that the right to a trial

by an impartial jury applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

With regard to the composition of the jury pool, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana

recognized that the presence of a fair cross-section of the community in the jury pool is essential

to a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury.

And in Duren v. Missouri the Court created

a three-prong test that defendants must use to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-

section requirement. Defendants must show:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in

the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires

from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation

to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this

underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in

the jury-selection process.

The Court has never precisely defined the term “distinctive group,” but it has noted that

distinctiveness “must be related to the purposes of the fair-cross-section requirement.”

Most

courts have incorporated Equal Protection considerations into the “distinctive group” prong,

limiting the scope to race, ethnicity, gender, and other “immutable characteristics.” With rare

exceptions, characteristics that can change (age, education, socioeconomic status, political

affiliation) are not recognized as distinctive groups.

The exclusion of distinctive groups merely needs to be “systemic” – that is, inherent in the jury

selection process itself. It does not need to be intentional exclusion, which is the higher

threshold required for an Equal Protection violation. Early fair cross section challenges during

the public health crisis have failed on grounds that the exclusion of distinctive groups from the

jury pool was not systemic, but instead was due to the pandemic.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966).

See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).

Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986). The three purposes of the fair-cross-section requirement are: “(1)

guarding against the exercise of arbitrary power and ensuring that the commonsense judgment of the community

will act as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor, (2) preserving public confidence in the fairness

of the criminal justice system, and (3) implementing our belief that sharing in the administration of justice is a phase

of civic responsibility.” Id. at 174–75 (alterations and quotations omitted).

State of New Jersey v. Dangcil, Superior Court of N.J. App. Div. No. AM-0053-20.

If a defendant introduces evidence supporting all three prongs, the burden shifts to the State to

provide a compelling justification for excluding the distinctive group. The Supreme Court also

grants broad discretion to the state to define qualification and exemption criteria for jury service.

Reasonable Path Going Forward

Courts can reasonably expect that jury pools will be less representative of their respective

communities due to the need to excuse individuals at high risk of severe health effects from

COVID-19 as well as individuals suffering significant financial hardship due to the economic

impact of the pandemic. Principle 10 of the ABA Principles for Juries & Jury Trials,

recommends courts “periodically review … the assembled jury pool for their representativeness

and inclusiveness of the eligible population…. Should the court determine that improvement is

needed in the representativeness or inclusiveness of the … assembled jury pool, appropriate

corrective action should be taken.” Corrective or mitigating action can include the following.

Courts can avoid offering broad exemptions from jury service to affected groups. Instead, they

should follow existing procedures concerning requests to be excused from jury service, and

carefully document the impact on the demographic composition of the jury pool. Courts can also

encourage prospective juror participation by publicizing the measures to protect public health

and safety in the courthouse.

(2) Selecting Unbiased Petit Jurors

In totally remote and hybrid jury selections, the ability of the parties and the court to observe the

demeanor of prospective jurors may be compromised. During remote voir dire, the nuances of a

juror’s body language are crimped by the confines of a video screen. In hybrid jury selections

conducted in socially distanced courthouse settings, evaluation of a juror’s demeanor is

compromised by face coverings and spatial distance.

With regard to the right of voir dire, the Supreme Court has held that defendants must be given a

fair and meaningful opportunity to determine whether potential jurors are prejudiced. In Smith v.

Phillips, the Court wrote that due process entitles a defendant to an impartial jury, which is a jury

comprised of people “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.”

And based on the Court’s holding in Ristaino v. Ross, “the demands of due process” seem to

require at least a “generalized but thorough inquiry into the impartiality of the veniremen.”

The Supreme Court has generally refused to regulate jury deliberations in the same way that it

has regulated other parts of the trial. However, the Court has explained that “[p]robing and

thoughtful deliberation improves the likelihood that other jurors can confront the flawed nature

of reasoning that is prompted or influenced by improper biases.”

Additionally, the Court has

encouraged trial courts to give instructions that emphasize “the group dynamic of deliberations

by urging jurors to share their questions and conclusions with their colleagues.”

In U.S. v. Trimarco, 2020 WL 5211051(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020), a trial judge faced with a

defense complaint about juror face masks inhibited the crucial task of measuring juror credibility

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976).

Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017).

Id.

ruled, “ Being able to see jurors’ noses and mouths ‘is not essential’ for assessing credibility

because ‘[d]emeanor consists of more than those two body parts” since it “includes the language

of the entire body.’(Citation omitted) Defendant's attorneys can still observe and evaluate other

aspects of jurors’ body language that will be fully visible during the trial. While recognizing that

‘being able to see a potential juror's full facial expressions may be tactically preferable, ... the

Court is unconvinced that it is required by the Constitution.’ (Citation omitted) Further, even if

they cannot see jurors’ noses and mouths, Defendant's attorneys still have access to other tools to

assess the credibility of potential jurors. All potential jurors will complete informative

questionnaires, which defendant himself will draft with the government for the Court's approval

and must respond to follow-up questioning by the Court during voir dire, to which defendant

may submit his own proposed questions. The Court therefore finds that Defendant's right to a fair

and impartial jury will not be impaired because jurors will be wearing masks during trial.

Reasonable Path Going Forward:

(2) Regarding voir dire, Principle 11 of the ABA Principles recommends that, before jury

selection begins, courts and parties use appropriate questionnaires to gain information pertinent

to a juror’s competence, qualifications, and impartiality.

IV. Confrontation Clause

Pandemic Issues:

In purely remote trials, live testimony is rendered through a digital platform. In hybrid trials

evidence is presented in a courthouse setting with witnesses wearing face masks and a social

distance from other courtroom actors. During jury selection, these settings may compromise a

party’s ability to assess and challenge the credibility of prospective jurors. With respect to trial

testimony in criminal cases, an accused has a constitutional right to face and cross examine

witnesses.

Black Letter Law:

The Sixth Amendment assures that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

The “core of the values furthered”

by this clause is the “literal right to confront the witness at the time of trial.”

The Court has

interpreted the Confrontation Clause to protect “the right physically to face those who testify,

and “the right to conduct cross-examination.”

The right of confrontation is a fundamental right

that the Supreme Court has incorporated against the States.

In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court explained that the right to confrontation is not

absolute.

Although the Court emphasized that the preference for face-to-face confrontation is

strong, it can sometimes be dispensed with.

The Court held that “a defendant’s right to

confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at

trial only where” (1) the “denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quotations omitted).

Id.

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990).

Id. at 850.

policy,” and (2) “the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.”

The Court later noted

that the “requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one.”

Using this two-part test, Craig permitted the testimony of a child abuse victim to be received by

a one-way closed-circuit television transmitted from outside the courtroom. This arrangement

allowed the defendant to see the child and communicate with his lawyer, without forcing the

child to see the defendant.

Since the COVID-19 crisis began, several courts have concluded that a defendant’s rights are not

abridged by prosecutions witnesses wearing face masks during their testimony.

Reasonable Path Going Forward:

Courts should rely on the findings and directives of public health officials in determining when

and for how long face masks must be used in courtrooms.

V. Grand Juries

Pandemic Issue:

While not all states require grand juries, those that do have varying requirements for size,

quorum, and decision rules. All grand juries are required to maintain the secrecy of their

proceedings. Like trial juries, grand jurors are prohibited from making ex parte contacts with

non-jurors. Grand juries are also required to be representative. How can these attributes be

maintained if grand jurors participate remotely?

Black Letter Law:

The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital,

or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”

However, the right to a grand jury indictment in criminal cases has never been incorporated and

does not apply to state and local governments.

Id.

Id. at 855.

Id. at 857.

U.S. V. Donzinger, 2020 U.S. District LEXIS 157797 (SDNY Aug. 31, 2020) While the Sixth Amendment's

Confrontation Clause gives defendants the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against [them]," U.S. Const.

amend. VI, the Supreme Court made clear in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666

(1990), that it does not "guarantee[]" defendants "the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting" with accusatory

witnesses. Id. at 844 (emphasis in original). Rather, "the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face

confrontation at trial, a preference that must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the

necessities of the case." Id. at 849 (emphasis in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Accordingly, Craig held that "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a

physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an

important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." Id. at 850. See also,

U.S. v. Crittenden, 2020 WL 4917733 (M.D. Georgia Aug. 21, 2020). The Nevada Supreme Court in Blandino v.

Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada cited several court decisions supporting the principle that mask-wearing

requirements do not violate a defendant’s legal rights.

U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).

In federal court, “[t]he right to have the grand jury make the charge on its own judgment is a

substantial right which cannot be taken away with or without court amendment.”

But the Fifth

Amendment does not require states to use grand juries. If states want, they can choose

alternatives such as preliminary hearings and prosecutorial informations.

States that do employ

grand juries must adhere to the same constitutional requirements as federal courts (e.g., Equal

Protection, Due Process, etc.).

The NCSC in 2019 published an overview about grand jury practices and procedures in state

courts. It discusses recent legislative and regulatory reforms proposed in several states to

strengthen public trust in the grand jury. Reforming the Grand jury Indictment Process: Recent

Efforts to Improve Public Confidence in Cases Involving Police Use of Lethal Force.

In the context of the current public health emergency, virtual grand jury proceedings are being

attacked by both prosecutors (asserting confidentiality concerns) and defense counsel (pointing

to representativeness shortcomings).

Reasonable Path Going Forward:

Just as with trial juries, courts should fashion jury instructions to grand jurors explaining the

reasoning for secrecy and the prohibition of ex parte contacts. Valuable lessons have been

learned from the steps taken in recent years to educate jurors about the importance of not doing

Internet research and avoiding ex parte contacts throughout a trial. Principle 10 of the ABA

Principles for Juries & Jury Trials, recommends courts “periodically review … the assembled

jury pool for their representativeness and inclusiveness of the eligible population…. Should the

court determine that improvement is needed in the representativeness or inclusiveness of the …

assembled jury pool, appropriate corrective action should be taken.”

VI. Right to a Civil Jury Trial

Pandemic Issue:

Although there are fewer constitutional issues pertinent to civil jury trials, many of the practical

concerns raised above for criminal trials will arise in civil trials.

Black Letter Law:

The Constitution’s Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common law, . . . the right of

trial by jury shall be preserved.”

The Supreme Court has ruled that the Seventh Amendment

right to jury trial in civil cases is not incorporated.

States therefore can eliminate juries in some

or even all civil suits without violating the United States Constitution.

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218–19 (1960).

See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 516.

E.g., State v. Vega-Larregui, ___N.J. ___ (2021).

U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).

Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).

See id.

The Supreme Court held in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover that the Seventh Amendment

requires a jury trial for all legal issues, including those intertwined with equitable issues.

State

courts, however, are not compelled to accept Beacon Theatres and are instead required to look at

their own state constitutions and state laws.

Reasonable Path Going Forward:

Follow the steps noted above.

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 503, 508–10 (1959).