ff
ff
The short and long dashed loci in the figure depict the predictions of the ho-
mogeneous λ = 0.25 and heterogeneous λ 2 [0.0, 0.5] versions of the agent-based
model. There is considerable similarity between the time paths of the actual and
simulated standard deviations: The standard deviation is greatest for both simu-
lated and actual data in the late 1970s and early 19 80s, because that is the period
when the levels of both actual and expected inflation changed the most. In both
simulated and real data the standard deviation falls gradually over time, but shows
an uptick around the 1990 recession and recovery before returning to its downward
path.
However, the levels of the standard deviations are very di erent between the
simulations and the data; the scale for the Michigan data on the right axis ranges
from 4 to 11, while the scale for the simulated standard deviations on the left
axis ranges from 0 to 3. Over the entire sample period, the standard deviation of
household inflation expectations is about 6.5 in the real data, compared to only
about 0.5 in the simulated data.
Curtin (1996) a nalyzes the sources of the large standard deviation in inflation
expectations across households. He finds that part of the high variability is at-
tributable to small numb ers of households with very extreme views of inflation.
Curtin’s interpretation is that these households are probably just ill-informed, and
he pro poses a variety of other ways to extract the data’s central tendency that are
intended to be robust to the presence of these outlying households. However, even
Curtin’s preferred measure of dispersion in inflation expectations, the size o f the
range from t he 25th to the 75th percentile in expectations, has an average span of
almost 5 percentage points over the 81q3-95q4 period, much greater than would be
produced by any of the simulation models considered above.
8
The first observatio n to make about the excessive cross-section variability of
household inflation exp ectations is that such varia bility calls into question almost
all standard mo dels of wage setting in which well-informed workers demand nom-
inal wage increases in line with a rational expectation about the future inflation
rate.
9
If a large fraction of workers have views about the future inflation rate that
are a long way from rational, it is hard to believe that those views have much im-
pact on the wage-setting process. Perhaps it is possible to construct a model in
which equilibrium is determined by average inflation expectations, with individual
variatio ns making little or no no di erence to individual wages. Constructing such
8
Curtin advocates use of the median rather than the mean as the summary s tatistic for ‘typical’
inflation expectations. However, the epidemiological model has simple analy tical predictions for
the mean but not the median of household expectations, so the empirical work in this paper uses
the mean.
9
The only prominent exception I am aware of is the two papers by Akerlof, Dickens, a nd
Perry (1996, 2000) mentioned briefly above. In these models workers do not bother to learn about
the inflation rate unless it is suÿciently high to make the research worthwhile. However s uch a
model would presumably imply a modest upper bound to inflation expectation errors, since people
who suspected the inflation rate was very high would have the incentive to learn the truth. In fact,
Curtin (1996) finds that the most problematic feature of the empirical data is the sma ll number
of households with wildly implausibly high forecasts.
17