A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and
Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
by Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 8
Center for Strategic Research
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
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Cover: U.S. Soldier looks over landscape as he stands guard at
Observation Post Coleman, outside Combat Outpost Monti, Kunar
Province, Afghanistan, May 2011
Photo by Mark Burrell
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and
Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
Institute for National Strategic Studies
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
Series Editors: C. Nicholas Rostow and Phillip C. Saunders
National Defense University Press
Washington, D.C.
November 2011
By Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and
Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
For current publications of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, please go to the
National Defense University Web site at: www.ndu.edu/inss.
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First printing, November 2011
Contents
Acknowledgments ...............................................1
Executive Summary ..............................................1
Bonn 2001: Why It Mattered ......................................5
e Military Advantage ...........................................6
Shaping the Interagency Position ...................................8
Shaping International Support—Bilateral Preparation ................12
Brahimi, Dobbins, and Multilateral Negotiations ....................15
Limited and Achievable Objectives ................................17
Bonn—Critical Review ..........................................19
Road Ahead ....................................................20
Military Advantage? .............................................21
Limited Objectives—Bonn II .....................................23
Objectives Following Bonn II to 2014 and Beyond ...................24
Critical Views ..................................................28
Conclusion ....................................................29
Notes .........................................................31
About the Authors ..............................................35
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A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
Acknowledgments
e authors are deeply grateful to Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, Ambassador James Dob-
bins, Colonel (Retired) Jack Gill, former Afghanistan Minister of the Interior Dr. Ali Jalali, Mr. Mi-
chael Kofman, Mr. Leo Michel, Ambassador Jerey Lunstead, Colonel (Retired) omas Lynch,
Ms. Camille Majors, Dr. Paul Miller, Ambassador omas Pickering, Dr. Phillip Saunders, Ms.
Sally Scudder, and Colonel (Retired) John Wood for either their detailed reading and assistance in
editing this manuscript or their extended discussions of the substantive issues appearing herein.
Executive Summary
Ten years ago in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambas-
sador Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition, Ambassador James Dob-
bins, led a diverse group of international diplomats and warriors to consensus and charted
the political course for Afghanistan well into the decade. e process that led to the Bonn
Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reects the best of U.S. and United Nations statesmanship
and was the result of the eective application of military and diplomatic power. Bonn 2001
was successful for ve reasons:
e U.S.-supported Northern Alliance held the clear military advantage.
e U.S. interagency position was eectively synchronized.
Dobbins paved the way for success at Bonn by thorough bilateral preparation and con-
sultations with international actors—he met personally with nearly all the international
participants and representatives.
Brahimi and Dobbins merged their negotiating experience and artfully used multilat-
eral negotiations to meld national interests into cohesive commitments.
Bonn Conference objectives were limited and achievable and the U.S. negotiating team
was empowered to exercise initiative in pursuit of those objectives.
As the Bonn Conference’s 10
th
anniversary approaches, the fundamental challenge is sim-
ply stated: how can U.S. national interests in Afghanistan be achieved with fewer resources?
is paper answers that question through an analysis of the process that produced the Bonn
2
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
Agreement in 2001. It oers step-by-step recommendations for U.S. policymakers on how to
shape specic conditions in Afghanistan, beginning with Bonn 2011 (Bonn II), for the post-
2014 period. ose recommendations include:
e United States must demonstrate long-term commitment to Afghanistan in the
form of a formal strategic partnership announced at Bonn.
Following Bonn, the United States must set conditions for a negotiated settlement
through military and diplomatic means:
e United States should announce its intention to maintain a reduced military
force in Afghanistan well beyond 2014.
e United States should fund the Afghanistan National Security Forces
(ANSF) at the present manning objective (352,000) through 2015, then reas-
sess this requirement.
e coalition should intensify eorts to kill or capture members of the insurgent
leadership.
Bilateral preparation should begin with President Hamid Karzai and the issue of
Afghan political reforms. Bonn I was about balancing control of central govern-
ment oces. Following Bonn II, Afghans should rebalance power between the
central government and provincial governments. Insurgents willing to lay down
arms could play a legitimate role in local governance.
Bilateral preparation should then proceed to Afghanistan’s neighbors and Rus-
sia, China, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. is paper oers recommendations for
dealing with each country in light of Bonn I and events to date.
Without U.S. commitment through the end of this decade, Afghanistan will likely fall back
into the civil war it experienced in the early 1990s. As ghting spreads, India and Pakistan will
back their Afghan proxies and the conict will intensify. is situation would not only create
opportunities for safe haven for extremists, but also invite a confrontation between adversarial
and nuclear-armed states. e growing strength of Pakistan’s own insurgency and the existential
3
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
threat it could pose in the future intensies this risk. e potential for such an outcome runs
counter to U.S. and coalition interests. Bonn 2001 began a journey toward Afghanistan’s stabil-
ity and representative government that has demanded great sacrice by Afghans, Americans,
and other members of the coalition. at journey has come far from its humble beginning and
requires American leadership and energy to remain on course.
5
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
Ten years ago at the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations (UN)
Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and the U.S. Envoy to the Afghan
Opposition, Ambassador James Dobbins, led a diverse group of international diplomats
and warriors to consensus and charted the political course for Afghanistan well into the
decade. The process that led to the Bonn Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reflects the
best of U.S. and UN statesmanship and was the result of the effective application of military
and diplomatic power. Bonn 2001 began a journey toward Afghanistan’s stability and repre-
sentative government that has not been without its surprises and setbacks. It has demanded
great sacrifice by Afghans, Americans, and other members of the coalition. But that jour-
ney has come far from its humble beginning and requires American leadership and energy
to remain on course.
In December 2011, the international community will meet again in Bonn to consider plans
for a stable Afghanistan. e successes and limitations of Bonn 2001 are worth remembering in
preparing for that conference. is paper describes the process that produced the Bonn Agree-
ment in 2001 and oers recommendations for U.S. policymakers on how to shape conditions in
Afghanistan, beginning with Bonn 2011 (Bonn II), for the post-2014 period.
Bonn 2001: Why It Mattered
In December 2001, a diverse group of Afghans, inuenced and supported by the interna-
tional community, agreed to measures that established the foundation for future Afghan gov-
ernance. Known as the Bonn Agreement, these measures established an interim authority for 6
months, under the leadership of Chairman Hamid Karzai, to govern Afghanistan until a tran-
sitional authority could be established by an emergency loya jirga.
1
e transitional authority
would then govern Afghanistan for 2 years, convene another loya jirga to dra a new constitu-
tion, and hold free and fair elections. e agreement’s authors also requested international as-
sistance in the form of the deployment of a UN Security Council–sanctioned force to maintain
security in Kabul “and other urban areas as deemed necessary,” train Afghan security forces,
and support general infrastructure repair and improvement eorts.
2
Bonn 2001 was successful for ve reasons:
First, the U.S.-supported Northern Alliance held the clear military advantage. e Tali-
ban were on the run by the time Bonn began.
Second, the U.S. interagency position was eectively synchronized.
6
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
ird, Dobbins paved the way for success at Bonn through thorough bilateral prepara-
tion and consultations with international actors—he met personally with nearly all the
international participants and representatives. As a result, he understood the interests
of the nations involved and how those interests could be productively leveraged.
Fourth, during the conference, Brahimi and Dobbins merged their negotiating ex-
perience and artfully used multilateral negotiations to meld national interests into
cohesive commitments.
Finally, Bonn Conference objectives were limited and achievable and the U.S. negotiat-
ing team was empowered to exercise initiative in pursuit of those objectives.
3
e Military Advantage
In late November 2001, the Northern Alliance dominated the Taliban on the battleeld.
Such was not always the case. Understanding the Taliban’s rise to power prior to 9/11 lends in-
sight into the signicance of the Bonn Agreement.
Following the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 and the demise of the Soviet-installed
government in 1992, Afghanistan was ruled by leaders of the mujahideen. A Tajik named
Burhanuddin Rabbani became president in June 1992 and, at that time, agreed to step down at
the end of 1994. In 1994, however, he refused to leave power. Elements of the mujahideen and
Pashtuns in the south contested Rabbani’s leadership. Pashtuns, who comprise about 40 percent
of Afghanistan’s population, felt that Rabbani was corrupt and anti-Pashtun.
In November 1994, aer a year of organizing support among ethnic Pashtuns in southeast-
ern Afghanistan, the Taliban peacefully took control of the southern city of Kandahar following
the defections of key members of the local government leadership. In September 1995, the Taliban
seized control of Herat and 1 year later took Kabul. Under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed
Omar, the Taliban imposed strict Islamic rules. It prohibited women from working outside the
house except for health care positions. It banned television and Western music and dance, and
imposed harsh penalties—even execution—for those who violated these rules. Prior to 9/11, the
Taliban controlled 75 percent of Afghanistan, including almost all of the provincial capitals.
e Taliban hosted and aorded protection to al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In April 1998,
as U.S. concern over al Qaeda intensied, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Bill Richardson visited
Afghanistan. Taliban leader Mullah Omar would not meet Richardson and refused to hand
over Osama bin Laden.
4
In August 1998, al Qaeda operatives bombed U.S. Embassies in Ke-
7
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
nya and Tanzania. In response, the United States launched cruise missiles at al Qaeda training
camps in Afghanistan.
Following the 9/11 al Qaeda attacks on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, the
George W. Bush administration decided to eliminate Taliban control of the Afghan government
based on the extensive support the Taliban had rendered to al Qaeda and the U.S. need for open
access to the country to eliminate its terrorist bases. On September 12, 2001, the UN Security
Council passed resolution 1368 that “expressed [UN] readiness to take all necessary steps to
respond [implying force] to the September 11 attacks.”
5
On September 18, the U.S. Congress
passed Joint Resolution 23, authorizing the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organiza-
tions or persons.”
6
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan commenced on October 7, 2001, and focused
on air strikes against the Taliban in support of the resistance forces of the Northern Alliance
(Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara tribesmen) and non-Taliban Pashtuns. Approximately 1,000 special
operations forces and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives worked directly with the
Northern Alliance on the ground.
7
In the south, non-Taliban Pashtuns led by Hamid Karzai
along with 1,300 U.S. Marines fought to expel the Taliban from Kandahar. In November 2001,
the Taliban lost Mazar-e-Sharif. On November 12, aer unsuccessfully battling the well-forti-
ed Taliban north of Kabul on the Shomali plains for 5 years, the Northern Alliance took Kabul.
An estimated 2,000 Taliban were killed in 48 hours, most by U.S. airpower.
8
In December, when
Taliban leader Mullah Omar vacated the city of Kandahar, the Taliban lost control of its birth-
place in the south.
As events rapidly unfolded on the battleeld in favor of the Northern Alliance, Bonn
Conference participants gathered at the Hotel Petersberg. e decisive nature of events on the
ground encouraged the active participation of Afghan factions and international interests. e
lightning fast shi in power signicantly aected the interests of border nations (Pakistan, Iran,
China, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) as well as Russia and India. e military ad-
vantage gained by the United States and its Afghan partners pushed the interested parties to
seek a timely political solution rather than drawn-out and inconclusive peace talks. e various
parties might have had dierent interests, but shared a concern that if an arrangement were not
made, Afghanistan would repeat past tribal/civil wars and become the same hotbed of instabil-
ity that gave birth to the Taliban and nurtured al Qaeda through the 1990s. is broad desire
not to repeat the previous decade’s mistakes brought a sense of urgency to the Bonn Conference
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Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
and mandated a speedy resolution as the pace of the war accelerated. Each day the Northern
Alliance held Kabul, Pashtuns saw a return to the unsatisfactory status quo of the early 1990s.
Pakistan saw an existential threat given India’s close ties and support to the Northern Alliance.
Neither group would sit back and watch as events unfolded along this course.
Successful military operations also inuenced the Bonn 2001 negotiating structure. Over
time, four Afghan groups were loosely recognized by the international community as having
a voice in the future of Afghanistan. ese groups were the Northern Alliance; supporters of
former King Mohammed Zahir Shah (known as the Rome Group because many had relocated
there); former Afghan leaders in Pakistan (known as the Peshawar Group); and a group of op-
position gures with links to Iran (the Cyprus Group).
9
ough the names and descriptions
might signal otherwise, these groups did not each have a single position or, in some cases,
even a pure ethnic makeup. Brahimi’s initial vision of Bonn was an event exclusively limited to
power-sharing negotiations among the Afghan groups in an environment free of outside inu-
ence.
10
Realistically, however, most of the Northern Alliance’s recent battleeld success was the
result of U.S. military power. It would be counterproductive to separate the United States from
the negotiating process—U.S. “strong-arming” would be required to fashion a lasting agree-
ment—especially when it came to power-sharing. e Northern Alliance would have to agree
to cede much of its temporary power to the Pashtuns.
Dobbins, based on his negotiating experience in the Bosnia and Kosovo conicts, recom-
mended a dierent construct for negotiations—one made up of Afghans, the bordering nations,
the United States, and Russia. Dobbins envisioned the potential for nations outside Afghanistan
to apply pressure on the Afghans when needed in order to overcome obstacles and reach an
agreement.
11
ese situations did ultimately manifest and were solved using Dobbins’s vision.
Eective military operations eliminated the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan, brought dip-
lomatic urgency to Bonn, and placed the United States in a position to leverage inuence. How
this leverage would be used in order to develop international consensus had to be sorted out
rst with the U.S. interagency, and then with the international community.
Shaping the Interagency Position
As the Northern Alliance made rapid military progress on the ground, the United States
and UN needed to balance this progress with a diplomatic eort that established legitimate
governance. e Bonn Agreement was born of this imperative. e achievement was the prod-
uct of extensive eorts to set the conditions for diplomatic success that took place in the U.S.
interagency and in the international community before the conference.
9
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
In October 2001, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman assigned Dobbins as Secretary
of State Colin Powell’s Envoy to the Afghan Opposition. Dobbins had a 37-year career with
State, which included key positions in Washington as well as experience as U.S. Ambassador to
the European Community and negotiating experience in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
Dobbins knew well the value of understanding and, where necessary, “rening” the interagency
position before beginning negotiations. Directly following his assignment by Grossman, he met
with the leadership of all the relevant U.S. agencies/departments in order to determine the U.S.
position, identify agency “rice bowls,” and chart out objectives and negotiating limits for the
road ahead.
ough Powell issued general guidance—“We need to get this [a governance agreement/
architecture in Afghanistan] done—speed, speed, speed”
12
—Dobbins quickly found that there
was no single authority coordinating Afghan policy in the interagency below the cabinet lev-
el.
13
Despite the dynamic situation in Afghanistan, policy development and approval across
the interagency could only be established among cabinet-level principals. No subcabinet-level
ocer could convene a meeting or task others to provide policy input or feedback. is prac-
tice, adopted by the Bush administration when it took oce, reversed a practice established by
the Clinton administration following the experience in Somalia, where a Presidential Decision
Memorandum was issued directing the appointment of a single ocial, at State or the National
Security Council (NSC), to oversee all policy aspects of any military intervention.
14
e lack of a
similar process in the Bush administration was a problem for Dobbins, since cabinet principals
were too busy to issue the type of specic guidance he needed before negotiating with the other
concerned governments and Afghan factions. So he set about the task of determining—and in
essence synchronizing and rening—the U.S. position on Afghanistan, acting on the basis of
very general guidance and with a high degree of personal initiative.
Key contributors in Washington to the development of U.S.-Afghanistan policy were Zal-
may Khalilzad and Frank Miller at the NSC and Christina Rocca (Assistant Secretary for South
and Central Asian Aairs) and Richard N. Haass at State. Khalilzad, born in Afghanistan and
educated there through high school, was the only Washington policymaker with rst-hand
knowledge of the country and its personalities.
15
Miller chaired an interagency working group
that was almost exclusively focused on the military build-up in Afghanistan. Haass was the head
of State’s Afghanistan Policy Planning Sta and worked with Rocca. His job was to coordinate
policy among four of State’s organizations that managed policy for Afghanistan’s bordering na-
tions: the South Asian Bureau (Pakistan); the European Bureau (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan); the Middle Eastern Bureau (Iran); and the East Asian Bureau (China). From these
10
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
meetings Dobbins pieced together a short-term U.S. position that gained consensus: the United
States desired a broadly based, moderate Afghan regime that would reassure its neighbors and
assist in stamping out residual terrorism.
16
In support of that objective and based on Afghani-
stan’s history of resistance to foreign occupation and inuence, the United States wanted to
minimize foreign participation and inuence in the future Afghanistan.
Dobbins also met with U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte. Together they dis-
cussed the UN’s potential contribution and the Northern Alliance’s reluctance to date to discuss
power-sharing with other Afghan factions. Dobbins suggested a UN-sponsored conference to
decide the future of Afghan governance—an idea developed by the Policy Planning Sta.
17
is
meeting would gather all the factions as well as Afghanistan’s neighbors and other countries with
interest in a solution. Negroponte liked the idea and suggested the conference be announced
at a UN-hosted meeting of Afghanistan’s neighbors, plus the United States and Russia, the fol-
lowing week. Under UN sanction and leadership, the initiative could proceed with credibility.
In other meetings, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain described President
Pervez Musharraf ’s concerns that a Northern Alliance–run Afghanistan would align with In-
dian interests and threaten Pakistan. Pakistan had supported the Taliban in their rise to power,
and Chamberlain emphasized Musharraf’s post-9/11 announcement that Pakistan would cut
support to the Taliban. Robert Blackwill, U.S. Ambassador to India, described the important
support India had given to the Northern Alliance. Bill Burns, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Aairs, told Dobbins that Iran shared some U.S. interests in Afghanistan in that
it opposed the Sunni-based philosophy of the Taliban. Iran desired the return of the two mil-
lion Afghan civil war refugees who had settled inside its territory and also wanted to reduce
the amount of Afghan opium that traveled through Iran on the way to the European market.
In spite of the opportunity presented by shared interests, Burns also pointed out the fact that
the administration had limited U.S. dialogue with Iran. All communication was supposed to be
channeled through Swiss embassies in either capital. Dobbins was interested in exploring his
ability to leverage mutual U.S.-Iranian interests in negotiations, but found that he would need
Powell’s permission to do so.
18
At the Department of Defense, Dobbins met with Under Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and
U.S. Central Command Commander General Tommy Franks. Dobbins surfaced with Wolfow-
itz the possibility that U.S. forces might be needed for a post-settlement peacekeeping mission.
Franks reviewed operational details and emphasized the importance of maintaining a small
U.S. military footprint.
19
Franks also indicated to Dobbins that Karzai had recently been safely
extracted by the United States from the possibility of Taliban capture.
11
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
At CIA, Dobbins met with Deputy Director John E. McLaughlin and a group of experi-
enced Afghanistan analysts and operators who discussed Afghanistan’s recent history, the prog-
ress of ongoing operations, the role of specic warlords, and the role of the Pakistani ISI (Inter-
Services Intelligence) in supporting the Taliban.
20
According to Dobbins, the CIA provided the
very best insight into rapidly moving events on the ground and had positioned liaison ocers
with all the key warlords: Ismail Kahn in the west near Iran, General Abdul Rashid Dostum
with the Uzbeks, Ustad Atta Mohammed with the Tajiks, and Qasim Mohammed Fahim in the
northeast.
21
Resistance in the Pashtun-dominated south was far less organized or supported.
e Taliban enjoyed greater support among its own tribe in the region and also from the Paki-
stani ISI. At CIA and the Department of Defense, Dobbins asked for and received a member of
each organization to join his team; the representatives were to report developments and support
requirements back to the home organization.
22
Finally, prior to beginning his overseas mission, Dobbins met with the President’s Na-
tional Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and her Deputy, Stephen J. Hadley. Dobbins briefed
his mission to work with the UN and the Afghan resistance to quickly form a government. He
recognized that the Northern Alliance could not unilaterally yield all the power. Afghanistan
also needed Pashtun leaders not associated with the Taliban who had credibility within their
tribe as well as with the ISI to share a powerful role in the government. Most importantly, he
indicated he found general consensus regarding his mission and U.S. policy objectives within
the interagency. Rice and Hadley were in agreement with Dobbins’s plan and arranged for his
transport overseas.
23
By virtue of his previous experience, leadership ability, and willingness to consider the
counsel of his professional associates, Dobbins anticipated many of the requirements he would
later need to leverage an agreement at Bonn. In the absence of specic formal guidance and
under signicant pressure to launch his team overseas and demonstrate “progress,” Dobbins
took the time to meet personally with key interagency players. He not only became thoroughly
informed on a region where he had no previous experience, he also informally established U.S.
policy through personal contact and the exchange of ideas. He identied and engaged key deci-
sion- and policymakers within the bureaucracy—some who were layers deep and became key
informal contributors. He anticipated and probed potential agency redlines that, if not identi-
ed early on, could have undermined his later eorts in the negotiations. By making personal
contact and incorporating agency liaisons into his team, he built trust and condence for his
mission and personal credibility with the U.S. Government. He successfully introduced the idea
of direct coordination with Iran—a concept that would prove indispensable later on as he and
12
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
Brahimi leveraged much needed international support at the 11
th
hour at Bonn. Finally, he
transformed his informal coordination into ocial U.S. policy by receiving verbal approval for
his plan from Rice.
Shaping International Support—Bilateral Preparation
During most of the 1990s, the United States did not have a coherent policy for Afghanistan
or South Asia. In 1989, following the Soviet withdrawal, the United States closed its embassy
in Kabul. Many in the government considered the U.S. mission in Afghanistan completed.
24
Beginning in 1997, however, under the banner of the United Nations, the “six plus two group”
of nations (Afghanistan’s six neighbors—Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Tajikistan—plus the United States and Russia) began to meet to discuss the future of Afghani-
stan.
25
In 2000, another Afghanistan contact organization, the “Geneva Group,” began meeting.
is group consisted of Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States. ough the work of these
groups was criticized at the time as unproductive, they established a bridge for information
and relationships that proved important in the post-9/11 environment. One of the most impor-
tant contributions of the contact groups was knowledge of the nature and location of Afghan
factions and former prominent political gures (Northern Alliance, Peshawar Group, Rome
Group, and Cyprus Group). Brahimi attributes some of Bonn I’s success to the coordination and
working papers draed by these groups under the leadership of Personal Representative of the
UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell.
26
In October 2001, as the military situation began to change rapidly in Afghanistan, the UN
named Brahimi to replace Vendrell, and in that capacity Brahimi was entrusted with overall author-
ity for the UN’s political, human rights, relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.
Brahimi previously served as the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Afghanistan from July 1997
until October 1999, when he resigned the position out of frustration at the lack of progress.
27
At the UN, the idea for a UN-sanctioned conference on Afghan governance was taking
shape. Brahimi led a group of representatives from the six plus two group through the wording
of a joint statement calling for all Afghan opposition groups to meet under UN leadership to
form a new government. He did not, however, want to announce the specic conference dates
until he had a reasonable assurance that key participants among the Afghan factions would
attend. Given the strength of U.S. contacts with and support to the Afghan resistance on the
battleeld, Brahimi assigned Dobbins the task of obtaining that assurance.
28
Dobbins used his assignment as an opportunity not only to coordinate Afghan participa-
tion but also to inquire into and, to some extent, align the positions of key nations. At the UN
13
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
General Assembly, Dobbins listened as the Iranian foreign minister—following a plane crash
near LaGuardia Airport that was initially suspected to be a terrorist-related incident—said that
Iran stood with the United States against acts of terror and expressed his sorrow for the loss of
life. is Iranian gesture was signicant given the icy relations between the United States and
Iran, and opened the opportunity for Dobbins to engage the Iranians directly in negotiations on
Afghanistan at Bonn.
29
Dobbins began his mission to gain international consensus for the conference in mid-
November. He met in Italy with King Zahir (age 87) and his supporters and secured their sup-
port. He then visited Ankara, since the Turks had good contact with Northern Alliance warlord
General Dostum and had just hosted Pakistani President Musharraf. Turkish ocials advised
him to be sure to hold the conference in a nation that did not recognize the Taliban during their
time in power. e Turks also suggested Karzai as an acceptable Pashtun resistance leader for
the new Afghan government.
30
Dobbins ew next to Pakistan, arriving on the same day that the Northern Alliance en-
tered Kabul. In Islamabad, the Pakistanis made it clear that they would be hostile to any gov-
ernment headed by the Northern Alliance. As in Turkey, Dobbins heard the Pakistanis’ sugges-
tion—this time, from ISI director Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq—that Karzai should be named head
of the Afghan government.
31
In Peshawar, Dobbins met with relocated Afghans who protested
against the Northern Alliance’s entry into Kabul. He also met with the governor of the Pakistani
Frontier Province, who described the high degree of support that the Taliban had within his
province and elsewhere in Pakistan. e governor also registered his skepticism about Pakistan’s
ability to follow through on Musharraf’s commitment to cut ties with the Taliban.
32
In a separate
meeting, Pakistani diplomat Rustam Shah Mohmand urged Dobbins to move with urgency as
the situation in Afghanistan, in Mohmand’s view, could quickly degenerate into the civil war
experienced in the recent past.
Dobbins then stopped in Tashkent, where the CIA had persuaded Dr. Abdullah Abdul-
lah, the senior Northern Alliance political representative, to meet him.
33
Abdullah argued
that, despite U.S. reservations, the occupation of Kabul was needed to fill the vacuum left
by the Taliban. He wanted the conference to be held in Kabul but noted he would consider
other locations. In addition, he indicated that the Northern Alliance did not consider the
Peshawar Group or the Cyprus Group of Afghans as negotiating equals to King Zahir’s
group. He also vehemently protested the recent entry of British soldiers into Bagram.
34
Dobbins downplayed the significance of the issues to Abdullah—decisions made at the
conference would be based on consensus, not the size of the delegation. He also made it
14
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
clear that the United States clearly understood the significance of the Northern Alliance
contribution to events on the ground.
35
Dobbins ew to Bagram, Afghanistan, with Abdullah where he met with the top Northern
Alliance Commander General Mohammed Fahim. Fahim and Abdullah said that they were
willing to “move forward to form a broad-based government which will represent all regions
and all ethnicities.”
36
Dobbins had secured what he came for—a Northern Alliance commitment
on participation in the conference and a willingness to share power to form a government.
Soon thereaer, Dobbins and his team ew to Bonn to continue to set the conditions for
successful negotiations just 48 hours ahead of the opening of the conference. He met with Ger-
man diplomat omas Matussek who was assigned to manage activities at the Hotel Petersberg
conference site. ough Brahimi wanted to keep the Afghan parties in relative seclusion, he
understood the key contribution that Dobbins and his team would make. At Dobbins’s request,
Matussek gave members of Dobbins’s team much needed access to the Afghan diplomats.
37
Dobbins also met with other international representatives during the time before the
conference began. Ambassador S.K. Lambha from India discussed his country’s willingness to
reach a governance agreement and promised to work closely with the Northern Alliance to get
there. He also acknowledged the requirement for Pakistani support and did not pursue a hard
anti-Pakistani line, despite the adversarial nature of Pakistani-Indian relations.
38
Moscow sent career diplomat Zamir Kabulov who pledged his assistance. Like India, the
Russians had supported and could inuence the Northern Alliance. Kabulov also expressed
his low expectations for the ability of the conference to produce an outcome. Based on Russia’s
very close ties with the Northern Alliance, he knew there were strongly divided opinions about
power-sharing between leaders within the Alliance.
39
On the evening before the conference, the Iranian delegation asked to meet Dobbins at
their hotel. ey indicated their position that former King Zahir was not a good candidate to
assume the role of leader of the new government. ey did, however, indicate that Karzai had
their blessing.
40
By the eve of the conference, within a month of assuming his duties as U.S. Envoy to the
Afghan Opposition, Dobbins had made direct personal contact with the Indian, Russian, and
Iranian delegations, the leadership of all four Afghan delegations, Pakistani key civilian and
military leaders, as well as the Turks. He had not only secured the necessary commitments Bra-
himi had requested, he also found there was growing consensus regarding Karzai as Afghani-
stan’s future interim authority chairman. ese contacts and the knowledge gained would prove
essential to his ability to overcome obstacles during the conference.
15
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
Brahimi, Dobbins, and Multilateral Negotiations
e Bonn Conference began on November 27. Following opening statements by the Af-
ghan delegations, the conference settled into a routine series of parallel events.
41
At the Hotel
Petersberg, Brahimi guided the main eort and focus of the conference: discussion among the
four Afghan groups. As the conference was held during Ramadan, this discussion started late
in the day and ended late into the night. Brahimi slowly worked to achieve consensus on dra
documents that outlined measures for an interim Afghan government. Once delegates agreed to
that design, he intended to work a power-sharing solution by gaining agreement on individuals
for specic government posts.
Meanwhile, Dobbins, accompanied by his interagency team and Khalilzad from the NSC
sta, coordinated the important but less visible eort of the international community represen-
tatives, who had access to the conference location but did not have access to Brahimi’s formal
meetings with the Afghans.
42
Dobbins assigned a member of his team to track the issues evolv-
ing in each Afghan delegation; he received a daily morning brieng from his sta regarding
progress the previous night. Dobbins and Brahimi worked extremely closely together toward
common objectives. ey met daily to trade information regarding their negotiations or con-
tacts and together developed plans to overcome obstacles.
43
e Europeans, not fully aware that Dobbins had been empowered by Powell to talk di-
rectly to the Iranians, sponsored U.S.-Iranian contact sessions in order to facilitate coordina-
tion. When dra documents were distributed for review that described the governance archi-
tecture, it was the Iranians who suggested the document include the provision that Afghanistan
hold democratic elections. e Iranians also suggested wording that indicated the new Afghan
regime would be committed to combating terrorism.
44
Both recommendations ultimately ap-
peared in the document.
As the agreement took shape, it mandated measures over time intended to establish an ef-
fective Afghan government. e Afghans agreed to establish a 6-month interim administration
to govern the country. At the completion of that period, a loya jirga would select a transitional
government that would govern for 18 months. is transitional government would dra a new
constitution and establish elections for the new government to follow.
e Bonn Conference was initially scheduled to last 7 days. By the 10
th
day, Brahimi had
achieved consensus on many of the structural issues associated with Afghan governance, but he
lacked the essence of the power-sharing compromise—by-name recommendations for specic
ministerial positions. One provision suggested by Dobbins was that the Rome Group, led by
16
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
King Zahir, be allowed to nominate the interim government’s leader.
45
ere was signicant
support and respect for King Zahir among Afghan delegations. It was common knowledge by
most participants in the conference that Karzai was the only individual who could draw the
consensus required among Afghans and the international community, specically Pakistan, to
ll this position. Despite these facts, the Rome Group wanted to nominate their own candidate,
a scholar of Islamic Law named Professor Abdul Sattar Sirat. Brahimi, assisted by Matussek,
quietly persuaded Sirat that he could not achieve the consensus required and he subsequently
withdrew his name.
46
Other issues associated with power-sharing, however, could not be solved exclusively
among the Afghan factions and required leverage from the international delegations. Dobbins
and Khalilzad had the ability to focus international inuence on selected Afghan factions in
order to gain consensus; for example, when the Northern Alliance entered Kabul, they lled all
the key government postings in all the key ministries.
47
In order to achieve an agreement, they
would now have to give some of those positions up.
Brahimi asked each Afghan faction to submit the names of their desired candidates for
ministry positions. e Northern Alliance, on orders from Rabbani, stalled on the submission
of these names for days. Younis Qanooni, the Northern Alliance’s senior representative at Bonn,
claimed that the Alliance could not achieve consensus from within and asked that the confer-
ence be adjourned so that the issue could be worked out later.
48
Dobbins informed Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Powell in Washington,
who in turn discussed the issue with the Russians. Dobbins and Khalilzad gathered the Indian,
Iranian, Russian, and German delegates and outlined the critical nature of the problem, which
could determine success or failure of the entire initiative. Khalilzad spoke directly to Alliance
warlords Dostum and Fahim as well as Rabbani. Dobbins held a press conference to focus atten-
tion and pressure on Rabbani. On background, Dobbins told the press that Rabbani was “drag-
ging his feet” in order to buy time in favor of the Northern Alliance.
49
e following day, aer
being informed that the Alliance would receive no more Russian support unless they accepted
the “deal on the table,” Qanooni submitted the cabinet nominations to Brahimi.
50
e next day, the Northern Alliance raised yet another obstacle. ey refused to give
up the three key ministerial posts—defense, interior, and foreign aairs—and demanded 75
percent of the total cabinet positions.
51
Other Afghan groups would not agree. Again Brahimi,
Dobbins, and Khalilzad asked the Iranian, Russian, German, and Indian representatives to
meet with Qanooni and persuade him to compromise. Aer hours of fruitless discussion,
the Iranian representative asked Qanooni to join him for a private discussion. In less than a
17
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
minute, Qanooni returned to the group and agreed to give up two ministries and add three
to the total.
52
In the crucial nal moments of the conference, working the most dicult issues, Dob-
bins, Khalilzad, and Brahimi maneuvered international interests to leverage concessions by the
Northern Alliance and reached an agreement.
Limited and Achievable Objectives
In 2001, the U.S. strategic objective for Afghanistan was to establish a broad-based, stable
Afghan government that, in the short term, would assist U.S. eorts to nd and eliminate al
Qaeda and, in the long term, would be stable enough to deny terrorists a haven. Supporting ob-
jectives included the military defeat of the Taliban, persuading the Northern Alliance to share
power in a new government, gaining Afghan and Pakistani consensus on a new Pashtun leader,
gaining the support of neighboring nations for a new Afghan government, and initiating hu-
manitarian assistance with long-term “nation-building” (a term disliked by the Bush adminis-
tration) and reconstruction eorts sponsored by the international community.
53
ree of those objectives were assigned to Dobbins at Bonn: power-sharing, achieving
consensus on a Pashtun leader, and gaining international support. ese were limited, achiev-
able, and well within the capacity of U.S. military and diplomatic power.
As previously discussed, decisive U.S. military power helped set conditions for success at
Bonn. Support to the Northern Alliance gave urgency to the conference and enabled U.S. politi-
cal inuence with Alliance leadership.
e threat of military force also reduced Pakistan’s ability to challenge or undermine the
Bonn Agreement. Following 9/11, as the Taliban ed Afghanistan, Powell and Armitage deliv-
ered an ultimatum to Musharraf and the leadership of the ISI: “[Y]ou’re either with us or against
u s .”
54
Musharraf correctly interpreted the discussion as the direct threat of military force and
decided he was “with us.” He formally announced his intent to cut ties with the Taliban and
support the United States. He subsequently opened Pakistani airspace to U.S. bombers and air
bases to U.S. special operations forces.
55
In addition, Musharraf deployed forces to the border
and arrested hundreds of al Qaeda ghters eeing Afghanistan and turned them over to the
United States.
56
At Bonn, Pakistan’s interests were partially satised by the selection of Karzai,
although Musharraf was not in position to demand more ministries be lled by Pashtuns given
the situation on the ground and the ISI’s recent support to the Taliban.
U.S. objectives at Bonn were also well within the capacity of—and were well served by—
U.S. diplomatic power. e diplomatic team, working alongside the UN, identied and assessed
18
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
the various national interests at play and focused their signicant inuence to overcome Bonn’s
highest negotiating hurdles. Diplomatic power—much of it in the form of Dobbins’s experi-
ence and teamwork with Brahimi—produced a series of compromises that achieved consensus
among the four Afghan negotiating groups. Gaining the support of neighboring nations, espe-
cially Iran, required a tailored approach but, again, one well within capacity.
In spite of signicant U.S. policy dierences with Iran, Powell loosened existing protocol
(communication through Swiss embassies) and allowed Dobbins to interact directly with the
Iranian delegation and to ask for and accept Iran’s assistance in leveraging the Northern Alli-
ance. Brahimi and Dobbins combined this leverage with pressure from Russia at precisely the
right time in the negotiation in order to overcome the most dicult challenges associated with
power-sharing.
Perhaps equally important was the limited nature of U.S. objectives at Bonn. Dobbins was
not operating under a mandate to fashion a “U.S.-style democracy” for Afghanistan.
57
He was
not required to fashion an agreement that ensured the long-term stability of the region—par-
ticularly with regard to Pakistan. President Musharraf had publicly reversed his country’s posi-
tion and committed his support to cutting ties with the Taliban, and Bonn’s negotiations pro-
ceeded under the assumption that Pakistan would make good on that commitment. ere was
no requirement to fashion a role for the Taliban in the future of Afghanistan—they had been
“defeated” and many at Bonn assumed the Taliban were down, out, and not coming back.
58
Dobbins’s job was to minimize the U.S. footprint and structure an agreement that gave Afghans
the opportunity to build a stable government over years. Given Afghanistan’s history of erce
resistance to outside inuence, it was understood at Bonn that “overreaching” might doom the
project to failure.
e U.S. negotiating team was empowered to exercise initiative. Rice, Powell, and Armit-
age gave Dobbins and his team guidance regarding the endstate—get an agreement soon—and,
with minimal restrictions, allowed him to freely coordinate and cra the solution with the inter-
agency, UN, and international community.
59
Dobbins designed and built his team from among
the interagency and used the best that each agency had to oer. He scheduled and adjusted his
international preparation trip (Italy, Turkey, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan) and inter-
acted with international leaders without standard bureaucratic requirements, such as getting
his talking points cleared by the interagency before each visit.
60
He negotiated from a variety of
angles, held press conferences, and freely interacted on behalf of the United States as he deemed
appropriate. Dobbins noted, “ings were moving fast, everyone [in the interagency] stayed in
their lanes and we avoided elaborate [unproductive] discussion on what was going to happen
19
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
next.”
61
When Dobbins required assistance from his leadership in the form of transportation,
access, or U.S. leverage, he received it.
As a result of limited objectives, eective multilateral negotiation, intense bilateral prepa-
ration, U.S. interagency synchronization, and decisive military action, leaders at Bonn produced
an agreement that replaced the power vacuum and potential for civil war with edgling Afghan
governance. In spite of such signicant achievements, however, much of Bonn’s potential re-
mains unfullled and, as a result, some have come to view Bonn critically.
Bonn—Critical Review
One common critique is that the Taliban should have been part of the negotiations at
Bonn. According to this argument, if the Taliban’s interests had been taken into account, the
sacrice and situation the United States and the coalition presently face would have been mini-
mized or avoided.
62
Brahimi refers to the absence of the Taliban as Bonn’s “original sin,” but goes
on to clarify that Bonn would not have been possible had the Taliban been at the table because
of 9/11 and because other Afghan factions would not have allowed it.
63
e critique regarding Taliban nonparticipation also discounts the reality of the time. e
explicit U.S. objective was the expulsion of the Taliban from Afghanistan so that al Qaeda could
be pursued and destroyed. More than an objective, this became a personal commitment from
President Bush. Following 9/11, the American people would never have accepted direct nego-
tiations with al Qaeda’s sponsors in Afghanistan, since it would have been seen as rewarding
an act of horric terror with political concessions. e rapid progress of the Northern Alliance
campaign, the decisive nature of U.S. airpower, the number of Taliban casualties, and Pakistan’s
commitment to assist U.S. eorts all led to the reasonable conclusion that the Taliban was on
its last legs.
Another critique is Bonn’s failure to address the problem of warlords. True, many warlords
retained power years aer Bonn adjourned.
64
But this critique ignores the reality of events on
the ground. At the time of Bonn, the warlords who led the Northern Alliance to success on the
battleeld controlled roughly 75 percent of Afghanistan. e expectation that the Bonn Agree-
ment could somehow surgically remove warlords and their militias from Afghanistan’s funda-
mental culture and power base was and remains unrealistic. Bonn had to be eective to avoid
a civil war. e best anyone could reasonably expect was an agreement that structured transi-
tion, power-sharing, and compromise, which over time would evolve from a complete political
vacuum to a relatively peaceful and stable government. A decade later that evolution continues
to take place. Bonn’s potential remains available.
20
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
Road Ahead
Much has changed in and around Afghanistan in 10 years. e government that was
created from the Bonn Agreement struggles with corruption and incompetence in a security
environment that U.S. leaders dene as improving but “fragile and reversible.” What has not
changed, as reected by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks below, is the U.S. interest
and the fact that, just as on the rst day of Bonn I, the problem of legitimate Afghan governance
requires a political solution:
Aer he took oce, President Obama launched a thorough review of our policy and
set out a clear goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida, and prevent it from
threatening America and our allies in the future. Al-Qaida cannot be allowed to
maintain its safe haven, protected by the Taliban, and to continue plotting attacks
while destabilizing nations that have known far too much war. From the Tigris
to the Indus, the region will never live up to its full potential until it is free of al-
Qaida and its creed of violence and hatred. at is an aspiration that should unite
every nation. In pursuit of this goal, we are following a strategy with three mutually
reinforcing tracks—three surges, if you will: a military oensive against al-Qaida
terrorists and Taliban insurgents; a civilian campaign to bolster the governments,
economies, and civil societies of Afghanistan and Pakistan to undercut the pull of
the insurgency; and an intensied diplomatic push to bring the Afghan conict to
an end and chart a new and more secure future for the region.
65
As the 10
th
anniversary conference approaches and in the context of the formal date of
full transition to Afghan control in 2014, the fundamental challenge is simply stated: how can
the United States achieve the objectives outlined in Secretary Clinton’s remarks with fewer re-
sources? e realities of waning U.S. and coalition domestic support for the war and its heavy
nancial demands, announced U.S. and coalition troop reductions, and anticipated reductions
in funding for the Afghan army and police are certainly not a portent of the success that char-
acterized Bonn I. Bonn II, therefore, must emulate Bonn I by achieving modest objectives and
setting conditions for the implementation of additional measures through the transition in 2014
and the balance of the decade.
e United States must clearly demonstrate long-term commitment to Afghanistan in the form
of military action and support, assistance with governance and rule of law programs, and econom-
21
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
ic development through this decade. is commitment should take the form of a formal strategic
partnership endorsed by both nations and announced at Bonn II. It should reect planned troop
reductions of 10,000 this year and a total of 33,000 by the end of summer 2012, but maintain U.S.
advisory and counterterrorism capabilities beyond 2014. It should also reect sustained U.S. assis-
tance through a reassessment period in 2015 that prioritizes rule of law and good governance initia-
tives (per the 2012 budget request for $5.25 billion in non–Afghan National Security Forces funding
in the form of Economic Support Funds, Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds, and
other programs).
66
Bonn II should frame Afghanistan as a work in progress, but one that has made
gains in security and governance since 2001 and one that will continue to experience progress with
U.S. assistance and regional leadership and the support of the coalition. Demonstrating U.S. and
coalition commitment should be the exclusive objective for Bonn II.
Following Bonn II, the United States must continue to assist Afghanistan consistent with
the strategic partnership. In addition, ideally by 2015, it must set conditions for a negotiated
settlement with insurgents through military and diplomatic means. One essential condition ap-
plies to internal Afghan governance reforms. A strong central government was required at the
time of Bonn I, given the country’s history of factions, warlords, and militias as well as the ur-
gency of the situation on the ground. Bonn I was about balancing control of central government
oces (president, vice presidents, and ministers) among ethnic minorities. Following Bonn II,
however, Afghans should begin the work of rebalancing power between the central government
and the provincial governments. is change will produce more responsive local government,
allow for better political representation of Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, and increase the po-
tential for a negotiated settlement by appealing to Afghans (including the Taliban) and interna-
tional actors (including Pakistan). Ultimately, once conditions are set, the United States must
use its power to leverage international inuence to produce a negotiated settlement.
ough the conditions surrounding Bonn I dier from today, the factors associated with
Bonn’s success (military advantage, limited and achievable objectives, thorough bilateral prepa-
ration, skilled multilateral negotiation, and U.S. interagency synchronization) lend insight to
the recommendations for the road ahead oered above.
Military Advantage?
Ten years of ghting and the lack of decisive progress have replaced post-9/11 U.S. and in-
ternational consensus and commitment with skepticism toward a positive outcome in Afghani-
stan. e coalition does not possess the overwhelming military advantage it held in 2001/2002.
e Taliban is not on the run as it was a decade ago.
22
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
e Taliban has experienced, however, a number of tactical defeats in its birthplace in and
around Kandahar. A large number of middle and upper-level Taliban leaders, as well as insur-
gent leaders in the east, are being killed and captured as a result of a tremendously successful
intelligence and operational eort by coalition special operating forces. ese successes have
been dened by the coalition leadership as “fragile and reversible” and require sustained follow-
up by the Afghan army and police as well as governance/development measures.
Further magnifying the challenge are the announced complete transition to Afghan-con-
trolled security in 2014 and the drawdown of coalition forces that will take place between now
and then. e announcement of this date—and lack of clarity by the coalition regarding its will-
ingness to keep troops in Afghanistan aer 2014—has encouraged insurgents to “wait it out”
in anticipation of the day when they will exclusively ght against the Afghan National Army.
In addition, insurgents receive sanctuary in Pakistan and support from the ISI. e Pakistani
government is challenged by its own insurgency and does not demonstrate the capacity or will
to deny this sanctuary or support.
Acknowledging the lack of a clear military advantage, the military instrument of power
must be further applied to create the momentum required to inuence a political solution in
three ways.
First, the United States should announce its intention to maintain a military force in
Afghanistan well beyond 2014, at least through the next Afghan political administra-
tion in 2019. is force would sustain the tempo of counterterrorist operations and
provide professional advice and enablers to the Afghan army and police. It should
number 10,000 to 25,000 personnel and could be reduced as the ANSF demonstrate
their post-transition competence through the 2014 elections and into the next politi-
cal administration. It could also be reduced by coalition contributions. Counterterror
operations (supported by 3,000 to 5,000 coalition special operating forces) should focus
on al Qaeda’s attempts to relocate in remote areas of Afghanistan as well as target the
leadership of insurgent groups who refuse to reconcile and continue to challenge the
stability of the government. Advisory and enabling forces (supported by two brigades
and supporting aviation) should focus on the professional development and training of
the Afghan army and police as well as their eective performance in the eld.
Second, the United States and NATO should continue to provide funds to resource
the ANSF at its present manning objective (352,000) through 2015, then reassess this
23
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
requirement—including both the size of Afghan security forces and associated fund-
ing—based on security conditions. Funding for the period through 2015 should be
consistent with but not fall below recently announced reductions from $12.8 billion to
just under $6 billion per year.
67
Finally, without public announcement, the coalition should intensify eorts to kill or
capture members of the insurgent leadership, especially Mullah Omar and his depu-
ties. is will not only require a sustained and enhanced investment of intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance assets, but will also require intensied leverage on
the government of Pakistan and the ISI. Omar’s ideological commitment to extremist
philosophy during his sustained term as “leader of the faithful” enhances his value as
a target. Some believe Omar has the potential to represent the Taliban in negotiations.
However, his demands for the immediate departure of all foreign troops from Afghani-
stan and his extension of sanctuary to al Qaeda make him an unlikely candidate for
such a role. His capture or death would intensify the growing divide between the Tali-
ban’s working class ghting the war in Afghanistan and their leadership living in the
safety of Pakistan.
ese military eorts set conditions for political progress in four ways. First, they demon-
strate to the insurgents that pursuit of a military solution will continue to extract a very heavy
toll and, though they may be able to gain the upper hand at times in selected areas, they have
no chance of reversing the security situation throughout the country as they did in the early
1990s. Second, these eorts will continue to provide time for Afghan political reforms to take
eect. Many are already beginning to take shape. ird, they will continue to separate hard-core
ideological insurgents from those more willing to reconcile, reintegrate, and pursue solutions
through political means. Fourth, they will signal to nearby and neighboring nations—Pakistan,
Iran, and India—that they will not be able to ll the vacuum created by coalition departure and
the resulting instability in pursuit of their own interests at Afghanistan’s expense.
Limited Objectives—Bonn II
U.S. objectives for Bonn II, for the period between Bonn II and 2014, and for post-2014
Afghanistan must be set consistent with our ability to accomplish them through diplomatic
and military power. As stated, the coalition lacks the decisive military advantage and the in-
ternational consensus it had in 2001. International momentum for governance and military
24
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
initiatives in Afghanistan has been replaced, in the United States as well as in Europe, by
fatigue and domestic political pressure for withdrawal.
U.S. objectives for Bonn II should be modest and focus on demonstrating long-term com-
mitment to Afghanistan’s security and development through the decade. e United States
should announce a formal long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan that includes the
military support described above, continued assistance with governance and law and order
reforms, and sustained development eorts. Following this demonstration of leadership, the
United States should also begin work at Bonn to quietly secure similar long-term commitments
of troop and development resources from coalition members. Bonn II should also highlight
the progress to date of security eorts in the south, the development of the ANSF, the fact that
transition is on schedule, the work of the High Peace Council on reintegration and reconcili-
ation, and the evolution of women’s rights since 2001. Bonn II should in no way create or fuel
expectations of an immediate negotiated peace settlement in Afghanistan nor should it be the
forum to address any changes in regional strategy.
Objectives Following Bonn II to 2014 and Beyond
Once U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is formalized at Bonn, the conditions for a nal
settlement can be addressed, following the model set by Dobbins and Brahimi, thorough bi-
lateral preparation and multilateral negotiation. Bilateral preparation should begin rst and
foremost with the Afghan government—President Karzai—and the issue of Afghan political
reforms. Bilateral preparation should then proceed to neighboring nations. Coalition initiatives
(for example, troop contributions and economic assistance) should be announced consistent
with the desires of the Afghan leadership.
Bilateral Preparation for Negotiations
As in Bonn I, comprehensive bilateral preparation must precede the negotiation of a politi-
cal settlement with the insurgents. at preparation must begin between the United States and
President Karzai—negotiations cannot be successful without a consolidated position between
the two. President Karzai’s recent surprise announcement, shiing the direction of primary
peace negotiations from engagement with insurgents to engagement with the government of
Pakistan, is the most recent example of the divide: “e peace process which we began is dead,”
stated Afghan National Security Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta.
68
Brahimi is very critical of the
fact that Americans and Afghans have been ghting together for 10 years and have not worked
out clear consensus on a political solution.
69
He observes that both countries must agree on a
25
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
framework for a political solution before any other actors are brought in. Only aer that con-
sensus is achieved can the division of labor—discussions regarding positive international roles
in the solution—be decided. Brahimi sees the opposite going on: “everyone is being given a
piece of the labor before you and the Afghans have dened a solution.”
70
Once trust is reinforced through a U.S. long-term commitment to Afghanistan, President
Karzai should be encouraged to improve governance by empowering provincial governments
and reducing corruption. Both measures are essential to the condition-setting that must take
place prior to negotiations with insurgents. e United States should seek President Karzai’s
commitment to implement governance reforms that empower the Afghan provinces, even if
these reforms do not take full eect before Karzai leaves oce in 2014. President Karzai may be
persuaded to consider reforms in exchange for the long-term assistance oered in the strategic
partnership. Other forms of persuasion may be rewards or penalties associated with the Kabul
Bank crisis, the suspension of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) program in Afghani-
stan, and a potential large-scale IMF audit.
71
Each province must be granted the right to select
its own governor and to employ independent scal, legislative, and conict resolution powers.
Provincial government employees should be hired from within the province and answer to
provincial leaders. International nancial aid should be funneled directly to the provinces in
order to create rapid public support. ese measures, over time, would bring the power and
resources of the government to parts of the country where Kabul’s leadership is viewed as cor-
rupt and incompetent. At the same time, anti-corruption eorts from within the government
must be intensied. Continued coalition and international assistance through this decade in the
form of advice, investigation, and prosecution is essential. More eective local governance and
courts would also serve to undermine the appeal of local conict resolution currently oered
by insurgents.
Many of these recommendations have already been planned, documented, and initiated.
e Afghan government has published a thorough subnational governance policy.
72
is policy
is comprehensive and, if resourced, supported, and given time, would signicantly enhance the
contribution of local government to Afghan quality of life. is will take time and require the
continued commitment of the United States and the coalition to educate Afghan civil servants.
is policy appropriately calls for and schedules elections of provincial, district, and village
councils and should be modied to incorporate the election of provincial and district gover-
nors. In order to implement changes that empower subnational governance, the constitution
will have to be modied. In order to eect those changes, a constitutional loya jirga should be
assembled following the 2014 national elections to establish measures that allow the election
26
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
of provincial governors. It is important that this measure follow presidential elections so that
provincial councils can mature and so that the loya jirga would not be used to extend the term
of the present Afghan administration. e initiative should be a part of Afghanistan’s national
dialogue in the run-up to the election.
Afghans should also consider the creation and installation of a prime minister. Presently,
broad powers are assigned to the president by the constitution: appointment of cabinet minis-
ters, members of the Supreme Court, provincial governors, district governors, and local securi-
ty chiefs.
73
ese powers are too broad for execution by a single individual, lack credible checks
and balances, and invite the perception and reality of corruption. is change would also have
to be considered by the loya jirga.
Following alignment of the U.S.-Afghan political position, bilateral preparation to achieve a
negotiated settlement should, in many ways, follow the model of Bonn I. e United States should
work directly with and urge the UN to sponsor the initiative by rst identifying a credible UN En-
voy, equal in reputation and diplomatic skill to Brahimi, to lead negotiations. e present Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Afghanistan, Staan de Mistura, may be precisely
the right individual for this position. However, the job of lead negotiator requires an exclusive
focus. Together, the United States and UN must then identify credible Afghans who represent
elements of the insurgency (Quetta Shura Taliban, Hikmatyar Faction, and the Haqqani Faction).
In addition, negotiators for the Afghan government must include Pashtuns as well as Northern
Alliance representatives. Just as at Bonn, the Northern Alliance will be particularly sensitive to the
possibility that they will be required to give up power in the form of ministerial assignments. As
evidenced by the recent assassination of former Afghan President Rabbani, the process of identi-
fying who can speak credibly for selected insurgent factions—a job that requires personal courage
as well as popular consensus—may take months. In the shadow of Rabbani’s death, achieving the
trust required for negotiations will be harder to come by. It is very likely that hard-core ideologues
will have no interest in discussions—in which case talks should proceed without them and include
as much moderate insurgent representation as possible.
Once credible representatives are identied, the UN should announce its initiative pub-
licly. A schedule of discreet meetings should be set between now and the end of 2012. ese
meetings should evolve from discussions among mid-level representatives who exchange views
on details and negotiating positions to meetings among deputies and nally direct representa-
tives empowered to speak for their respective leadership.
e United States should take the lead in bilateral preparation of the six plus two group—
and, in addition, include Turkey and Saudi Arabia. As the moral center of Sunni Islam and as
27
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
nancial sponsors of many of the Wahabis in Pakistan who fuel the insurgency’s ranks, Saudis
may be persuaded to provide additional leverage on elements of the Taliban to negotiate rather
than continue ghting. Turkey, based on historic relationships, could oer a moderate Taliban
element—one serious about negotiations—an oce in their country and open an exchange of
ideas and moderate discussion.
In spite of more recent diplomatic obstacles, the United States should work closely with
Iran in this endeavor and build on Iranian interest in limiting Taliban-sponsored drug track-
ing into their country as well as Iran’s historic ties to the Northern Alliance. Russia, Turkmeni-
stan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan also have an interest in curtailing the ow of drugs into their
countries and, like Iran, an interest in stability across Afghanistan’s northern border, and can
leverage historic ties with the Northern Alliance.
74
Pakistan’s assistance in a long-term settlement is essential and will be the most dicult
obstacle in this process. Obtaining its full commitment to eliminate sanctuary and support
for Afghan insurgents while preserving a relationship in our interests is beyond the capability
of U.S. power—the last 10 years have clearly demonstrated that fact. e skepticism regarding
the government of Pakistan’s willingness to cut ties with the Taliban expressed by then North-
West Frontier Province Governor Shah to Dobbins 10 years ago in Peshawar was accurate and
remains unchanged.
Expectations should be set accordingly. In the short term, it will be important to seek a Paki-
stani commitment to limit active support to insurgent groups interested in undermining peace
initiatives. e United States should consider leveraging the signicant amount of U.S. foreign aid
funneled into Pakistan against this objective, as well as oering the Pakistanis a major role in the
negotiation process. Specic arrangements, consistent with the concept of the empowerment of
provincial governments, extending more autonomous political power within the provisions of the
Afghan constitution to factions in Afghanistan’s eastern and southern provinces, could be consid-
ered. e United States should also explore teaming with the Chinese to inuence the outcome as
they may possess an increasing amount of leverage on the Pakistanis.
Multilateral Negotiation
Following thorough U.S.-led bilateral preparation, and the identication of initial negoti-
ating positions, the UN should host a series of multilateral conferences—similar to Bonn in that
the UN Envoy facilitates negotiations between Afghans and insurgent factions and the United
States facilitates and leverages international actors and power in the pursuit of a settlement.
ese conferences should begin prior to Afghanistan’s 2014 elections—with the pre-election
28
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
goal of a commitment to an announced ceasere. Talks should progress through the election
and the constitutional loya jirga and, ideally, announce a settlement soon aer the loya jirga.
Synchronizing the Interagency
Synchronizing the interagency should not require the degree of personal initiative dis-
played by Dobbins 10 years ago. With regard to Afghanistan, the process has been institutional-
ized. e Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan oce, under the leadership of
Ambassador Marc Grossman, has been the government’s lead for consolidating interagency in-
put and developing U.S. policy recommendations for the routine cycle of Deputies, Principals,
and NSC meetings. is process, however, should not replace the requirement for personal con-
tact by leaders within the interagency—face–to-face meetings that engender trust, condence,
and support for the U.S. negotiating position and negotiators—just as Dobbins experienced.
e fact that this process will be signicantly longer and more dicult to achieve than the Bonn
Agreement further magnies the importance of continuous interagency synchronization and
support for the negotiating team.
Critical Views
e recommendations described above oer a plan to achieve success in spite of diminished
U.S. and coalition resources over the next 2-plus years. is raises the question of whether a suc-
cessful solution can be achieved with fewer resources given the fact that success has eluded the
resource-intensive approach followed to date. e key to achieving success lies in the momentum
previously established through the training, elding, and employment of the Afghan army and
police, intensied targeting of insurgent leadership by special operations forces, and the credible
oer of a legitimate political role for members of the Taliban who wish to come in. e Afghan
army is moving toward independent capability and its demonstrated performance in the eld has
steadily improved, most recently in the Taliban’s birthplace in and around Kandahar. Intensied
eorts at professionalizing the Afghan police began only 4 years ago, well aer the army eort
began, and their size and prociency, especially in the Afghan Civil Order Police, are steadily
improving. ese improvements would continue under the proposed advisory force. Maintaining
a counterterrorist force in Afghanistan that captures or kills insurgent leaders would continue to
drive the wedge that has already developed between insurgents in the eld and their leadership in
Pakistan. Most importantly, political reforms empowering the provinces would undercut insur-
gent support by improving local governance while also providing insurgents the ability to address
legitimate political concerns through participation in local and national governance.
29
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
A second critical view of the recommendations applies to corruption. Will rebalancing
power between the central and provincial governments reduce corruption or simply transfer it
to a lower level? e reforms suggested call for the election of district and provincial governors
and the distribution of resources to them. Elections install a measure of local accountability not
previously applied in Afghanistan and make government ocials more responsive to their con-
stituents. Provinces that spend money responsibly and eectively could be rewarded with ad-
ditional government and assistance funds. Elections also oer new options to citizens unhappy
with the performance of the level of government that, in Afghanistan, most inuences daily life.
Local governance would operate more along ethnic lines where the time-honored Afghan insti-
tutions of elders and shuras reinforce fair conict resolution and equitable behavior.
A nal concern is whether the U.S. Government can garner the necessary domestic and
international support to extend the eort in Afghanistan through the decade. e answer lies
in a realistic analysis of the U.S. national interest. Le on its own as U.S. assistance and inu-
ence declines, Afghanistan will very likely fall back into the civil war it experienced in the early
1990s between the tribes of the Northern Alliance and the Pashtuns. Other actors will move
quickly to leverage their own security and ideological interests. Consistent with history and
present alliances, India will back its proxies in the north and Pakistan will back its proxies in the
east and south. e situation would not only create opportunities for safe haven for extremists,
but would also invite a confrontation between adversarial, nuclear-armed states. e growing
strength of Pakistan’s own insurgency and the existential threat it could pose in the future in-
tensify this risk. In addition, Saudi-funded conservative Wahabi groups will attempt to expand
the spread of radical Islamic rhetoric to future generations of Afghan children who, as a result
of declining assistance, will have no other options. ese facts have precedent in recent history
and their potential clearly runs counter to U.S. and coalition interests.
Conclusion
Afghanistan remains critical to U.S. interests. Despite the country’s long history of tribal
conict, civil war, and foreign occupation, the rest of this decade will bridge the dierence be-
tween unfullled potential and a stable Afghan government.
Bonn 2001’s success was the result of a clear military advantage, a synchronized U.S. inter-
agency position, thorough bilateral preparation, eective multilateral negotiation, limited objec-
tives, and an empowered U.S. negotiating team. Ten years later, the United States lacks the decisive
military edge and the international momentum that it had in 2001. However, the United States
has a much better understanding of the dierent Afghan factions and their interests. e Afghan
30
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
government has structure, is growing in overall eectiveness and anticorruption eorts, and has a
vision in the form of empowered subnational governance. e attainment of our initial objective—
a stable, broad-based Afghan government that does not provide safe haven to terrorists—requires
strong and public U.S. commitment through the rest of this decade. e cost of failure is outlined
by Admiral Michael Mullen: “I believe if we walk away from that part of the world, we’ll be back
in 10 or 20 years. It’ll be much more viral than it is right now, as has been the case, since we le in
1989. So I think we all have to work together to keep this going, to bring the pressure we can, and
to try—in particular, on the development side, the economic side.”
75
31
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
Notes
1
A loya jirga is a traditional Afghan assembly.
2
United Nations (UN), “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” December 5, 2001, available at <www.un.org/
News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>.
3
Phillip Kurata, “Envoy to Afghanistan on Bonn Agreement Success,” Scoop Independent
News, October 7, 2005, available at <http://article.wn.com/view/2005/10/07/Envoy_to_Afghani-
stan_on_Bonn_Agreement_Success/>. In this State Department press release, Dobbins cites ve reasons
for Bonn’s success: the high level of competence displayed by international civil servants and Afghan
leaders, war weariness of the Afghan people, the presence of an internal resistance movement, the active
support of Afghanistan’s neighbors, and “modest, limited U.S. objectives.”
4
Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congres-
sional Research Service (CRS), RL30588 (Washington, DC: CRS, July 25, 2011), 6.
5
UN, UN Security Council Resolution 1368, September 12, 2001, available at <www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm>.
6
U.S. Congress, Joint Resolution 23 (Use of Force Resolution), September 14, 2001, available at
<www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/terrorism/july-dec01/jr_09-14.html>.
7
Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy.
8
Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, Jawbreaker: e Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A
Personal Account by the CIA’s Key Field Commander (New York: ree Rivers Press, 2005), 168.
9
James Dobbins, Aer the Taliban: Nation Building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Potomac
Books, Inc., 2008), 46.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 47.
12
Ambassador Jerey Lunstead, telephone interview by authors, May 23, 2011.
13
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 19.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ambassador James Dobbins, interview by authors, May 26, 2011.
17
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 23.
18
Dobbins interview.
19
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 30.
20
Ibid., 31.
21
Ibid., 32.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., 36.
24
Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, CRS,
RS21922 (Washington, DC: CRS, June 1, 2011), 4.
25
Ibid.
26
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, interview by authors, June 1, 2011.
32
Strategic Perspectives, No. 8
27
Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, 4.
28
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 46.
29
Ibid., 49.
30
Ibid., 55.
31
Ibid., 57.
32
Ibid., 59.
33
Ibid., 62.
34
A small group of British soldiers arrived at Bagram Air Force Base in support of the newly opened Brit-
ish embassy. ey did not coordinate this arrival in advance and this greatly displeased the Northern Alliance.
35
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 63.
36
John Burns, “A Nation Challenged: e Bargaining Alliance in Kabul Will Share Power, U.S.
Envoy Reports,” e New York Times, November 20, 2001.
37
Lunstead interview.
38
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 73.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid., 74.
41
Lunstead interview.
42
Ibid.
43
Dobbins interview.
44
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 83.
45
Lunstead interview.
46
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 90.
47
Brahimi interview.
48
Steven Erlanger, “A Nation Challenged: e Politics; Afghan Talks Stall in Bonn on Com-
ments from Kabul,” e New York Times, December 1, 2001.
49
Ibid. e press did not have access to the site because Ambassador Brahimi thought that
they would be a distraction. At times, however, Dobbins assisted the process by focusing pressure on a
certain issue or Afghan faction during a background interview.
50
Dobbins, Aer the Taliban, 94.
51
Ibid., 95.
52
Ibid., 96.
53
Colin Powell, “20 November 2001 Remarks at a State Department Working Session on Af-
ghanistan Reconstruction,” Foreign Policy Bulletin 12 (2002), 232–244.
54
Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 201. Musharraf
describes Armitage’s conversation with the ISI director general as even more direct: “[I]f you choose the
terrorists be prepared to be bombed back into the stone age.”
55
Burns.
56
Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, CRS, RL30588 (Washington,
DC: CRS, August 1, 2003), 19.
57
James Dobbins, “Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War—Statement before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations,” March 8, 2007.
33
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
58
Dobbins interview.
59
Lunstead interview.
60
Dobbins interview.
61
Ibid.
62
omas Johnson, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban’s Transition: e State of State Building aer
the War,” Central Asian Survey, March–June 2006, 22.
63
Lakhdar Brahimi, interview by Mary Sack and Cyrus Samii, Journal of International Aairs
58 (Fall 2004), 244. Brahimi believes that the Taliban should have been part of reconciliation measures
directly following Bonn.
64
Mark Sedra, “Consolidating an Elusive Peace: Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan,” in
Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hanggi (New Jersey:
Transaction Publishers, 2004), 22.
65
Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the Launch of the Asia Society’s Series of Richard C. Hol-
brooke Memorial Addresses,” New York, February 18, 2011, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/
rm/2011/02/156815.htm>.
66
Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 86.
67
David Cloud, “U.S. to Halve Afghan Forces’ Funds,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2011.
68
Dion Nissenbaum and Maria Abi-Habib, “Afghanistan Halts Taliban Peace Initiative,” e
Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2011.
69
Brahimi interview, June 1, 2011.
70
Ibid.
71
Alissa Rubin, “Clouds Around Karzai Darken the Road Ahead,” e New York Times, July 13,
2011, available at <www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14kabul.html?ref=hamidkarzai>.
72
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Sub-national Governance Policy,” Independent Directorate
of Local Governance, Spring 2010.
73
Katzman, Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, 5.
74
Ashley Tellis, Reconciling with the Taliban (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, 2009), 35, available at <http://carnegieendowment.org/les/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf>.
75
Michael Mullen, “U.S. Won’t Leave Afghanistan Says Mullen,” e Nation, June 16, 2011.
35
A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan
About the Authors
Colonel Mark Fields, USA, is an Army Infantry Ocer and Senior Military Fellow in the
Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense
University. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from e Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity and Master’s degree in National Security Studies from the National War College.
Ramsha Ahmed is a student at Baylor University and is pursuing a degree in Interna-
tional Studies.
Center for Strategic Research Senior Fellows
Col MiChael h. Belding, USMC
Senior Military Fellow
MS. M. elaine BUnn
Distinguished Research Fellow
Mr. John a. Cope
Senior Research Fellow
Col Mark FieldS, USa
Senior Military Fellow
dr. T.X. haMMeS
Distinguished Research Fellow
MS. Sandra hodgkinSon
Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow
Col MiChael p. hUgheS, USaF
Senior Military Fellow
Mr. TeTSUya iTo
Visiting Research Fellow
dr. ChriSTopher J. laMB
Distinguished Research Fellow
dr. andre le Sage
Senior Research Fellow
dr. ThoMaS F. lynCh iii
Distinguished Research Fellow
Mr. leo g. MiChel
Distinguished Research Fellow
dr. John parker
Visiting Research Fellow
dr. JaMeS J. przySTUp
Senior Research Fellow
lTC Joel d. rayBUrn, USa
Senior Military Fellow
CapT Mark e. redden, USn
Senior Military Fellow
dr. niCholaS roSTow
Senior Director
dr. phillip C. SaUnderS
Director of Studies
dr. JUdiTh S. yaphe
Distinguished Research Fellow
dr. ChriSTopher yUng
Senior Research Fellow
For a complete list of INSS researchers and staff, please visit www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm.
