Naval War College Review
Volume 54
Number 1 Winter
Article 14
2001
A New Structure for National Security Policy
Planning,
Charles Neimeyer
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Recommended Citation
Neimeyer, Charles (2001) "A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning,," Naval War College Review: Vol. 54 : No. 1 , Article
14.
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY
Cambone, Stephen A. A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning. Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 1998. 262pp. $23.95
Stephen Cambone is the director of research
at the Institute for National Strategic
Studies at the National Defense University.
A former senior fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
Cambone is obviously well qualified to
undertake work that focuses on a pro-
posed reorganization of the National Se-
curity Council (NSC). Cambone
approaches his work with vigor and an
insider’s knowledge of the workings of
the U.S. government’s highest national-
security entity. He also extensively uses
the knowledge and expertise of two col
-
leagues, Patrick J. Garrity of the Los
Alamos National Laboratory and Alistair
J. K. Shepard of the University of
Aberdeen, Scotland. They have included
valuable appendices for students of na
-
tional security affairs on the major inter
-
ests and issues that surround national
security policy development, as well as a
historical synopsis of the various national
security councils used by past presidents
and how the institution has evolved.
Cambone has included a compendium of
important presidential directives.
Cambone’s principal argument is that it
is time—now that the end of the Cold
War is nearly a decade in the past—to re
-
evaluate the National Security Act of
1947 and the institutions created by that
watershed law. Moreover, Cambone asks
his readers to consider what, if any, insti-
tutional changes should be implemented
to ensure that the United States is prop-
erly prepared for national security policy
planning in the post–Cold War era. He
is attempting, by his own admission,
to conduct an organization-and-pro
-
cess approach to the question of revising
the 1947 National Security Act; he is
largely successful.
Cambone boils down the present-day
debate over national security policy making
to two essential features. He identifies
one side as the issues faction and the
other as the interests faction. “Issues” ad
-
vocates emphasize such things as reli
-
gion, ethnicity, and human rights. These
national security analysts focus on the
need for countries to conform to interna
-
tional laws and norms. They emphasize
the protection of the rights of individuals
against the power of the state. They rely
heavily on international agreement to
settle problems. The “interest” faction,
on the other hand, is less concerned with
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Neimeyer: A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning,
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
the legal authority of the international
community and more interested in the
construction of a system that manages risk
to the United States as a sovereign state.
However, Cambone argues that the real
problem is that neither “issues” nor “in
-
terests” elements within national-secu
-
rity policy-making circles can agree on
an overarching concept for, or defini
-
tion of, the nation’s security. The au
-
thor’s answer is to suggest a new model
for national security decision making
that eschews the Cold War mentality and
methodology for policy making and takes
into account the new paradigms of the
post–Cold War era.
Cambone reviews how past national se
-
curity policy was developed. He then
proposes a reorganization of the NSC into
five directorates: crisis management, re-
gional affairs, home defense affairs, fi-
nance and trade, and science and
technology. A “dual-hatted” cabinet secre-
tary would head these directorates. In
this way, the president’s control over na-
tional security policy development would
be strengthened.
While his suggestions for improvement
are well thought out and well intentioned,
his proposals may prove nearly impossi
-
ble to implement. First and foremost, such
a proposed reorganization would need
strong political support on Capitol Hill.
A new National Security Act would likely
entail a tremendous amount of debate, as
senators and congressmen attempt to in
-
fluence the legislation. One need only re
-
call the highly rancorous and largely
unhealthy debate over service roles and
missions following the passage of the
1947 law to understand what might occur
if a new national security law were passed
along the lines that Cambone suggests.
This is not to say that the United States
should not consider a new law; Cambone
simply needs to be aware that national
security policy has never been, and most
likely never will be, entirely devoid of
politics.
Nonetheless, Cambone’s model for a new
NSC is a logical one. Efficient and ele
-
gant, if implemented it would maximize
the president’s power to influence the
creation and accomplishment of national
security policy—something that the NSC
and the national security advisor are sup
-
posed to facilitate. Further, it would
make maximum use of the entire execu
-
tive branch of government and take the
pressure off an understaffed and
ill-equipped White House to oversee na
-
tional security policy, development, and
implementation. Yet the suggestion of a
dual-hatted cabinet secretary as head of a
national security “directorate” could prove
disastrous. Cambone ignores Washing-
ton’s deeply entrenched organizational
bureaucracies and their tendency to “so-
cialize” appointed cabinet officials into
their own particular cultures. It has long
been axiomatic in the nation’s capital
that the president’s worst political and
bureaucratic enemies can reside in his
own cabinet; in 1867 such a situation
nearly drove an unpopular president
(Andrew Johnson) from office. To make
matters worse, most cabinet officials have
rather short tenures in office. Thus the
Washington bureaucracy knows full well
that these political appointees will be
moving on sooner or later; it waits them
out. Finally, presidential cabinet officials
are usually chosen not for their expertise
but for political expediency. Therefore, it
is very likely that the person who would
serve as a “directorate” chair might be
thoroughly unqualified for such a posi
-
tion of responsibility. Although the
way that national security policy is
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developed today is certainly not optimal,
would Cambone’s system be better?
Despite his failure to consider the second
and third-order effects of enacting the
system he proposes, Cambone provides
the basis for a great academic discussion
over future national security policy and
how it is developed. It is a topic that needs
to be discussed, and as the author has
emphatically pointed out, the time is
now. This point is hard to refute. As the
world’s sole remaining superpower, and
as the debate and divergence over how
policy gets developed becomes stronger,
the United States must reflect on how to
improve its national security decision
making structure.
In sum, Cambone and his colleagues
have provided a good point of departure
for a debate on how the United States
should develop and implement future
national security policy. There are many
things to consider, and this book will get
us started.
CHARLES NEIMEYER
Naval War College
O’Hanlon, Michael. Technological Change and the
Future of Warfare. Washington, D.C.: Brookings In
-
stitution Press, 2000. 208pp. $42.95
Over the past several years, the U.S. mil
-
itary has officially embraced the idea
that rapidly evolving technologies soon
will lead to a profound change in the
conduct of warfare. The need to inno
-
vate in response to a prospective revolu
-
tion in military affairs is the central
theme of Joint Vision 2010 and similar
force-planning documents. Some stud
-
ies, such as the congressionally man
-
dated National Defense Panel, have
concluded that only immediate and
radical transformation to new systems,
new operational concepts, and new or
-
ganizations will enable the U.S. military
to retain its battlefield dominance.
Michael O’Hanlon, however, is not con
-
vinced. In his view, most calls for trans
-
formation lack any systematic or rigorous
analysis of how emerging technologies
might specifically change the character of
combat in the coming decades. Thus the
goal of this book is to provide realistic
projections of technological possibilities
that offer a better idea of how the U.S.
military might best proceed in future re
-
search and acquisition.
O’Hanlon examines a wide range of
militarily relevant technologies, in two
broad categories: those primarily elec-
tronic (sensors, computers, and communi-
cations), and those primarily mechanical
(vehicles, ships, aircraft, and weapons).
From this survey he offers an evaluation
of where evolving technologies are likely
to provide new capabilities over the next
two decades, and where significant force
limitations are likely to remain.
In the realm of electronics, O’Hanlon
expects continued advances in computers
and communications but foresees no im
-
minent breakthrough in sensors that will
significantly improve one’s ability to de
-
tect and track the adversary’s activity. He
specifically rejects the idea that the bat
-
tlefield can be rendered “transparent.”
On the mechanical side, he sees no
near-term developments that will allow
maneuver and strike forces to become
sufficiently light, fast, fuel efficient, or
stealthy to allow profound improvements
in speed of movement or lethality. Thus
he concludes that proponents of trans
-
formation provide neither a compelling
case for a near-term revolution in warfare
nor any adequate idea of what the mili
-
tary should be transforming itself into.
BOOK REVIEWS 155
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