BORDERSECURITY
ProgressandChallenges
withtheUseof
Technology,Tactical
Infrastructure,and
PersonneltoSecurethe
SouthwestBorder
Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland
Security & Justice
Accessible Version
Testimony
BeforetheSubcommitteeonBorderand
MaritimeSecurity,Committeeon
HomelandSecurity,Houseof
Representatives
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET
Thursday, March 15, 2018
GAO-18-397T
Error! No text of specified style in document.
United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office
Highlights of GAO-18-397T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Border and
Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives
March 2018
BORDER SECURITY
Progress and Challenges with the Use of
Technology, Tactical Infrastructure, and Personnel
to Secure the Southwest Border
What GAO Found
The U.S. Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), has made progress deploying surveillance
technology—a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras—along the southwest U.S.
border. As of October 2017, the Border Patrol had completed the planned
deployment of select technologies to several states along the southwest border. The
Border Patrol has also made progress toward assessing performance of surveillance
technologies, but additional actions are needed to fully implement GAO’s 2011 and
2014 recommendations in this area. For example, the Border Patrol has not yet used
available data to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to border
security efforts.
CBP spent about $2.3 billion to deploy fencing from fiscal years 2007 through 2015
and constructed 654 miles of fencing by 2015. The Border Patrol has reported that
border fencing supports agents’ ability to respond to illicit cross-border activities by
slowing the progress of illegal entrants. GAO reported in February 2017 that CBP
was taking a number of steps in sustaining tactical infrastructure—such as fencing,
roads, and lighting—along the southwest border. However, CBP has not developed
metrics that systematically use data it collects to assess the contributions of border
fencing to its mission, as GAO has recommended. CBP concurred with the
recommendation and plans to develop metrics by January 2019. Further, CBP
established the Border Wall System Program in response to a January 2017
executive order that called for the immediate construction of a southwest border wall.
This program is intended to replace and add to existing barriers along the southwest
border. In April 2017, DHS leadership gave CBP approval to procure barrier
prototypes, which are intended to help inform new design standards for the border
wall system.
Physical Barriers in San Diego, California, April 2016
The Border Patrol has faced challenges in achieving a staffing level of 21,370
agents, the statutorily-established minimum from fiscal years 2011 through 2016. As
of September 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had about 19,400 agents. GAO
reported in November 2017 that Border Patrol officials cited staffing shortages as a
challenge for optimal deployment. As a result, officials had to make decisions about
how to prioritize activities for deployment given the number of agents available.
View GAO-18-397T. For more information,
contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777
or [email protected].
Why GAO Did This Study
DHS has employed a variety of
technology, tactical infrastructure, and
personnel assets to help secure the
nearly 2,000 mile long southwest border.
Since 2009, GAO has issued over 35
products on the progress and challenges
DHS has faced in using technology,
infrastructure, and other resources to
secure the border. GAO has made over
50 recommendations to help improve
DHS’s efforts, and DHS has implemented
more than half of them.
This statement addresses (1) DHS efforts
to deploy and measure the effectiveness
of surveillance technologies, (2) DHS
efforts to maintain and assess the
effectiveness of existing tactical
infrastructure and to deploy new physical
barriers, and (3) staffing challenges the
Border Patrol has faced. This statement
is based on three GAO reports issued in
2017, selected updates conducted in
2017, and ongoing work related to DHS
acquisitions and the construction of
physical barriers. For ongoing work GAO
analyzed DHS and CBP documents,
interviewed officials within DHS, and
visited border areas in California.
What GAO Recommends
In recent reports, GAO made or
reiterated recommendations for DHS to,
among other things, assess the
contributions of technology and fencing
to border security. DHS generally agreed,
and has actions planned or underway to
address these recommendations.
Letter
Page 1 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Letter
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work reviewing the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to deploy surveillance
technology, tactical infrastructure, and personnel resources to the
southwest border. This area continues to be vulnerable to illegal cross-
border activity. The U.S. Border Patrol reported apprehending almost
304,000 illegal entrants and making over 11,600 drug seizures along the
southwest border in fiscal year 2017. In January 2017, an executive order
called for, among other things, the immediate construction of a southwest
border wall and the hiring of 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents,
subject to available appropriations.
1
The Border Patrol, within DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), is the federal agency responsible for securing the national borders
between U.S. ports of entry.
2
The Border Patrol divides responsibility for
southwest border security operations geographically among nine sectors,
and each sector is further divided into varying numbers of stations. To
respond to cross-border threats, DHS has employed a combination of key
resources, including surveillance technology, tactical infrastructure (which
includes fencing, roads, and lighting), and Border Patrol agents. For
example, DHS has deployed a variety of land-based surveillance
technologies, such as cameras and sensors, which the Border Patrol
uses to assist its efforts to secure the border and to apprehend individuals
1
Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order No. 13767, §§
2, 8 (Jan. 25, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795 (Jan. 30, 2017). The executive order
defines “wall” as a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and
impassable physical barrier.
2
See 6 U.S.C. § 211(a) (establishing CBP within DHS), (c) (enumerating CBP’s duties), (e)
(establishing and listing duties of the U.S. Border Patrol within CBP). Ports of entry are
facilities that provide for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States.
Specifically, a port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land
border location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers and
merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS officers inspect
persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing the United States pursuant to
U.S. immigration law and travel controls.
Letter
attempting to cross the border illegally.
Page 2 GAO-18-397T Border Security
3
In addition, CBP spent
approximately $2.4 billion from fiscal years 2007 through 2015 to deploy
tactical infrastructure, including about $2.3 billion on fencing, at locations
along the nearly 2,000 mile long southwest border. The Border Patrol
deploys agents along the immediate border and in areas up to 100 miles
from the border as part of a layered approach the agency refers to as the
defense in depth strategy, and the Border Patrol reported it had 16,605
agents staffed at southwest border sectors at the end of fiscal year 2017.
4
Since 2009 we have issued over 35 products on the progress DHS and
its components have made and challenges it faces in using surveillance
technology, tactical infrastructure, personnel, and other resources to
secure the southwest border.
5
As a result of this work, we have made
over 50 recommendations to help improve DHS oversight over efforts to
secure the southwest border, and DHS has implemented more than half
of them. My statement describes (1) DHS efforts to deploy and measure
the effectiveness of surveillance technologies, (2) DHS efforts to maintain
and assess the effectiveness of existing tactical infrastructure and deploy
new physical barriers, and (3) staffing challenges the Border Patrol has
faced.
This statement is based on three reports we issued in 2017, and on
selected updates we conducted in November and December 2017 on the
Border Patrol’s efforts to address some of our previous
3
In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) to develop a
comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as the Secure Border
Initiative Network (SBInet). Under the SBInet program, CBP acquired 15 fixed-tower
systems at a cost of nearly $1 billion, which are deployed along 53 miles of Arizona’s 387-
mile border with Mexico. In January 2011, in response to internal and external
assessments that identified concerns, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced the
cancellation of further procurements of SBInet surveillance systems. That same month,
CBP introduced the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. In June 2014, CBP
developed the Southwest Border Technology Plan, which incorporates the Arizona
Technology Plan, and plans to extend land-based surveillance technology deployments to
the remainder of the southwest border.
4
As part of this strategy, the Border Patrol deploys some agents to activities along the
immediate border while other agents may be assigned to activities further from the border,
such as immigration checkpoint operations that are generally located on highways 25 to
100 miles from the border.
5
See Related GAO Products page.
Letter
recommendations.
Page 3 GAO-18-397T Border Security
6
This statement also includes preliminary observations
and analyses from ongoing work related to the construction of new and
replacement physical barriers along the southwest border and our fourth
annual assessment of select DHS major acquisition programs.
7
Our
reports and testimonies, along with selected updates, incorporated
information we obtained and analyzed from officials at various DHS
components, and during site visits along the southwest border. More
detailed information about our scope and methodology can be found in
our published reports and testimonies. For ongoing work, we reviewed
acquisition documents, such as CBP’s Concept of Operations for
Impedance and Denial, the Wall System Operational Requirements
Document, and the Border Wall Prototype Test Plan. We also met with
officials from DHS components, including CBP’s Office of Facilities and
Management and the Border Patrol, from September 2017 to January
2018. Further, in December 2017 we conducted a site visit to California to
view existing tactical infrastructure and border wall prototypes that will
inform the design of future physical barriers along the southwest border.
All of our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
CBPHasMadeProgressDeploying
SurveillanceTechnologyalongtheSouthwest
6
GAO, Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance Technologies
but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-18-119 (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 30, 2017); Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better
Assess Fencing’s Contributions and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps,
GAO-17-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.16, 2017); Border Patrol: Issues Related to Agent
Deployment Strategy and Immigration Checkpoints, GAO-18-50 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
8, 2017).
7
We plan to complete the current annual assessment of DHS major acquisition programs
in spring 2018. For the most recently published report, see: GAO, Homeland Security
Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and Clear Documentation of Key Decisions
Could Facilitate Ongoing Progress, GAO-17-346SP (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2017). We
plan to complete the review related to the construction of new and replacement physical
barriers along the southwest border later this year.
Letter
Border,butHasNotFullyAssessed
Effectiveness
On multiple occasions since 2011, we have reported on the progress the
Border Patrol has made deploying technologies along the southwest
border. Figure 1 shows the land-based surveillance technology systems
used by the Border Patrol.
Page 4 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Letter
Figure 1: Border Surveillance Technology Systems Used by the Border Patrol
Page 5 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Letter
In November 2017, we reported on the progress the Border Patrol made
deploying technology along the southwest border in accordance with its
2011 Arizona Technology Plan and 2014 Southwest Border Technology
Plan.
Page 6 GAO-18-397T Border Security
8
For example, we reported that, according to officials, the Border
Patrol had completed deployments of all planned Remote Video
Surveillance Systems (RVSS), Mobile Surveillance Capability systems,
and Unattended Ground Sensors, as well as 15 of 53 Integrated Fixed
Tower systems to Arizona. The Border Patrol had also completed
deployments of select technologies to Texas and California, including
deploying 32 Mobile Surveillance Capability systems. In addition, the
Border Patrol had efforts underway to deploy other technology programs,
but at the time of our report, some of those programs had not yet begun
deployment or were not yet under contract. For example, we reported
that, according to the Border Patrol officials responsible for the RVSS
program, the Border Patrol had begun planning the designs of the
command and control centers and towers for the Rio Grande Valley
sector in Texas. Further, we reported that the Border Patrol had not yet
initiated deployments of RVSS to Texas because, according to Border
Patrol officials, the program had only recently completed contract
negotiations for procuring those systems. Additionally, the Border Patrol
initially awarded the contract to procure and deploy Mobile Video
Surveillance System units to Texas in 2014, but did not award the
contract until 2015 because of bid and size protests, and the vendor that
was awarded the contract did not begin work until March 2016.
9
Our
November 2017 report includes more detailed information about the
deployment status of surveillance technology along the southwest border
as of October 2017.
We also reported in November 2017 that the Border Patrol had made
progress identifying performance metrics for the technologies deployed
along the Southwest Border, but additional actions are needed to fully
implement our prior recommendations in this area. For example, in
November 2011, we found that CBP did not have the information needed
to fully support and implement the Arizona Technology Plan and
recommended that CBP (1) determine the mission benefits to be derived
8
GAO-18-119.
9
A bid protest, filed with GAO, is a dispute in which the protester alleges that a federal
agency has not complied with statutes and regulations controlling government
procurements. A size protest, filed with the Small Business Administration, is a challenge
of the determination that an awardee of a small business set-aside contract meets the
definition of “small business” in order to be eligible for the set-aside.
Letter
from implementation of the Arizona Technology Plan and (2) develop and
apply key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation.
Page 7 GAO-18-397T Border Security
10
CBP
concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of them.
Specifically, in March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified mission
benefits of its surveillance technologies to be deployed along the
southwest border, such as improved situational awareness and agent
safety. However, the agency had not developed key attributes for
performance metrics for all surveillance technologies to be deployed.
11
Further, we reported in March 2014 that CBP did not capture complete
data on the contributions of these technologies. When used in
combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, these
data could be used to better determine the impact of CBP’s surveillance
technologies on CBP’s border security efforts and inform resource
allocation decisions. Therefore, we recommended that CBP (1) require
data on technology contributions to apprehensions or seizures to be
tracked and recorded within its database and (2) subsequently analyze
available data on apprehensions and technological assists—in
combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as
appropriate—to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies.
CBP concurred with our recommendations and has implemented one of
them. Specifically, in June 2014, the Border Patrol issued guidance
informing agents that the asset assist data field—which records assisting
technology or other assets (canine teams)—in its database had become a
mandatory data field.
While the Border Patrol has taken action to collect data on technology, it
has not taken additional steps to determine the contribution of
surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. In April 2017,
we reported that the Border Patrol had provided us a case study that
assessed technology assist data, along with other measures, to
determine the contributions of surveillance technologies to its mission.
12
We reported that this was a helpful step in developing and applying
10
GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is
Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011).
11
GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to
Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
3, 2014).
12
GAO, 2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap,
and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits, GAO-17-491SP (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 26, 2017).
Letter
performance metrics; however, the case study was limited to one border
location and the analysis was limited to select technologies. In November
2017, we reported that Border Patrol officials demonstrated the agency’s
new Tracking, Sign Cutting, and Modeling (TSM) system, which they said
is intended to connect between agents’ actions (such as identification of a
subject through the use of a camera) and results (such as an
apprehension) and allow for more comprehensive analysis of the
contributions of surveillance technologies to the Border Patrol’s mission.
One official said that data from the TSM will have the potential to provide
decision makers with performance indicators, such as changes in
apprehensions or traffic before and after technology deployments.
However, at the time of our review, TSM was still early in its use and
officials confirmed that it was not yet used to support such analytic efforts.
We continue to believe that it is important for the Border Patrol to assess
technologies’ contributions to border security and will continue to monitor
the progress of the TSM and other Border Patrol efforts to meet our 2011
and 2014 recommendations.
CBPIsPlanningtoConstructNewPhysical
Page 8 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Barriers,butHasNotYetAssessedtheImpact
ofExistingFencing
FencingIsIntendedtoAssistAgentsinPerformingTheir
Duties,butItsContributionstoBorderSecurity
OperationsHaveNotBeenAssessed
We have reported on the significant investments CBP has made in
tactical infrastructure along the southwest border. The Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), as amended,
provides that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take actions, as
necessary, to install physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of the
border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry.
13
The
Secure Fence Act of 2006, in amending IIRIRA, required DHS to
construct at least two layers of reinforced fencing as well as physical
barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors on certain segments of the
13
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, tit. I, subtit. A, § 102(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-554 (classified, as
amended, at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note).
Letter
southwest border.
Page 9 GAO-18-397T Border Security
14
From fiscal years 2005 through 2015, CBP increased
the total miles of primary border fencing on the southwest border from
119 miles to 654 miles—including 354 miles of primary pedestrian fencing
and 300 miles of primary vehicle fencing.
15
In addition, CBP has deployed
additional layers of pedestrian fencing behind the primary border fencing,
including 37 miles of secondary fencing.
16
From fiscal years 2007 through
2015, CBP spent approximately $2.4 billion on tactical infrastructure on
the southwestern border—and about 95 percent, or around $2.3 billion,
was spent on constructing pedestrian and vehicle fencing. CBP officials
reported it will need to spend additional amounts to sustain these
investments over their lifetimes. In 2009, CBP estimated that maintaining
fencing would cost more than $1 billion over 20 years.
17
CBP used
various fencing designs to construct the 654 miles of primary pedestrian
and vehicle border fencing. Figure 2 shows examples of existing
pedestrian fencing deployed along the border.
14
See Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638-2639. Under the Secure Fence Act
of 2006, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to achieve and maintain operational
control over the borders of the United States through surveillance activities and physical
infrastructure enhancements to prevent unlawful entry by aliens and facilitate CBP’s
access to the borders. See id. § 2, 120 Stat. at 2638 (classified at 8 U.S.C. § 1701 note).
Subsequently, the DHS Appropriations Act, 2008, rewrote the border fencing requirements
section of IIRIRA to require that DHS construct not less than 700 miles of reinforced
fencing along the southwest border where fencing would be most practical and effective,
and to provide for the installation of additional physical barriers, roads, lighting, cameras,
and sensors to gain operational control of the southwest border. IIRIRA § 102(b), 110
Stat. at 3009-554 to -555, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, tit. V, §
564(a)(2)(B)(ii), 121 Stat. 1844, 2090-91 (2007) (classified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note).
IIRIRA § 102(b), as amended, also gives the Secretary of Homeland Security discretion to
install tactical infrastructure in particular locations along the border, as deemed
appropriate. Id.
15
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (notwithstanding fencing requirements, DHS is not required to
install fencing or other resources in a particular location along the border if the Secretary
of Homeland Security determines that the use or placement of such resources is not the
most appropriate means to achieve and maintain operational control over the border at
that location).
16
The first layer of fencing, the primary fence, may include both pedestrian and vehicle
fencing and is the first fence encountered when moving north from the border; the
secondary fence, located behind the primary fence, consists solely of pedestrian fencing;
and the third layer, or tertiary fence, is primarily used to delineate property lines rather
than deter illegal entries.
17
CBP’s 2009 life cycle cost estimate estimated operations and maintenance costs for
fencing would be approximately $1.4 billion from 2009 through 2029.
Letter
Figure 2: Selected Designs of Existing Pedestrian Fencing on the Southwest Border
Page 10 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Note: For the purposes of this statement, we refer to fencing constructed prior to January 2017 as
“existing” fencing or barriers. A January 2017 executive order called for the immediate construction of
a “contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier”
and CBP is assessing prototypes to inform future designs of barriers. See Exec. Order No. 13767, § 2
(Jan. 25, 2017), 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017).
Letter
In February 2017, we reported that border fencing had benefited border
security operations in various ways, according to the Border Patrol.
Page 11 GAO-18-397T Border Security
18
For
example, according to officials, border fencing improved agent safety,
helped reduce vehicle incursions, and supported Border Patrol agents’
ability to respond to illicit cross-border activities by slowing the progress
of illegal entrants. However, we also found that, despite its investments
over the years, CBP could not measure the contribution of fencing to
border security operations along the southwest border because it had not
developed metrics for this assessment. We reported that CBP collected
data that could help provide insight into how border fencing contributes to
border security operations. For example, we found that CBP collected
data on the location of illegal entries that could provide insight into where
these illegal activities occurred in relation to the location of various
designs of pedestrian and vehicle fencing. We reported that CBP could
potentially use these data to compare the occurrence and location of
illegal entries before and after fence construction, as well as to help
determine the extent to which border fencing contributes to diverting
illegal entrants into more rural and remote environments, and border
fencing’s impact, if any, on apprehension rates over time. Therefore, we
recommended in February 2017 that the Border Patrol develop metrics to
assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border
security along the southwest border using the data the Border Patrol
already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making
investment and resource allocation decisions. The agency concurred with
our recommendation. As of December 2017, officials reported that CBP
plans to establish initial metrics by March 2018 and finalize them in
January 2019.
CBPFacesChallengesinSustainingTactical
InfrastructureandHasNotProvidedGuidanceonIts
ProcessforIdentifyingandDeployingTactical
Infrastructure
In February 2017, we also reported that CBP was taking a number of
steps to sustain tactical infrastructure along the southwest border;
however, it continued to face certain challenges in maintaining this
infrastructure.
19
For example, CBP had funding allocated for tactical
18
GAO-17-331.
19
For the purpose of this statement, sustainment refers to the maintenance, repair, and
replacement of tactical infrastructure.
Letter
infrastructure sustainment requirements, but had not prioritized its
requirements to make the best use of available funding, since CBP also
required contractors to address urgent repair requirements. According to
Border Patrol officials, CBP classifies breaches to fencing, grates, or
gates as urgent and requiring immediate repair because breaches
increase illegal entrants’ ability to enter the country unimpeded. At the
time of our February 2017 review, the majority of urgent tactical
infrastructure repairs on the southwest border were fence breaches,
according to Border Patrol officials. From fiscal years 2010 through 2015,
CBP recorded a total of 9,287 breaches in pedestrian fencing, and repair
costs averaged $784 per breach.
While contractors provide routine maintenance and address urgent
repairs on tactical infrastructure, certain tactical infrastructure assets used
by the Border Patrol—such as border fencing—become degraded beyond
repair and must be replaced. For example, in February 2017 we reported
that CBP had provided routine maintenance and repair services to the
primary legacy pedestrian fencing in Sunland Park, New Mexico.
However, significant weather events had eroded the foundation of the
fencing, according to the Border Patrol officials in the El Paso sector, and
in 2015 CBP began to replace 1.4 miles of primary pedestrian fence in
this area. We also reported on several additional CBP projects to replace
degraded, legacy pedestrian fencing with more modern, bollard style
fencing. For example, in fiscal year 2016, CBP began removing and
replacing an estimated 7.5 miles of legacy primary pedestrian fencing
with modern bollard style fencing within the Tucson sector. In addition,
from fiscal years 2011 through 2016, CBP completed four fence
replacement projects that replaced 14.1 miles of primary pedestrian
legacy fencing in the Tucson and Yuma sectors at a total cost of
approximately $68.26 million and an average cost of $4.84 million per
mile of replacement fencing. We plan to provide information on additional
fence replacement projects in a forthcoming report.
In 2014, the Border Patrol began implementing the Requirements
Management Process that is designed to facilitate planning for funding
and deploying tactical infrastructure and other requirements, according to
Border Patrol officials. At the time of our February 2017 review, Border
Patrol headquarters and sector officials told us that the Border Patrol
lacked adequate guidance for identifying, funding, and deploying tactical
infrastructure needs as part of this process. In addition, officials reported
experiencing some confusion about their roles and responsibilities in this
process. We reported that developing guidance on this process would
provide more reasonable assurance that the process is consistently
Page 12 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Letter
followed across the Border Patrol. We therefore recommended that the
Border Patrol develop and implement written guidance to include roles
and responsibilities for the steps within its requirements process for
identifying, funding, and deploying tactical infrastructure assets for border
security operations. The agency concurred with this recommendation and
stated that it planned to update the Requirements Management Process
and, as part of that update, planned to add communication and training
methods and tools to better implement the process. As of December
2017, DHS plans to complete these efforts by September 2019.
CBPHasTestedBarrierPrototypesandPlansto
Page 13 GAO-18-397T Border Security
ConstructNewBarriersinSanDiegoandRioGrande
ValleySectors
In response to the January 2017 Executive Order, CBP established the
Border Wall System Program to replace and add to existing barriers along
the southwest border. In April 2017, DHS leadership authorized CBP to
procure barrier prototypes, which are intended to help refine requirements
and inform new or updated design standards for the border wall system.
CBP subsequently awarded eight contracts with a total value of $5 million
for the construction, development, and testing of the prototypes. From
October to December 2017, CBP tested eight prototypes—four
constructed from concrete and four from other materials—and evaluated
them in five areas: breachability, scalability, constructability, design, and
aesthetics. CBP officials said the prototype evaluation results are
expected by March 2018.
CBP has selected the San Diego and Rio Grande Valley sectors for the
first two segments of the border wall system. In the San Diego sector,
CBP plans to replace 14 miles of existing primary and secondary barriers.
The primary barriers will be rebuilt to existing design standards, but the
secondary barriers will be rebuilt to new design standards once
established. In the Rio Grande Valley sector, CBP plans to extend an
existing barrier by 60 miles using existing design standards. CBP intends
to prioritize construction of new or replacement physical barriers based on
threat levels, land ownership, and geography, among other things. We
have ongoing work reviewing the Border Wall System Program, and we
plan to report on the results of that work later this year.
Letter
TheBorderPatrolHasContinuedtoFace
Page 14 GAO-18-397T Border Security
StaffingChallenges
In November 2017 we reported that, in fiscal years 2011 through 2016,
the Border Patrol had statutorily-established minimum staffing levels of
21,370 full-time equivalent agent positions, but the Border Patrol has
faced challenges in staffing to that level.
20
Border Patrol headquarters,
with input from the sectors, determines how many authorized agent
positions are allocated to each of the sectors. According to Border Patrol
officials, these decisions take into account the relative needs of the
sectors, based on threats, intelligence, and the flow of illegal activity.
Each sector’s leadership determines how many of the authorized agent
positions will be allocated to each station within their sector.
At the end of fiscal year 2017, the Border Patrol reported it had over
19,400 agents on board nationwide, and that over 16,600 of the agents
were staffed to sectors along the southwest border. As mentioned earlier,
the January 2017 executive order called for the hiring of 5,000 additional
Border Patrol agents, subject to available appropriations, and as of
November 2017 we reported that the Border Patrol planned to have
26,370 agents by the end of fiscal year 2021. The Acting Commissioner
of CBP reported in a February 2017 memo to the Deputy Secretary for
Homeland Security that from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2016, the
Border Patrol hired an average of 523 agents per year while experiencing
20
GAO-18-50. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-10, div. B, tit. VI, § 1608, 125 Stat. 38, 140; Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, div. D, tit. II, 125 Stat. 786, 946 (2011); Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, div. D, tit. II, 127 Stat.
198, 345; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128
Stat. 5, 249; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-
4, tit. II, 129 Stat. 39, 41; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div.
F, tit. II, 129 Stat. 2242, 2495 (2015). For fiscal year 2017, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2017, did not include the provision from prior years mandating a
workforce floor for Border Patrol agents, but the accompanying explanatory statement
directed CBP to continue working to develop a fully justified workforce staffing model that
would provide validated requirements for all U.S. borders and to brief the appropriations
committees on its progress in this regard within 30 days of the enactment of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act (enacted May 5, 2017). See Explanatory Statement, 163
Cong. Rec. H3327, H3809-10 (daily ed. May 3, 2017), accompanying Pub. L. No. 115-31,
131 Stat. 135 (2017).
Letter
a loss of an average of 904 agents per year.
Page 15 GAO-18-397T Border Security
21
The memo cited
challenges such as competing with other federal, state, and local law
enforcement organizations for applicants. In particular, the memo noted
that CBP faces hiring and retention challenges compared to DHS’s U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (which is also planning to hire
additional law enforcement personnel) because CBP’s hiring process
requires applicants to take a polygraph examination, Border Patrol agents
are deployed to less desirable duty locations, and Border Patrol agents
generally receive lower compensation.
In November 2017, we reported that the availability of agents is one key
factor that affects the Border Patrol’s deployment strategy. In particular,
officials from all nine southwest border sectors cited current staffing levels
and the availability of agents as a challenge for optimal deployment. We
reported that, as of May 2017, the Border Patrol had 17,971 authorized
agent positions in southwest border sectors, but only 16,522 of those
positions were filled—a deficit of 1,449 agents—and eight of the nine
southwest border sectors had fewer agents than the number of
authorized positions. As a result of these staffing shortages, resources
were constrained and station officials had to make decisions about how to
prioritize activities for deployment given the number of agents available.
We also reported in November 2017 that within sectors, some stations
may be comparatively more understaffed than others because of
recruitment and retention challenges, according to officials. Generally,
sector officials said that the recruitment and retention challenges
associated with particular stations were related to quality of life factors in
the area near the station—for example, agents may not want to live with
their families in an area without a hospital, with low-performing schools, or
with relatively long commutes from their homes to their duty station. This
can affect retention of existing agents, but it may also affect whether a
new agent accepts a position in that location. For example, officials in one
sector said that new agent assignments are not based solely on agency
need, but rather also take into consideration agent preferences. These
officials added that there is the potential that new agents may decline
offers for stations that are perceived as undesirable, or they may resign
their position earlier than they otherwise would to pursue employment in a
more desirable location. We have ongoing work reviewing CBP’s efforts
21
The Acting Commissioner’s memo outlines plans and requests to assist the Border
Patrol in hiring more agents, including the additional 5,000 agents called for in the
Executive Order on Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements.
Letter
to recruit, hire, and retain its law enforcement officers, including Border
Patrol agents.
Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the
Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
GAOContactandStaffAcknowledgments
Page 16 GAO-18-397T Border Security
For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at
(202) 512-8777 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
are Jeanette Henriquez (Assistant Director), Leslie Sarapu (Analyst-in-
Charge), Ashley Davis, Alana Finley, Tom Lombardi, Marycella Mierez,
and Claire Peachey.
Related GAO Products
Page 17 GAO-18-397T Border Security
RelatedGAOProducts
Southwest Border Security: Border Patrol Is Deploying Surveillance
Technologies but Needs to Improve Data Quality and Assess
Effectiveness. GAO-18-119. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2017.
Border Patrol: Issues Related to Agent Deployment Strategy and
Immigration Checkpoints. GAO-18-50. Washington, D.C.: November 8,
2017.
2017 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,
Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-17-
491SP. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2017.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Earlier Requirements Definition and
Clear Documentation of Key Decisions Could Facilitate Ongoing
Progress. GAO-17-346SP. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2017.
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess
Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for
Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-331. Washington, D.C.: February
16, 2017.
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess
Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for
Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-167SU. Washington, D.C.:
December 22, 2016.
Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology, Unmanned Aerial
Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24,
2016.
2016 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,
Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-16-
375SP. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2016.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Strengthened Management,
but Execution and Affordability Concerns Endure. GAO-16-338SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2016.
Related GAO Products
Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess
Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.:
March 1, 2016.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement
and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington,
D.C.: May 13, 2015.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Addressing Gaps in Oversight and
Information is Key to Improving Program Outcomes. GAO-15-541T.
Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2015.
Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments Reveal
Actions Needed to Improve Accountability. GAO-15-171SP. Washington,
D.C.: April 22, 2015.
2015 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation,
Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-15-
404SP. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2015.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed
to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-411T.
Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014.
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed
to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368.
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.
Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS Implementation and
Assessment Efforts. GAO-13-653T. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2013.
Border Security: DHS’s Progress and Challenges in Securing U.S.
Borders. GAO-13-414T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2013.
Border Patrol: Key Elements of New Strategic Plan Not Yet in Place to
Inform Border Security Status and Resource Needs. GAO-13-25.
Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2012.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. GAO-
12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.
Page 18 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Related GAO Products
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and
Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.:
November 4, 2011.
Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and
Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.:
July 15, 2011.
Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S.
Southwest and Northern Borders. GAO-11-508T. Washington, D.C.:
March 30, 2011.
Border Security Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key Southwest
Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T. Washington, D.C.: March
15, 2011.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and
Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6. Washington, D.C.: October
18, 2010.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan. GAO-
10-877R. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010.
Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex
Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed
Investment in Key Technology Program. GAO-10-340. Washington, D.C.:
May, 5, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T.
Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution Challenges Put
Delivery of Technology Program at Risk. GAO-10-511T. Washington,
D.C.: March 18, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and
Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk.
GAO-10-158. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010.
Page 19 GAO-18-397T Border Security
Related GAO Products
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-1013T.
Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896.
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.
Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but
More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could
Improve Effectiveness. GAO-09-824. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2009.
Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year
2009 Expenditure Plan. GAO-09-274R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. GAO-09-244R.
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2009.
Page 20 GAO-18-397T Border Security
(102613)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
GAO’sMission
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative
arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the
federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public
funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed
oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government
is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
ObtainingCopiesofGAOReportsandTestimony
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is
through GAO’s website (https://www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, GAO
posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence. To
have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, go to https://www.gao.gov
and select “E-mail Updates.”
OrderbyPhone
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and
distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether
the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering
information is posted on GAO’s website, https://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard,
Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.
ConnectwithGAO
Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.
Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at https://www.gao.gov.
ToReportFraud,Waste,andAbuseinFederal
Programs
Contact:
Website: https://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: [email protected]
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470
CongressionalRelations
Orice Williams Brown, Managing Director, W[email protected], (202) 512-4400,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125,
Washington, DC 20548
PublicAffairs
Chuck Young, Managing Director, [email protected], (202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, DC 20548
StrategicPlanningandExternalLiaison
James-Christian Blockwood, Managing Director, [email protected], (202) 512-4707
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814,
Washington, DC 20548
PleasePrintonRecycledPaper.