DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation
CHALLENGES TO
SECURITY IN SPACE
Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion
2022
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
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Cover image, Cislunar space domain viewed from beyond the far side of the Moon:
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
SCOPE NOTE
Challenges to Security in Space was rst published in early 2019 to address the main threats to the array of
U.S. space capabilities, and examine space and counterspace strategies and systems pursued primarily by
China and Russia and, to a lesser extent, by North Korea and Iran. This second edition builds on that work and
provides an updated, unclassied overview of the threats to U.S. space capabilities, particularly from China
and Russia, as those threats continue to expand.
Between 2019 and 2021 the combined operational space eets of China and Russia have grown by
approximately 70 percent. This recent and continuing expansion follows a period of growth (2015–
2018) where China and Russia had increased their combined satellite eets by more than 200 percent.
The drive to modernize and increase capabilities for both countries is reected in nearly all major space
categories—satellite communications (SATCOM), remote sensing, navigation-related, and science and
technology demonstration.
Since early 2019, competitor space operations have also increased in pace and scope worldwide, China’s
and Russia’s counterspace developments continue to mature, global space services proliferate, and orbital
congestion has increased. As a result, DIA has published this new edition to:
• Expand its examination of competitor space situational awareness (SSA), and command and
control (C2) capabilities;
• Detail the proles of organizations operating space and counterspace systems based on new information;
• Deepen our characterization of new space and counterspace systems deployed and in development;
• Focus on China's and Russia's interests in exploring the Moon and Mars;
• Provide a new section on the use of space beyond Earth orbit and its implications;
• Widen our treatment on the threats posed to all nations’ space operations from space debris.
Growth of All Chinese and Russian Satellites In-Orbit, 2019–2021
CHINESE SATELLITES RUSSIAN SATELLITES
2019 2020 2021 2019 2020 2021
Science, Technology Development, or Other
SATCOM Remote Sensing Navigation-related
0
100
200
300
400
500
0
100
200
300
400
500
End of year totals are represented for 2019 through 2021. China’s and Russia’s combined, in-orbit satellite fleets
will continue to grow. Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1 January 2022, Satellite Database.
2110-30293
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Space Reliance In An Era Of Competition And Expansion
Capabilities. Space-based capabilities impact many day-to-day aspects of the American way of life. These
capabilities enable functions that aect our homes, transportation, electric power grids, banking systems,
and our global communications. Satellites provide access to a broad range of information and enable many
services in real time, from watching breaking news to monitoring our deployed armed forces around the
world day or night. These and other benets enabled by space systems are the result of more than 60 years
of dedicated work by government agencies—military and civilian—supported by many commercial space
providers. Space systems also enable the United States and our allies to project combat power to areas of
conict and instability and allow our armed forces to collect vital intelligence on foreign threats, to navigate
and maneuver rapidly, and to communicate with each other anywhere around the globe to ensure our
security and quick response to international military and humanitarian crises.
Competition. Space competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union began in
earnest with Moscow’s launch of the world’s rst articial satellite, Sputnik-1, in 1957. China’s emergence
as a space power in the late 20th and early 21st century and Russia’s post-Soviet resurgence have
expanded the militarization of space as both countries integrate space and counterspace capabilities
into their national and warghting strategies to challenge the United States. Adversaries have observed
more than 30 years of U.S. military operations supported by space systems and are now seeking ways to
expand their own capabilities and deny the U.S. a space-enabled advantage.
1
China and Russia, in particular, are developing various means to exploit the perceived U.S. reliance on
space-based systems and challenge the U.S. position in the space domain.
2
Beijing and Moscow seek
to position themselves as leading space powers, intent on creating new global space norms. Through
the use of space and counterspace capabilities, they aspire to undercut U.S. global leadership. Iran and
North Korea will continue to develop and operate electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to deny or degrade
space-based communications and navigation.
3
Proliferation. Space capabilities are increasing across a growing list of nations, including: missile warning,
geolocation and tracking of friendly and adversary activities, target identication, and navigation services
for their citizens and armed forces. Expanding constellations of remote-sensing satellites are reducing all
countries' ability to conceal sensitive tests, evaluation activities, and military exercises and operations.
4, 5
Space commercialization is also growing as companies augment or replace government-provided launch,
communications, SSA, remote-sensing—also referred to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR)— and human spaceight services. These rms are opening access to space technologies, services,
and products to government and nongovernment entities that can pay for their capabilities.
6,7,8
The
growth of viable commercial space enterprises best represents how the use of space has expanded in
scope, scale, and importance across the globe.
Counterspace. Space is being increasingly militarized. Some nations have developed, tested, and
deployed various satellites and some counterspace weapons. China and Russia are developing new
space systems to improve their military eectiveness and reduce any reliance on U.S. space systems such
IV
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
as the Global Positioning System (GPS). Beijing and Moscow have also created separate space forces. As
China’s and Russia’s space and counterspace capabilities increase, both nations are integrating space
scenarios into their military exercises. They continue to develop, test, and proliferate sophisticated
antisatellite (ASAT) weapons to hold U.S. and allied space assets at risk. At the same time, China and
Russia are pursuing nonweaponization of space agreements in the United Nations.
9
Russia regularly
expresses concern about space weapons and is pursuing legal, binding space arms control agreements
to curb what it sees as U.S. strength in outer space.
10,11
The expansion of Chinese and Russian space and
counterspace weapons combined with the general rise of other foreign space capabilities is driving many
nations to formalize their space policies to better position themselves to secure the space domain and
facilitate their own space services.
12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25
Collisions. The probability of collisions of massive derelict objects in low Earth orbit (LEO) is growing
and almost certainly will continue through at least 2030 because of rising numbers of space launches—
especially those with multiple payloads—and continuing fragmentation from collisions, battery
explosions, and further ASAT testing events.
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACECHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACECHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
CONTENTS
Scope Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV
Space Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Denying Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Emerging Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Key Space Issues through 2030 and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Growth of Reusable Space Technology:
Commercial Opportunities and Military Advantage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Human Spaceflight and Cislunar Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Challenge to Space Operations: Debris and Orbital Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix: Space and Counterspace Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Glossary of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Sources/Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Active Foreign Satellites
Countries/Multinational Owned Space Assets
SATCOM
ISR and
Earth Observation
Navigation-related
Science, Technology
Development, or Other
China Russia Other Foreign States
874
87
61
563 118 334
269
192
17
125
32
726
262
28
49
41
Countries/Consortiums
51 50 5 44
Source: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1 January 2022, Satellite Database
2008-26360
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Space-based remote-sensing, communication,
and navigation systems are used for various com-
mercial, civilian, and military applications. Many
nations, including China and Russia, have recog-
nized the benets of investing in and using space
technologies. Those space capabilities include:
• Space-based remote-sensing or ISR satellites
gather data of security concern and support intel-
ligence and military activities, such as tracking and
monitoring military forces and observing related
events and locations. Space-based remote-sensing
also supports civilian activities, such as crop and
weather monitoring, as well as disaster response
sites and operations.
26
• Satellite communications is used for beyond-line-
of-sight communications, including voice and televi-
sion services. Communications satellites also enable
Internet and other communications to reach remote
areas without direct connectivity. Military SATCOM
improves C2, allowing for greater mobility over
greater distances by eliminating the need for ground-
based infrastructure.
27
• Positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services
transmit timing signals for various applications,
including air, land, sea, and space navigation; asset
tracking; and precision weapons guidance. PNT also
supports civilian transportation; precision farming;
autonomous vehicle guidance; time synchroniza-
tion for electrical power grids and banking transac-
tions; communications across wireless Internet and
emergency medical, re, and police services; as well
as navigation services for rail, road, air, and ocean
cargo operations.
28
• Space launch vehicles (SLVs) place objects in Earth
orbit or put them on trajectories to explore the far-
thest reaches of space. For decades, this capability
was restricted to a few spacefaring nations. The num-
ber of organizations able to launch satellites is small
and placing satellites in orbit has usually been the
largest expense in space operations. However, during
the past 10–12 years, other nations have been devel-
oping SLVs, and increasing numbers of commercial
entities worldwide have steadily elded new capabili-
ties. As a result, the average price, and thus barrier, to
entry into space, has declined.
29
As more nations and more services depend on space-
based capabilities—especially in critical social and
economic sectors, such as medical, disaster response,
weather forecasting, and nancial transactions—
the loss or degradation of those capabilities will
increasingly disrupt daily life.
30
Space asset disruption
will probably lead to degradation of critical military and
intelligence capabilities. Such disruptions can deny
access to space for scientic purposes and negatively
impact technological innovation.
31,32,33
[See the Appendix on Space and Counterspace Concepts
for additional details.]
SPACE
CAPABILITIES
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Counterspace Threat Continuum
Space
Situational
Awareness
Electronic
Warfare
Denial &
Deception
Directed Energy
Weapons
Orbital
Threats
Ground Site
Attacks
Cyber
Attacks
Kinetic Energy
Weapons
Nuclear
Detonation
NONREVERSIBLE
REVERSIBLE
The counterspace continuum represents the range of threats to space-based services, arranged from
reversible to nonreversible effects. Reversible effects from denial and deception and EW are nondestruc-
tive and temporary, and the system is able to resume normal operations after the incident. Directed energy
weapons (DEW), cyberspace threats, and orbital threats can cause temporary or permanent effects.
Permanent effects from kinetic energy attacks on space systems, physical attacks against space-related
ground infrastructure, and nuclear detonation in space would result in degradation or physical destruction
of a space capability.
2008-26370
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Competitor nations have capabilities to deny others
the use of space assets. Space is a critical enabler
for U.S. and allied military forces during operations,
exercises, and logistics around the world provid-
ing for near-instantaneous communications, situa-
tional awareness, and precision navigation for our
forces. Military and civilian space services are not
easily separated. Actions taken by any nation to
interfere with space services used by the military
probably would deny civilian space services as well,
either accidentally or with purpose. Although many
counterspace weapons are intended to degrade
space services temporarily, others can damage or
destroy satellites permanently.
• Physical or cyberattacks against ground sites and
infrastructure supporting space operations can
threaten satellite services.
• Space situational awareness sensors predict when
satellites pass overhead. This allows for tracking,
warning, and, if necessary, targeting of space-
based systems.
• Adversaries can jam global navigation and communi-
cations satellites used for C2 of naval, ground, and air
forces as well as manned and unmanned vehicles.
• Adversary DEWs that target ISR satellites almost
certainly are able to temporarily or permanently
blind imagery satellites and other strategic sensors,
thereby denying the ability to monitor, track, and tar-
get forces.
• Adversary ASAT missiles can be used to attack satel-
lites in LEO and would produce massive amounts of
debris that can remain in orbit for decades or even
centuries. China tested an ASAT missile against its
own defunct weather satellite in 2007, which cre-
ated a debris cloud that poses a threat to satellites
in nearby orbits today.
34
Russia used an ASAT missile
as recently as 15 November 2021 to destroy one of
its derelict satellites in orbit.
35
• Other space-based weapons can deliver temporary
or permanent eects on other satellites.
Countries with nuclear weapons can launch a war-
head on a long-range booster, such as an intercon-
tinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or SLV, and probably
conduct a high-altitude nuclear detonation, which
would create widespread electromagnetic disrup-
tions in space and on Earth leading to potential dam-
age or destruction of satellites.
36
DENYING
SPACE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACECHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Orbit Types and Uses
37,38
Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO)
Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO)
Medium Earth Orbit (MEO)
Low Earth Orbit (LEO)
Orbit Altitude* Uses
Low Earth Orbit
Up to 2,000 kilometers
- Communications
- ISR
- Human Spaceight
†
Medium Earth Orbit
Approx. 2,000 to 20,000 kilometers
- Communications
- Positioning, Navigation,
andTiming
Highly Elliptical Orbit
LEO altitudes at perigee
(nearest to Earth)
Approx. 40,000 kilometers at
apogee (farthest from Earth)
- Communications
- ISR
- Missile Warning
Geosynchronous
Earth Orbit
Approx. 36,000 kilometers
- Communications
- ISR
- Missile Warning
* The advantages of higher orbits for communications and ISR are near-persistent coverage of most of the Earth in view of the satellite,
with the exception of Earth’s polar regions where it is limited. LEO satellites cover all parts of the world, including the poles, but for
shorter periods based on the speed of the satellite.
† With the exception of nine U.S. Apollo missions to the Moon, all human spaceight has been completed in LEO.
2008-26357
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Long March-5 (LM-5) carrying China's Tianwen-1 mission to Mars, launching from Wenchang Space Launch Center.
Image Source: Noel CELIS/AFP
7
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
China has devoted considerable economic and
technological resources to growing all aspects of its
space program, improving military space applica-
tions, developing human spaceight, and conduct-
ing lunar and Martian exploration missions.
41
During
the past 10 years, China has doubled its launches
per year and the number of satellites in orbit.
42,43
China has placed three space stations in orbit, two
of which have since deorbited, and the third of which
launched in 2021.
44,45,46,47,48
Furthermore, China has
launched a robotic lander and rover to the far side
of the Moon;
49
a lander and sample return mission
to the Moon;
50,51,52,53
and an orbiter, lander, and rover
in one mission to Mars.
54,55,56
China has also launched
multiple ASAT missiles that are able to destroy sat-
ellites and developed mobile jammers to deny SAT-
COM and GPS.
57,58,59,60,61,62,63
Beijing’s goal is to become a broad-based, fully
capable space power.
64
Its rapidly growing space
program—second only to the United States in the
number of operational satellites—is a source of
national pride and part of Chairman Xi Jinping’s
“China Dream” to establish a powerful and pros-
perous China. The space program, managed by the
People's Liberation Army (PLA), supports both civil-
ian and military interests, including strengthening
its science and technology sector, growing interna-
tional relationships, and modernizing the military.
China seeks to rapidly achieve these goals through
advances in the research and development of space
systems and space-related technology.
65,66,67,68,69
China will continue to launch a range of satellites
that substantially enhance its ISR capabilities; eld
advanced communications satellites able to trans-
mit large amounts of data; increase PNT capabili-
ties; and deploy new weather and oceanographic
satellites.
70
China has also developed and probably
will continue to develop weapons for use against
satellites in orbit to degrade and deny adversary
space capabilities.
71,72,73
Exploring the vast universe, developing space
programs, and becoming an aerospace power
have always been the dream we have been
striving for.
—Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party, 24 April 2016,
Remarks on the rst China Space Day
39
The Beijing Aerospace Control Center (BACC) during the
2 August 2020 launch of the Tianwen-1 mission to Mars.
Image Source: Xinhua via AFP
Space has already become a new domain of
modern military struggle; it is a critical factor for
deciding military transformation; and it has an
extremely important inuence on the evolution
of future form-states, modes, and rules of war.
Therefore, following with interest the military
struggle circumstance of space and strengthening
the study of the space military struggle problem is
a very important topic we are currently facing.
—China’s Science of Military Strategy, 2020
National Defense University
40
CHINA
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Space Strategy and Doctrine
China ocially advocates for the peaceful use of space
and is pursuing agreements in the United Nations on
the nonweaponization of space.
78
China also contin-
ues to improve its counterspace weapons capabilities
and has enacted military reforms to better integrate
cyberspace, space, and EW into joint military opera-
tions. China’s space strategy is expected to evolve
over time, keeping pace with the application of new
space technology. These changes probably will be
reected in published national space strategy docu-
ments, through space policy actions, and in programs
enacted by political and military leadership.
The PLA views space superiority, the ability to con-
trol the space-enabled information sphere and to
deny adversaries their own space-based informa-
tion gathering and communication capabilities, as
a critical component to conduct modern “informa-
tized warfare.”
79,80,81,82
China’s rst public mention of
space and counterspace capabilities came as early
as 1971, largely from academics reviewing foreign
publications on ASAT technologies. However, Chi-
nese science and technology eorts on space began
to accelerate in the 1980s, most likely as a result of
the U.S. space-focused Strategic Defense Initiative
to defend against the former Soviet Union’s nuclear
weapons.
83
Subsequently, after observing the U.S.
military’s performance during the 1991 Gulf War
through actions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the
second Iraq War, the PLA embarked on an eort
to modernize weapon systems, across all domains
including space, and update its doctrine to focus
on using and countering adversary information-en-
abled warfare.
84
China’s perceptions of the importance of space-en-
abled operations to the United States and its allies
has shaped integral components of PLA military
planning and campaigns. In addition, space is a crit-
ical enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for
deployed Chinese forces, and the PLA probably sees
counterspace operations as a means to deter and
counter a U.S. intervention during a regional mili-
tary conict.
85,86
China has claimed that “destroying
or capturing satellites and other sensors” would
make it dicult for the U.S. and allied militaries to
use precision-guided weapons.
87
Moreover, Chi-
nese defense academics suggest that reconnais-
sance, communication, navigation, and early warn-
ing satellites could be among the targets of attacks
designed to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
88
Military Strategic Guidelines
In 2015, Beijing’s ocial release of China’s Military Strategy directed the PLA to research and give priority to
strategies to win “informatized local wars” and emphasized “maritime military struggle.”
74
Chinese military
strategy documents also emphasize the growing importance of oensive air, long-distance mobility, and
space and cyberspace operations. China expects its future wars to be fought mostly outside its borders and
in the maritime domain. China promulgated its military strategy and the supporting documents through its
most recent update to its military strategic guidelines, the top-level directives that Beijing uses to dene con-
cepts, assess threats, and set priorities for planning, force posture, and modernization.
75
The PLA uses “informatized warfare” to describe the process of acquiring, transmitting, processing, and
using information to conduct joint military operations across the land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace
domains and the electromagnetic spectrum during a conict. PLA writings guide much of China’s mili-
tary modernization today and highlight the benet of near-real-time shared awareness of the battleeld
in enabling quick, unied eorts to seize tactical opportunities. In November 2020, China’s Central Mili-
tary Commission issued a trial update to PLA joint doctrine to codify warghting reforms and will almost
certainly improve its ability to conduct joint operations.
76
Space-based systems will play an increasingly
important role in support of these goals.
77
9
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Space and Counterspace
Organizations
China’s space program comprises organizations in
the military, political, defense-industrial, and com-
mercial sectors. The PLA historically has managed
China’s space program and continues to invest in
improving China’s capabilities in space-based ISR,
SATCOM, satellite navigation, human spaceight, and
robotic space exploration.
89
Although state-owned
enterprises are China’s primary civilian and military
space contractors, China is placing greater emphasis
on decentralizing and diversifying its space industry
to increase competition.
90
In 2015, China established the Strategic Support
Force (SSF) to integrate cyberspace, space, and EW
capabilities into joint military operations as part of
its military reforms.
91,92,93
The SSF forms the core
of China’s information warfare force, supports
the entire PLA, and reports directly to the Central
Military Commission.
The SSF, led by PLA General Ju Qiansheng,
94
is
divided into two major departments: the Space
Systems Department (SSD), very likely consolidating
the majority of the PLA’s space functions, and the
Network Systems Department (NSD), very likely
in charge of cyberspace operations and EW.
95,96
The SSD focuses primarily on satellite launches
and operations to support ISR, navigation, and
communication requirements.
97
The SSD’s China
Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) operates all
four launch sites, in addition to Yuanwang space
support ships, two major satellite control centers—
Xian Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the BACC—
and the PLA telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C)
system for all Chinese satellites.
98,99
The EW functions
of the PLA before 2015 were probably transferred to
the NSD when it was stood up in 2015 as well.
100,101
The State Council’s State Administration for Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense
(SASTIND) is the primary civilian organization
that coordinates and manages China’s space
activities, including allocating space research and
development funds.
102
It also maintains a working
relationship with the PLA organization that oversees
China’s military acquisitions. SASTIND guides
and establishes policies for state-owned entities
conducting China’s space activities.
103
The China National Space Administration (CNSA),
subordinate to SASTIND, serves as the public face of
China’s civilian space eorts.
104
China is increasingly
using CNSA eorts to bolster relationships with
countries around the world, providing opportunities
to cooperate on space issues.
105,106,107
As of 2019,
China had more than a hundred cooperative space-
related agreements with more than three dozen
countries and four international organizations.
108,109
Many space technologies can serve a civilian and mil-
itary purpose and China emphasizes “military-civil
fusion”—a phrase used, in part, to refer to the use of
dual-use technologies, policies, and organizations for
military benet.
110
The SSF works with civilian organi-
zations like universities and research organizations
to incorporate civilian support to military eorts since
there is an already high demand for aerospace talent
and competition for nite human resources.
111
Chi-
na’s commercial space sector features partially state-
owned enterprises such as Zhuhai Orbita, Expace,
Galactic Energy, and OK-Space for remote sensing,
launch, and communication services.
112,113,114,115
Acquisition of Foreign
Space and Counterspace
Technologies
The PLA continues to rely on overt and covert acqui-
sition of foreign space and counterspace technol-
ogies to build Chinese knowledge and advance
technological modernization as a supplement to its
domestic research. China uses traditional technical
espionage and cyberespionage techniques as well
as its open-source collection network, technology
transfer organizations, and exploitation of overseas
scholars.
Acquisition of foreign technology is used
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
to circumvent the costs of research and facilitate
“leapfrog” development by exploiting the creativity
of other nations.
116
ISR Satellite Capabilities
China employs a robust space-based ISR capabil-
ity designed to enhance its worldwide situational
awareness. Used for military and civilian remote
sensing and mapping, terrestrial and maritime sur-
veillance, and intelligence collection, China’s ISR sat-
ellites are capable of providing electro-optical and
synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery as well as
electronic and signals intelligence data.
117
China also
exports its satellite technology globally, including its
domestically developed remote-sensing satellites.
As of January 2022, China’s ISR satellite eet contained
more than 250 systems—a quantity second only to
the United States, and nearly doubling China's in-orbit
systems since 2018.
118,119
The PLA owns and operates
about half of the world’s ISR systems, most of which
could support monitoring, tracking, and targeting of
U.S. and allied forces worldwide, especially through-
out the Indo-Pacic region. These satellites also allow
the PLA to monitor potential regional ashpoints,
including the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, Indian Ocean,
and the South China Sea.
120,121,122
Recent improvements to China’s space-based ISR
capabilities emphasize the development, procure-
ment, and use of increasingly capable satellites with
digital camera technology as well as space-based
radar for all-weather, 24-hour coverage. These
improvements should increase China’s monitoring
capabilities—including observation of U.S. aircraft car-
riers, expeditionary strike groups, and deployed air
wings, making them more susceptible to long-range
strikes. Space capabilities probably will enhance
potential PLA military operations farther from the Chi-
nese coast.
123,124,125,126
These capabilities are being aug-
mented with electronic reconnaissance satellites that
monitor radar and radio transmissions.
127
Satellite Communications
China owns and operates more than 60 communi-
cations satellites, at least 4 of which are dedicated
to military use.
128
China produces its military-ded-
icated satellites domestically. Its civilian commu-
nications satellites incorporate o-the-shelf com-
mercially manufactured components.
129
China is
elding advanced communications satellites capa-
ble of transmitting large amounts of data.
130
Existing
and future data relay satellites and other beyond-
line-of-sight communications systems could con-
vey critical targeting data to Chinese military
operation centers.
131,132,133
In addition, China is making progress on its ambi-
tious plans to propel itself to the forefront of the
global SATCOM industry.
134,135,136
China is continuing
to test next-generation capabilities like its Quan-
tum Experimentation at Space Scale (QUESS) space-
based quantum-enabled communications satellite,
which could supply the means to eld highly secure
communications systems.
137,138
In June 2020, a team
of Chinese scientists claimed to achieve quantum
supremacy, reporting successful satellite-based dis-
tributions of entangled photon pairs at a distance
of more than 1,200 kilometers and that the photon
pairs’ integrity remained intact after traveling such
distances. Testing satellite-based quantum entan-
A 10 December 2016 satellite-to-Earth link from Ali,
Tibetan Autonomous Region to China's Micius Quan-
tum Teleportation Satellite Experiment.
Image Source: Xinhua via AFP
11
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
glement represents a major milestone in building a
practical, global, ultrasecure quantum network, but
the widespread deployment and adoption of this
technology still faces hurdles.
139,140
China also intends to provide SATCOM support
to users worldwide and plans to develop at least
seven new SATCOM constellations in LEO. How-
ever, as these constellations are still in the early
stages of development their eectiveness remains
uncertain.
141,142,143,144,145
PNT Capabilities
China’s satellite navigation system, known as Bei-
Dou, is an independently constructed, developed,
and exclusively China-operated PNT service. Chi-
na’s priorities for BeiDou are to support national
security and economic and social development
by adopting Chinese PNT into precise agriculture,
monitoring of vehicles and ships, and aiding with
civilian-focused services across more than 100 coun-
tries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.
146,147
BeiDou pro-
vides all-time, all-weather, and high-accuracy PNT
services to users domestically, in the Asia-Pacic
region, as well as globally and consists of 49 oper-
ational satellites.
148,149,150,151,152,153,154
Initially deployed
to facilitate regional PNT services, BeiDou achieved
worldwide initial operating capability in 2018.
155,156
In June 2020, China successfully launched the
nal satellite in the BeiDou satellite constellation,
completing its global navigation system.
157
Chi-
na’s military uses BeiDou’s high-accuracy PNT ser-
vices to enable force movements and precision-
guided munitions delivery.
161,162
BeiDou has a worldwide positional accuracy stan-
dard of 10 meters; accuracy in the Asia-Pacic region
is within 5 meters.
163
In addition to providing PNT,
the BeiDou constellation oers unique capabilities,
including text messaging and user tracking through
its Regional Short Message Communication service to
enable mass communications among BeiDou users.
The system also provides additional military C2 capa-
bilities for the PLA.
164,165,166
China intends to use its BeiDou constellation to oer
additional services and incentives to countries taking
part in its Belt and Road Initiative emphasizing build-
ing strong economic ties to other countries to align
partner nations with China’s interests.
167,168
As of May
2021, China is predicting Beidou products and ser-
vices will be worth $156 billion by 2025, and poten-
tially export BeiDou products to more than 100 million
users in 120 countries.
169
Human Spaceflight
and Space Exploration
Following uncrewed missions that began in 1999,
China became the third country to achieve indepen-
dent human spaceight when it successfully orbited
the crewed Shenzhou-5 spacecraft in 2003.
170,171,172
In 2011, China then launched its rst space station,
Tiangong-1, and in 2016, it launched its second
space station, Tiangong-2.
173,174,175
In 2020, China
conducted its rst orbital test of the New-Gen-
eration Manned Spaceship, which is expected to
replace the Shenzhou series of crewed spacecraft.
176
On 29 April 2021, China launched the rst element,
Tianhe, of its new Tiangong space station.
177
Beijing
launched the rst supply vessel, Tianzhou, and has
launched two Chinese crews since then.
178,179
China has also taken on a greater role in deep space
exploration and space science and has made nota-
ble accomplishments during the past several years.
China has demonstrated its interest in working with
Russia and the European Space Agency (ESA) to con
China's Zhurong rover and Tianwen lander on Utopia
Planitia, Mars, 11 June 2021.
158,159,160
Image Source: Xinhua via AFP
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
China: Space Exploration Missions
Mission Description Launch Date
Yinghou-1
Mars orbiter launched aboard Russian Phobos-Grunt space-
craft. Mission failed to exit LEO.
180
2011
XPNAV-1
The world’s rst X-ray navigation satellite test—uses distant
X-ray pulsars to navigate and determine its location in the solar
system within 5 kilometers.
181
2016
SISASAIL-1 Solar sail technology test for future deep-space missions.
182
2019
Chang'e-4
First-ever landing on lunar far side; mission included a rover
and lander and the lunar relay satellite, which was launched in
May 2018.
183,184,185,186
2019
Tianwen-1 Martian orbiter, lander, and rover.
187,188,189,190
2020
Chang'e-5
Robotic mission landed on the Moon, collected samples, and
returned them to Earth.
191,192,193,194
2020
Tiangong
Modular space station designed to host Chinese and foreign
payloads and astronauts.
195,196,197,198,199,200
2021–2022
Chang'e-6
Robotic mission to land, collect samples from the Moon’s
south pole, and return to Earth.
201
2023
Chang'e-7
Orbiter, relay satellite, lander, rover, and yby craft. The lander
and rover will have ground-penetrating radar, surface magne-
tometer, and a spectrometer for lunar exploration.
202
2024
Chang'e-8 Test and verication mission for future lunar expeditions.
203
TBD
Lunar Robotic
Mission
Robotic research station on the Moon.
204,205
2025
Human Lunar
Program
Human lunar exploration program to put astronauts on the
Moon.
206,207,208
Mid-2030s
Lunar
Research and
Development
Base
Establish a research base on the Moon, primarily supported
by robotic technology and capable of supporting human
visits.
209,210
By 2050
13
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Chinese Space Launch Vehicles
Kaituo
(KT)
-2
LM-11
The launch vehicles depicted are representative of China’s launch capabilities. Additional light-, medium-, and
heavy-lift vehicles are in development. China uses its light-lift vehicles to place small payloads into LEO and its
medium-lift—specifically the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4—to place larger satellites into LEO and MEO and smaller sat-
ellites in GEO. The LM-5 heavy-lift SLV supports launching crewed space station components to LEO and heavy
payloads to GEO. The developmental super heavy-lift LM-9 primarily will support missions to the Moon and Mars.
2008-26363
duct deep-space exploration.
211,212
China is the third
country to place a robotic rover on the Moon and
was the rst to land a rover on the lunar far side in
2019, which is communicating through the Queqiao
relay satellite that China launched the year before
to a stable orbit around an Earth-Moon Lagrange
point [See Cislunar Chart, page 35].
213,214
Space Launch Capabilities
China is improving its space launch capabilities to
ensure it has an independent, reliable means to
access space and to compete in the international
space launch market. China continues to improve
manufacturing eciencies and launch capabilities
overall, supporting continued human spaceight
and deep-space exploration missions—including to
the Moon and Mars.
215
New modular SLVs that allow
China to tailor an SLV to the specic conguration
required for each customer are beginning to go
into operation, leading to increased launch vehicle
reliability and overall cost savings for launch
campaigns.
216
China is also in the early stages of
developing a super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S.
Saturn V or the newer U.S. Space Launch System
to support proposed crewed lunar and Mars
exploration missions.
217
In addition to land-based launches, in 2020 China
demonstrated the ability to launch a Long March-11
(LM-11) from a sea-based platform. This capability,
if staged correctly, would allow China to launch
nearer to the equator than its land-based launch
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
14
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
sites, increase the rocket’s carrying capacity, and
potentially lower launch costs.
218
China has developed quick-response SLVs to
increase its attractiveness as a commercial small
satellite launch provider and to rapidly recon-
stitute LEO space capabilities, which could sup-
port Chinese military operations during a conict
or civilian response to disasters. Compared with
medium- and heavy-lift SLVs, these quick-re-
sponse SLVs are able to expedite launch cam-
paigns because they are transportable via road
or rail and can be stored launch-ready with solid
fuel for longer periods than liquid-fueled SLVs.
Because their size is limited, quick-response SLVs
such as the Kuaizhou-1 (KZ-1), LM-6, and LM-11
are only able to launch relatively small payloads
of up to approximately 2 metric tons into LEO.
Chinese Space Launch, SSA, Satellite Control Centers, Command and Control,
and Data Reception Stations
219,220
All locations are approximate. Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
Depiction of claims on this map is without prejudice to U.S. non-recognition of any such claims.
0 500 1,000 Kilometers
Data Reception Station
Deep Space Tracking Network
Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR)
Satellite Control Center
Space Launch Site
Telemetry, Tracking, and Control (TT&C)
East China
Sea
N.
KOR.
MONGOLIA
CHINA
KYR.
BHU.
INDIA
NEPAL
BURMA
VIET.
JAPAN
BANGL.
S.
KOR.
PAK.
KAZAKHSTAN
RUSSIA
LAOS
THAI.
Aksai
Chin
Beijing
Beijing
Taiyuan
Xian
Wenchang
Xichang
Jiuquan
Haiyang
Port
Kunming
Zhejiang
Changchun
Nanning
Weinan
Jiamusi
Sanya
Kashgar
Shandong
Zhanyi
Kashgar
Qingdao
Korla
Miyun
Lingshui
China has four fixed launch sites. The newest, Wenchang on Hainan Island, has a launch latitude closer to the Equator,
which provides a more efficient path to launch satellites into GEO. In 2020, China launched a LM-11 from a barge based
in Haiyang Port. China's main satellite control center is in Xian, and its primary control center for human space flight
and lunar missions is in Beijing. The PLA operates four large phased array radars (LPAR) most likely used for missile
warning and SSA. Additionally, there are at least six ground stations used for satellite C2—including one in Neuquén,
Argentina, and five for receiving remote sensing data from satellites—including one located in Kiruna, Sweden.
2108-29551
15
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
In June 2020, China announced its intention to
upgrade the payload capacity of the LM-11 in the
new LM-11A, designed for land or sea launches,
beginning in 2022.
221,222,223,224
The expansion of nonstate-owned Chinese launch
vehicle and satellite operation companies in China’s
domestic market since 2015 suggests that China is
successfully advancing military-civil fusion eorts.
Military-civil fusion blurs the lines between these
entities and obfuscates the end users of acquired
foreign technology and expertise.
225
Space Situational Awareness
China has a robust network of space surveillance
sensors capable of searching, tracking, and char-
acterizing satellites in all Earth orbits. This net-
work includes a variety of telescopes, radars,
and other sensors that allow China to support its
missions including intelligence collection, counter-
space targeting, ballistic missile early warning
Chinese International SSA Efforts Collaboration and
Overseas Tracking, Telemetry, and Control Sites
China leads the Asia-Pacic Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a mul-
tilateral organization with rotating leadership whose members include China,
Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey with Egypt,
Indonesia, and Mexico as associate members.
226
APSCO oversees a space sur-
veillance project known as the Asia-Pacic Ground-Based Optical Space Object
Observation System (APOSOS). As part of the project, China provided to Iran,
Pakistan, and Peru 15-cm telescopes that are able to track objects in LEO and
GEO. All tasking information and subsequent observation data collected is
funneled through the Chinese Academy of Science’s National Astronomical
Observatory of China. APOSOS has near full coverage of LEO and GEO. The
organization is planning to improve optical system capabilities, coverage, and
redundancy as well as data sharing networks.
227,228,229
China has established locations worldwide to aid in TT&C of space missions
both around the Earth as well as in cislunar and deep space. There are ground
stations in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Ethiopia, France, Green-
land, Kenya, Kiribati, Namibia, Norway, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, and
Sweden. There are also four sites in Antarctica that can provide similar sup-
port as well as a BeiDou reference station: Great Wall, Kunlun, Taishan, and
Zhongshan Stations.
230
Image Source: Xinhua via AFP
The four Chinese Yuanwang space tracking ships—
based in Jiangyin, near Shanghai, and usually sup-
porting space launch operations from positions in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans—are part of China’s SSA
network. In early 2020, China’s Yuanwang-7 con-
ducted operations in the Atlantic Ocean, a first for
Yuanwang space support vessels.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
16
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
(BMEW), spaceight safety, satellite anomaly resolu-
tion, and space debris monitoring.
231,232
Electronic Warfare
Capabilities
The PLA considers EW capabilities to be critical
assets for modern warfare, and its doctrine
emphasizes using EW to suppress or deceive enemy
equipment.
233
The PLA routinely incorporates in its
exercises jamming and antijamming techniques
that probably are intended to deny multiple types
of space-based communications, radar systems,
and GPS navigation support to military movement
and precision-guided munitions employment.
234
China probably is developing jammers dedicated
to targeting SAR, including aboard military
reconnaissance platforms. Interfering with SAR
satellites very likely protects terrestrial assets by
denying imagery and targeting in any potential
conict involving the United States or its allies.
235,236
In addition, China probably is developing jammers
to target SATCOM over a range of frequency
bands, including military-protected extremely high
frequency communications.
237,238
Cyberthreats
The PLA emphasizes oensive cyberspace
capabilities as a major component of integrated
warfare and could use its cyberwarfare capabilities
to support military operations against space-
based assets.
239,240
For example, the PLA could
employ its cyberattack elements to establish
information dominance in the early stages of
a conict to constrain an adversary’s actions
or slow its mobilization and deployment by
targeting network-based command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); logistics;
and commercial activities.
The PLA also conducts cyberespionage against
foreign space entities, consistent with broader
state-sponsored industrial and technical espionage,
to increase its level of technologies and expertise
available to support military research, develop-
ment, and acquisition. The PLA unit responsible
for conducting signals intelligence has supported
cyberespionage against U.S. and European satellite
and aerospace industries since at least 2007.
241,242
Directed Energy Weapons
During the past two decades, Chinese defense
research has proposed the development of several
reversible and nonreversible counterspace DEWs
for reversible dazzling of electro-optical sensors and
even potentially destroying satellite components.
China has multiple ground-based laser weapons
of varying power levels to disrupt, degrade, or
damage satellites that include a current limited
capability to employ laser systems against satellite
sensors.
243
By the mid- to late-2020s, China may eld
higher power systems that extend the threat to the
structures of nonoptical satellites.
244,245,246,247,248
ASAT Missile Threats
In 2007, China destroyed one of its defunct
weather satellites more than 800 kilometers
above the Earth with an ASAT missile. The eect
of this destructive test generated more than
3,000 pieces of trackable space debris, of which
more than 2,700 remain in orbit and most will
continue orbiting the Earth for decades.
249,250
The PLA’s operational ground-based ASAT mis-
sile system is intended to target LEO satellites.
China’s military units have continued training with
ASAT missiles.
251,252
China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT
weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to
GEO. In 2013, China launched an object into space
on a ballistic trajectory with a peak orbital radius
above 30,000 kilometers, near GEO altitudes. No
new satellites were released from the object, and
the launch prole was inconsistent with traditional
17
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
SLVs, ballistic missiles, or sounding rocket launches
for scientic research, suggesting a basic capability
could exist to use ASAT technology against satellites
at great distances and not just LEO.
253,254
Orbital Threats
China is developing other sophisticated space-based
capabilities, such as satellite inspection and repair. At
least some of these capabilities could also function
as a weapon. China has launched multiple satellites
to conduct scientic experiments on space main-
tenance technologies and is conducting research
on space debris cleanup; the most recent launch
was the Shijian-21 launched into GEO in October
2021.
255,256,257
In January 2022, Shijian-21 moved a
derelict BeiDou navigation satellite to a high grave-
yard orbit above GEO.
258
The Shijian-17 is a Chinese
satellite with a robotic arm. Space-based robotic arm
technology could be used in a future system for grap-
pling other satellites.
259
Since at least 2006, the government-aliated aca-
demic community in China began investigating
aerospace engineering aspects associated with
space-based kinetic weapons—generally a class of
weapon used to attack ground, sea, or air targets
from orbit. Space-based kinetic weapons research
included methods of reentry, separation of pay-
load, delivery vehicles, and transfer orbits for tar-
geting purposes.
260,261,262,263,264,265
China conducted
the rst fractional orbital launch of an ICBM with
a hypersonic glide vehicle from China on 27 July
2021. This demonstrated the greatest distance
own (~40,000 kilometers) and longest ight time
(~100+ minutes) of any Chinese land attack weap-
ons system to date.
266
The 15 September 2020 LM-11 launch from the
Yellow Sea carrying nine satellites including the Jilin-1
Gaofen 03-1.
Image Source: Xinhua via AFP
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
18
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Image Source: Sputnik via AFP
Russian Space Agency ROSCOSMOS launch of a Soyuz-2.1b from Vostochnyy Cosmodrome. Vostochnyy is
Russia's newest space launch facility, located in the Russian Far East. It is partially operational with con-
struction still ongoing and once complete, this location will reduce Russia's reliance on the Baikonur Cos-
modrome in Kazakhstan to access orbits which are unreachable from its more northerly main space launch
center, Plesetsk.
19
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Russia views its space program as a longstanding
example of its leadership on the international
stage. Russia is a pioneer of space dating back to
the former Soviet Union launching the rst satellite,
Sputnik-1, in 1957 and placing the rst person into
Earth orbit, Yuri Gagarin, in 1961. The International
In the new, 21st century, Russia must maintain its status as a leading nuclear and space power because
the space industry is directly linked with defence [sp] and I would like to remind you of this. Today, we will
discuss issues related to long-term priorities of space exploration and will analyse [sp] what we must do to
strengthen our positions in this truly strategic area.
—Russian President Vladimir Putin, 12 April 2021
269
Slowly but surely, we are heading toward [mili-
tarization of space]. Roscosmos has no illusions
about this. Everyone is working on it.
—Dimtry Rogozin, Chief,
Russian State Corporation Roscosmos
270
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
General Colonel Aleksandr Golovko, the first and current Commander of Russia’s Aerospace Forces, is seen here
at the launch of a Global Navigation Satellite System-M (GLONASS M) satellite in November 2018.
267,268
RUSSIA
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
20
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Space Station’s (ISS) reliance on Russian launch
vehicles to carry astronauts to and from the station
from 2011 to 2020 reinforced the perception of
Moscow as a global leader in space, which garnered
Russia a measure of prestige and economic support
for its space program.
271
Russia’s space program is robust but more narrowly
focused than China’s. Additionaly, Moscow’s budget is
more limited than Beijing’s because of competing pri-
orities within Russia’s broader military modernization
eorts.
272
In the years following the end of the Cold
War, a combination of economic constraints and tech-
nological setbacks caused a decay of Russian space
capabilities, including space-based remote sensing
and satellite navigation.
273
Nonetheless, during the
past two decades, Moscow has continued to pursue
space services in support of terrestrial applications
while developing a suite of counterspace weapon
capabilities, including EW to deny, degrade, and dis-
rupt communications and PNT and DEWs to deny the
use of space-based imagery.
274,275
Russia is developing
a mobile missile that is able to destroy satellites and
crewed space vehicles.
276,277,278,279
Space Strategy and Doctrine
Russia openly supports space arms control agree-
ments to prevent weaponization of space, even as
Russian military doctrine and authoritative writings
clearly articulate that Russia views space as a war-
ghting domain and that achieving supremacy in
space will be a decisive factor in winning future con-
icts.
280,281,282,283,284
Russian military thinkers believe
the importance of space will continue to expand
because of the growing role of precision weapons
and satellite-supported information networks in all
types of conict.
285,286
Moscow regularly expresses
concern about space weapons and is pursuing legal,
binding space arms control agreements to curb what
it sees as U.S. strength in outer space.
287,288,289
At the
same time, Russia is developing an arsenal of coun-
terspace capabilities to attack U.S. and allied assets.
290,291,292,293,294,295,296,297,298,299,300,301,302,303,304,305,306
As Russia continues to modernize its military, it will
increasingly integrate space services into its armed
forces. Russia has a strong foundation of technical
knowledge and expertise fostered by more than 60
years of experience in space. However, Moscow sees
overreliance on space as a potential vulnerability and
is determined to avoid becoming excessively depen-
dent on space to conduct its national defense mis-
sion.
307,308,309,310
Russia has developed terrestrial redun-
dancies to complement or replace space services that
may be denied in a wartime environment.
311
Russia views space as a critical enabler of U.S. preci-
sion-strike and military force projection capabilities.
Russia believes that U.S. missile defense systems
paired with U.S. space-enabled, conventional preci-
sion-strike capabilities undermine strategic stabil-
ity.
312,313
At the same time, Russia perceives the U.S.
dependence on space as its Achilles’ heel, which
can be exploited to achieve Russian conict objec-
tives.
314
Russia is therefore pursuing counterspace
systems to neutralize or deny U.S. space-based ser-
vices, both military and commercial, as a means of
osetting a perceived U.S. military advantage.
315,316
The Nedelin-class missile range instrumentation ship
(AGM) Marshal Krylov, subordinate to Russia’s Pacific
Fleet. AGM Marshal Krylov supports space and missile
instrumentation tracking and range support missions.
Image Source: U.S. National Archives
21
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Russian counterspace doctrine involves employing
ground-, air-, cyber-, and space-based systems to tar-
get an adversary’s satellites with attacks ranging from
temporary jamming or sensor blinding to destruc-
tion of enemy spacecraft and supporting infrastruc-
ture.
317,318,319,320
Moscow believes that developing and
elding counterspace capabilities will deter aggres-
sion from adversaries reliant on space.
321
If deter-
rence fails, Russia believes its counterspace forces
will oer its military leaders the ability to control
escalation of a conict through selective targeting of
adversary space systems.
322,323
Space and Counterspace
Organizations
In 2015, Russia created the Aerospace Forces
by merging the former Air Force and Aerospace
Defense Troops. This new force includes the Space
Forces, Russia’s military element that conducts
space launches and operates the BMEW, the sat-
ellite control network, and the space surveillance
network.
324,325,326
Russia’s defense minister stated
that the change was “prompted by a shift in the
center of gravity toward the aerospace sphere”
and as a counter to the U.S. Prompt Global Strike
doctrine.
327,328
To accomplish space and counter-
space operational tasks, Russia’s Space Forces
were organized into the 15th Special Purpose Aero-
space Army, which consists of the 820th Main Mis-
sile Attack Warning Center, the 821st Main Space
Reconnaissance Center, and the 153rd Titov Main
Test and Space Systems Control Center.
329,330,331,332,333
The Space Forces also operate the Plesetsk Cos-
modrome, where they launch military satellites,
and the Mozhayskiy Military Space Academy, where
they train ocers and enlisted personnel in strate-
gic and operational military operations theory and
aerospace engineering specialties.
334,335,336
The reorganization of Russia’s civilian space program
was designed to improve upon ineciencies across
the sector and readjust from the loss of control
over former Soviet space production enterprises in
Ukraine. Today the Russian space industry is almost
exclusively state owned.
337
The state-owned corpo-
ration Roscosmos is the executive body responsi-
ble for overall management of the space industry
and for carrying out Russia’s civilian space program.
The space industry primarily comprises 75 design
bureaus, enterprises, and companies that carry out
research, engineering development, and production
of Russia’s space technologies, satellites, and SLVs
for both civilian and military purposes.
338,339
During the past few years, Russia has faced several
obstacles to its space program. Corruption has been
prevalent and has stalled developments,
340
budget
cuts and sanctions have delayed projects,
341,342,343
and negligible private space investment has stymied
growth and innovation.
344
Acquisition of Foreign
Space and Counterspace
Technologies
Moscow directs a whole-of-government approach to
select and acquire foreign space and counterspace
technologies in support of Russia’s economic and
military goals. Following the imposition of sanctions
by the United States, western Europe, Australia, and
Japan in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of the
Crimean Peninsula, Moscow has exploited multiple
collection paths to mitigate U.S. and European Union
(EU) restrictions on Russia’s access to space tech-
nology, information, and expertise, but sanctions
are still aecting space systems production.
345,346
Russia relies on acquisition of Western components
because of the decline of its domestic microelectron-
ics industry and because of its inability to realize its
import substitution program goals.
347,348,349,350,351,352,353
ISR Satellite Capabilities
Russia designs and employs some of the world’s most
capable individual ISR satellites, despite funding short-
falls and technological setbacks limiting the number
of such systems in orbit. The eet contains more than
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
22
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
30 satellites providing electro-optical imagery, a new
radar observation platform, missile warning, and elec-
tronic and signals intelligence.
354,355,356
At least half of
these systems are owned and operated by the Rus-
sian Defense Ministry. Space-based sensors provide
Russia strategic warning of ballistic missile launches,
support targeting of Russian antiship cruise mis-
siles,
357
and support electro-optical imagery require-
ments for Russian military operations in Syria.
358,359
Setbacks have hindered Russia’s ability to launch and
maintain its military-dedicated ISR satellites, leading to
increased use of its civilian and commercial satellites
to fulll military tasks.
360
Satellite Communications
Russia owns and operates a diverse constellation
of commercial and military communications sat-
ellites capable of providing mobile and xed SAT-
COM services from various orbital altitudes. In
spite of lagging behind other competitors, and the
instituting of Western sanctions in 2014, Russia
continues to replace aging communications sat-
ellites with modern and more capable satellites
to preserve and expand its SATCOM capabilities,
including through partnerships with European
satellite manufacturers.
361,362
The satellites are
able to support worldwide military and paramil-
itary deployments, enabling Moscow to maintain
C2 over its military units to support its national
objectives.
363,364,365,366,367,368
PNT Capabilities
GLONASS provides Russia worldwide satellite nav-
igation services and supports Russia’s economic
development and national security interests.
369
Fol-
lowing the GLONASS constellation’s deterioration in
the late 1990s, Russia committed to reconstituting
GLONASS during the 2000s.
370
Full operating capa-
bility was regained in 2011; Russia now launches sat-
ellites as needed to maintain the constellation while
developing next-generation GLONASS satellites.
371
Russia’s military also uses GLONASS to enable mili-
tary system deployments, force movement, and pre-
cision-guided munitions delivery.
372,373,374
Human Spaceflight and
Space Exploration Efforts
Russia’s human spaceight program started in the
late 1950s and had its rst major milestone with the
launch of Yuri Gagarin aboard the Vostok-1 space-
craft in 1961.
375
Since that historic launch, the former
Soviet Union and then Russia has launched the Salyut,
Almaz, and Mir Space Stations, multiple elements of
the ISS, and several Mars exploration missions; how-
ever, only two Mars missions were successful—the
last in 1971.
376
Although Russia has talked about with-
drawing from the ISS as late as April 2021, it is commit-
ted to the eort through at least 2025.
377
Russia’s Luch relay satellites allow Moscow to com-
municate between the ISS and Earth without reli-
ance on National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration’s (NASA) and U.S. SATCOM systems.
378
Since
the manned launch of SpaceX’s Crew Dragon to the
ISS in May 2020, Russia has oered to sell Soyuz
seats to other international partners, such as the
United Arab Emirates, to make up revenue from
losing U.S. astronaut transportation requirements
to the ISS.
379,380
Like other spacefaring nations, Russia has ambi-
tious plans for lunar exploration and settlement
Russia's Luch 5A relay satellite in the Space Pavilion at
the Cosmonautics and Aviation Center at the Exhibi-
tion of Achievements of the National Economy.
Image Source: Sputnik via AFP
23
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Russia: Space Exploration Missions
381,382,383
Mission Description Launch Date
Nauka Russian ISS science module.
384,385
July 2021
386
Luna-25 Joint lunar lander project with ESA.
387
2022
388
Prichal Russian ISS docking module.
389
2021
ExoMars Joint Mars lander with ESA.
390,391
TBD
Luna-Grunt Lunar lander and sample return.
392
2024
Luna-27
First mission to explore the lunar south pole, where
frozen water lies under the surface and where Russia
intends to build a base.
393
2025
394
Luna-26 Lunar orbital mapping mission.
395
2024
Luna-28 Lunar sample return mission.
396
2027–2028
Luna-29 Lunar rover mission.
397
2028
Expedition-M Phobos sample return mission.
398
2026–2035
International
Lunar Research
Station
Establish a research base on the Moon, primarily sup-
ported by robotic technology and capable of supporting
human visits.
399
2025–2035
during the next 40 years.
401
Russia has discussed
partnering with China, the EU, and the United States
to achieve its lunar aspirations.
402
China and Russia
signed a memorandum of understanding in March
2021 to work together on the International Lunar
Research Station (ILRS).
403,404
Space Launch Capabilities
Russia is updating and improving its space launch
capabilities to enhance reliability, alleviate environ-
mental concerns, increase manufacturing ecien-
cies, and support future human spaceight and
Russian Aerospace Forces monitor GLONASS satel-
lites at the Titov Main Test and Space Systems Control
Center in Krasnoznamensk outside Moscow.
400
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
24
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Russian Space Launch Vehicles
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Meters
Angara-1.2
Soyuz-2.1A
Soyuz-2.1B
Soyuz-2.1V
Soyuz-5
Angara-A5
Proton-M
Energia-5
Medium-Lift
2–20 metric tons
Heavy-Lift
20–50 metric tons
Super Heavy-Lift
>50 metric tons
Light Lift <2 tons
Medium Lift 2–20 tons
Heavy Lift 20–50 tons
Super Heavy Lift >50 tons
Russia has focused on maintaining its own military and civil strategies, using heavier rockets into LEO. Russia’s
heavy-lift vehicles are mostly used for launching into GEO or HEO. The developmental Energia SLV, designed to
boost the Russian space shuttle into orbit, was discontinued in the 1980s. However, it was revived in 2016 to sup-
port proposed lunar missions and renamed "Yensei."
2008-26366
Russian Space Agency ROSCOMOS launches Progress MS-14 on Soyuz-2.1a from Baikonur Cosmodrome, Kazakhstan.
Image Source: Sputnik via AFP
25
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Russian Space Launch, SSA, Satellite Control Centers, and Command and
Control Stations
405,406,407,408,409,410,411,412,413,414,415,416,417,418,419,420,421,422,423,424,425,426,427,428,429,430,431,432,433
Russia owns two of its launch sites and leases one from Kazakhstan. The European Space Agency has con
-
tracted Russia to conduct launches from Kourou, French Guiana. Inactive spaceports include Kapustin Yar and
Svobodny Spaceports. Russia’s space control sites are spread across Russia to enable effective satellite C2.
GLONASS TT&C stations are similarly spread across Russia to ensure timely control of the navigation constella
-
tion. Moscow has spread nine radars at eight locations of various types across its landmass to enable a dual-role
BMEW and SSA mission.
2108-29556
deep-space exploration missions.
434,435
Russia’s updates to its medium- and heavy-lift
launch eets include modular SLVs, which allow
Russia to tailor SLVs to the specic conguration
required for each customer. Unlike China, Rus-
sia has not focused on new light-lift SLV designs,
instead usually choosing to launch small satel-
lites in multipayload launches on larger rockets.
Russia is also in the early stages of developing a
super heavy-lift SLV similar to the U.S. Saturn V or
the newer U.S. Space Launch System to support
proposed crewed lunar and Mars exploration mis-
sions.
436
In 2019, Moscow retired the Soyuz-FG and
Rokot, and it has since focused on newer SLVs with
similar capabilities.
437,438
Russia’s commercial launch industry acquired the
launch systems of a previously Russia-Ukraine-U.S.
consortium called Sea Launch. This capability fea-
tures a mobile oating platform for space launches;
however, this eort is plagued by nancial hardship
and is on hold.
439
A ban on U.S. purchases of Russian rocket engines is
currently set to take eect in 2022, but Russian enter-
prises probably began to see negative consequences
beginning in 2020, as the U.S. demand for these
engines decreased. In 2018, 17 of the 19 total engines
on order were destined for the United States. Roscos-
mos has oered to cut prices by 30 percent.
440
Space Situational Awareness
Russia’s space surveillance network, managed by
the 821st Main Space Reconnaissance Center, is
composed of a variety of telescopes, radars, and
other sensors, and is capable of searching for, track-
ing, and characterizing satellites in all Earth orbits.
This network allows Russia to support its various
missions including intelligence collection, counter-
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
26
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
space targeting, spaceight safety, satellite anom-
aly resolution, and space debris monitoring. Some
of these sensors also perform a BMEW function as
their primary mission.
444
Electronic Warfare Capabilities
The Russian military views EW as an essential tool
for gaining and maintaining information superior-
ity over its adversaries, allowing Russia to seize the
operational initiative by disrupting adversary C4ISR
capabilities. Russia has elded a wide range of
ground-based EW systems to counter GPS, tactical
communications, SATCOM, and radars.
446
Mobile
jammers target radar and communications satel-
lites. Russia has developed and elded a full spec-
trum of EW capabilities with mobility, automation,
and performance improvements able to counter
Western space-enabled C4ISR and weapons guid-
ance systems.
447,448,449
In February 2020, Russian military ocials con-
rmed that Russia is actively employing EW capa-
bilities in Syria to counter GPS-enabled capabilities
such as drones.
450,451,452
Cyberthreats
Since at least 2010, the Russian military has placed
a priority on the development of forces and capa-
bilities, including cyberspace operations, for what it
Russian International SSA Collaboration
Russia leads the nongovernmental organization International Scientic
Optical Network (ISON), which is the largest foreign network of ground-
based optical space surveillance sensors. ISON was established in 2001,
and participants include international academic and scientic organizations
and government entities such as Roscosmos. Russia’s Keldysh Institute of
Applied Mathematics coordinates sensor tasking and combines information
from nearly 100 ground-based optical sensors of varying sizes at 40 obser-
vatories across 16 countries—Australia, Bolivia, China, Georgia, Germany,
Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia (seven locations) Spain,
Switzerland, Ukraine (4 locations), the United States, and Uzbekistan.
441,442,443
Russia has invested heavily in developing sophisticated
EW capabilities, including this Krashuka-4 jammer.
Image Source: Russia Ministry of Defense/Creative Commons 4.0 Copyright
Deployed SATCOM jammer in the field.
445
Image Source: NASA Spaceflight Online Forum
27
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
a The name Burevestnik is also associated with a Russian developmental nuclear-powered cruise missile. [Source: National Air and Space
Intelligence Center; 2020; 2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat Report; p.36.]
Russian Peresvet laser weapon probably is
intended for use against satellites (July 2018).
Image Source: SPUTNIK/AFP
terms “information confrontation”—a holistic con-
cept for ensuring information superiority. The wea-
ponization of information is a critical aspect of this
strategy and is employed in times of peace, crisis,
and war. Russia considers the information sphere,
especially space-enabled information collection and
transmission, to be strategically decisive and has
taken steps to modernize its military’s information
attack and defense organizations and capabilities.
453
Directed Energy Weapons
Directed energy weapons pose a direct threat to
space operations. Russia has several ground-based
lasers, for example, that can blind satellite sensors.
454
By July 2018, Russia began delivering the Peresvet
laser weapon system to its Aerospace Forces. Russian
leaders indicate that Peresvet has an ASAT mission. In
public statements, Russian President Vladimir Putin
called it a “new type of strategic weapon,” and the
Russian Defense Ministry asserted that it is capable
of “ghting satellites in orbit.”
455,456,457,458
In December
2019, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu stated
that this laser weapon has been deployed to ve stra-
tegic missile divisions.
459,460,461
Additional press report-
ing indicates that the ground-mobile Peresvet laser
system is designed to blind enemy optical tracking sys-
tems, including those on satellites, with its laser.
462,463
The system is meant to mask the movement of strate-
gic missile systems, according to Moscow Interfax.
464
Russia probably will eld lasers that are more capable
of damaging satellites in the mid-to-late 2020s.
465
By
2030, Russia may also eld higher power systems that
extend the threat to the structures of all satellites, not
just electro-optical ISR.
466
ASAT Missile Threats
Russia is also developing ASAT missile systems. These
missiles can destroy U.S. and allied space systems in
LEO, threatening ISR and communications satellites.
Russia is developing and testing a mobile missile
defense complex referred to as Nudol, which Russian
sources describe as capable of destroying ballistic
missiles and low-orbiting satellites.
467,468,469,470,471,472
Although Russia publicly describes Nudol as a ballis-
tic missile defense system, it has an inherent counter-
space capability. Deputy Prime Minister, then Deputy
Defense Minister, Yuri Borisov remarked in 2018 that
Nudol is a “counterspace attack complex” for the Rus-
sian military.
473
This weapon system—most recently-
tested in November 2021—created over 1,500 pieces
of trackable space debris and tens of thousands of
pieces of lethal but nontrackable debris. This debris
endangers spacecraft of all nations in LEO, including
astronauts and cosmonauts on the ISS and China's
Tiangong space station. With this test, Russia demon-
strated the capability of the missile to destroy satel-
lites in LEO.
474,475
MiG-31BM taking off from Zhukovskiy with potential
Burevestnik ASAT missile.
Image Source: The Space Review (Alex Snow)
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
28
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Russia is reportedly developing an air launched ASAT
weapon called Burevestnik
a
, targeting spacecraft in
LEO. This system is based on the Soviet-era system
called “Contact” that was designed for launching an
ASAT missile from a MiG-31 ghter aircraft.
476,477
In
September 2018, a MiG-31 was photographed in ight
at the Zhukovskiy aircraft test site near Moscow carry-
ing a large missile that could be related to air-launched
ASAT weapon testing.
478
An Aerospace Forces squad-
ron commander remarked that Russia would deploy
an ASAT weapon on a MiG-31 ballistic missile “capable
of destroying targets in near-space.”
479
Orbital Threats
In 2020, Russia tested a space-based ASAT weapon
and continues to research and develop sophisti-
cated orbital capabilities that could serve dual-use
purposes. For example, inspection and servicing
satellites can closely approach satellites to inspect
and repair malfunctions; this same technology
could also be used to conduct an attack on other
countries’ satellites, resulting in temporary or
permanent damage.
480
In 2017, Russia deployed what it described as
an “inspector satellite capable of diagnosing the
technical condition of a Russian satellite from the
closest possible distance,” possibly as part of its
Nivelir program. However, the satellite’s behav-
ior has been inconsistent with on-orbit inspec-
tion or SSA activities.
481,482,483
In November 2019,
Russia deployed two satellites, Cosmos 2542
and 2543.
484,485
After the launch, one of the satel-
lites appeared to begin following a U.S. national
security satellite, approaching close enough to
create potentially dangerous operating con-
ditions.
486,487,488
In July 2020, Russia ejected an
object into orbit from Cosmos 2543 near another
Russian satellite in a test of a space-based ASAT
weapon.
489,490
Additionally, Cosmos 2504 and Cos-
mos 2536 are prototype Russian ASAT weapons
that could kinetically kill satellites in LEO.
491
According to Russian press reporting, Roscosmos
is creating a satellite intended for GEO operations,
which will have orbital servicing capabilities. The
same report also recognizes the ASAT capabilities
of servicing satellites in all orbits.
492
29
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Iran
Iran’s pursuit of a national space program sup-
ports both its civilian and military goals, including
boosting national pride, economic development, and
military modernization.
494,495,496
Tehran states it has
developed sophisticated capabilities, including SLVs
as well as communications and remote-sensing sat-
ellites;
497
however, its SLVs are only able to launch
small satellites into LEO and have proven unreliable.
The Iranian Space Agency (ISA) and Iranian Space
Research Center (ISRC)—subordinate to the Ministry
of Information and Communications Technology—
along with the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics (MODAFL) oversee part of the country’s sat-
ellite development programs.
498,499
ISA and ISRC work
with Iranian universities, private industry, and foreign
partners to develop satellites to test communications
and remote-sensing technologies.
500,501,502
However,
Iran’s limited space launch capacity has led to a signi-
cant backlog of built-but-unlaunched satellites.
503
To ensure access to space-based ISR, Iran’s Project
505 is probably an attempt to buy an ISR system
from Russia that started in August 2015; however,
this system is not yet in orbit.
504,505
A Russian aero-
space company, NPK Barl, and the All-Russian Scien-
tic Research Institute of Electromechanics would
provide the ground system and the satellite respec-
tively which would be operated by the Iranian state-
run trade company, Bonyan Danesh Shargh.
506,507
MODAFL and the IRGC-ASF oversee Iran’s SLV devel-
opment programs. MODAFL’s rst launch attempt,
the two-stage Sar SLV in 2008,
508
was followed by
four successful launches, numerous failures, and
retirement in 2020.
509,510
In 2016, MODAFL tested the larger liquid-fu-
eled Simorgh SLV, and as of March 2020,
MODAFL planned to use the Simorgh’s tech-
nologies to develop other larger more capa-
On 22 April 2020, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF) successfully
launched the Ghased SLV, placing the Noor-1 satellite
into LEO.
493
Image Source: IRNA
CHALLENGES
EMERGING
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
30
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
ble SLVs, including the Sarir and Soroush.
511
Iran conducted launches of the IRGC-ASF–devel-
oped hybrid liquid- and solid-fueled Ghased SLV
in 2020 and 2022.
512
The IRGC-ASF subsequently
announced its intent to continue SLV development,
including a future SLV with GEO launch capabil-
ity.
513,514,515,516,517,518,519
Iran has also revealed plans
for a larger four-stage Ghaem SLV, which could
serve as a test bed for developing ICBM technolo-
gies. Because of inherent overlapping technology
between ICBMs and SLVs, some Western analysts
are concerned that Iran’s development of booster
technology for larger, more capable SLVs will
improve Iran’s ICBM potential.
520,521,522,523
On 12 June
2021, Iran launched an unknown SLV and was pre-
paring a second SLV for launch in late-June.
524
Iran recognizes the strategic value of space and
counterspace capabilities and will attempt to deny
an adversary use of space during a conict.
525
Tehran
has publicly acknowledged it has developed capabil-
ities to jam space-based communications and GPS
signals.
526,527,528
Iran may also contribute to the pro-
liferation of such jamming equipment. Since 2010,
state-owned Iran Electronics Industries has marketed
several GPS jammers on its website.
529
Advance-
ments in SLV technology could also be applied to
developing a basic ground-based ASAT missile, if Iran
chooses to do so in the future.
530,531,532,533
Iran has improved its domestic space domain
awareness capabilities, establishing its rst
space-monitoring center in 2013.
534
In 2005, Iran
joined China-led APSCO to access SSA from other
countries and hopes to expand its cooperation
with the organization.
535,536,537,538
North Korea
North Korea’s space program is administered by a
state-run civilian agency, the National Aerospace
Development Administration.
539
North Korea’s
space launch complex on the west coast, Sohae
Satellite Launching Station, and associated space
tracking facilities in Pyongyang supported satellite
launch cycles in 2012 and 2016. In January 2021,
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un announced that
Pyongyang—in an attempt to secure its own space-
based reconnaissance capability—had completed
its design of a satellite and will launch it in the near
future. Kim Jong Un emphasized that North Korea
is undertaking, “full scale work,” toward space capa-
bilities, suggesting development of new or mod-
ied SLVs or a satellite intended for operational
use.
541,542
An older space launch site on the east
coast, Tonghae, has not been used for a launch
since 2009.
543,544
North Korea has demonstrated
Launch of Unha-3 SLV.
540
Image Source: KCTV
31
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
nonkinetic counterspace capabilities, including GPS
and SATCOM jamming, and probably intends to
deny space-based navigation and communications
during a conict.
545,546,547
In 2020, North Korean actors conducted numer-
ous cyberoperations against our foreign part-
ners’ defense industries and attempted to com-
promise various U.S. Government networks.
548
Multiple North Korean hacker groups have
targeted the aerospace industries potentially
including space technologies.
549,550,551
This activ-
ity, if left unchecked, could enable North Korea’s
weapons and space system development and
procurement programs.
552,553,554,555,556
North Korea’s ballistic missiles and SLVs, such
as the Unha-3 SLV, in theory could be used to
target satellites in a conict.
557
North Korea has
placed two satellites in orbit and has articu-
lated further space ambitions. Its space program
has also enabled testing of technology used
in ballistic missiles under the guise of peace-
ful use of space.
558,559,560
These systems provided
North Korea with valuable data applicable to
the development of long-range and multistage
ballistic missiles.
561
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
32
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACECHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACECHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
KEY SPACE ISSUES
THROUGH 2030 AND BEYOND
Growth of Reusable
Space Technology:
Commercial
Opportunities and
Military Advantage
Access to space has traditionally required the use
of expendable spacecraft: single-use launch vehi-
cles, satellites, and capsules that are designed to
maximize performance and then be discarded.
Reliance on expendable vehicles has made access
to space expensive and exclusive. Reusable tech-
nologies, while even more dicult and expensive
to develop and build, stand to greatly reduce the
cost of spaceight by recovering, refurbishing,
and reusing rocket stages, fairings, and capsules.
Foreign nations increasingly seek to repeat U.S.
successes in reusable technologies by developing
their own reusable SLVs (R-SLVs) and spacecraft.
The state-owned enterprise, China Academy of
Launch Vehicle Technology, modied the LM-8—
launched for the rst time on 22 December 2020—
into an R-SLV.
562
The Chinese company, i-Space,
plans to launch the country’s rst commercially
developed R-SLV, called Hyperbola-2, in late-2021,
but a Hyperbola-1 failure probably delayed that
launch.
563,564
China is also developing two partially
reusable capsules: the New-Generation Manned
Spaceship intended to replace the Shenzhou cap-
sule, and the New-Generation Reusable Recov-
erable Satellite as an inexpensive platform for
microgravity experiments and rapid space equip-
ment testing.
565,566
In 2019, the chief designer for NPO Energomash, one
of Russia’s rocket propulsion companies, said that
the company is moving forward with a proposal to
create an R-SLV.
567
NPO Energomash has also stated
that it hopes to modify its successful RD-180 engine
to be reusable as many as 10 times.
568
Another Rus-
sian space corporation, Myasishchev, is designing an
R-SLV rst-stage that will return to its launch center
after second stage separation.
569
Space planes are another form of reusable technol-
ogy. Space planes also feature enhanced maneuver-
ability, making them uniquely suitable for certain
missions as compared with traditional satellites.
Developing a space plane requires overcoming the
obstacles of hypersonic ight, a raried atmospheric
environment, and extreme external heating. China
has developed hypersonic glide vehicles for ballis-
tic missile warhead delivery probably enabling fur-
ther achievements in space application.
570
China
is developing the Shenlong and Tengyun space
planes. In 2020, China launched into orbit its rst-
ever prototype of a space plane, which stayed in
orbit for 2 days before returning to Earth. Bei-
jing stated its space plane was testing reusable
spacecraft technologies as part of advancing the
peaceful use of space.
571,572
The Shenlong pro-
gram previously conducted a drop test as early as
2011, and Tengyun has only completed a model
wind tunnel test.
573,574
Russia announced multiple
space plane projects during the past two decades,
but it has made no serious progress following the
one and only ight of Buran, a copy of the U.S. Space
Shuttle, in 1988.
575,576,577,578
Reusable spaceight technology will also enable the
commercial space tourism industry, both for subor-
bital and orbital ight. The cost savings provided by
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
34
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Cislunar Chart
DRO
LLO
NRHO
Y
X
L
Halo
L
Moon
L
DRO - Distant Retrograde Orbit
LLO - Low Lunar Orbit
NHRO - Near-Rectilinear Halo Orbit
L
- Lagrange Point 1
L
- Lagrange Point 2
To Earth
Most satellites operate in orbits near Earth to provide services for users on the ground. Satellite orbits are
selected to best serve their application, for example, satellites that are required to remain over a single region
on Earth are placed in GEO. Satellites will be placed in various cislunar orbits in the near future. In addition
to direct orbits around the Moon, there are other points in the Earth-Moon system that are useful for sat-
ellite operations. Lagrange points are stable positions in space between two celestial bodies. Gravitational
pull equals the centripetal force required for a smaller object to orbit there, and subsequently reduces fuel
requirements to remain in these positions. L1 and L2—between the Moon and Earth and the far side of the
Moon respectively—are depicted here. There are three other Lagrange points associated with the Earth-Moon
system, L3-L5.
579
2008-26359
reusable technology will be key for lowering ticket
prices and widening the market. British, Japanese,
and Russian rms are among those developing
tourist spacecraft.
580,581
Human Spaceflight and
Cislunar Operations
Human spaceight and space operations of most
types to and beyond the moon will very likely
increase in the future. Threats to U.S. and allied
military space capabilities will persist as humanity
expands its reach into space. Nations are motivated
to pursue new scientic missions, compete for mil-
itary advantage, expand communications and data
processing, and obtain greater national and inter-
national prestige. Economic competition to exploit
the potentially large amount of natural resources on
the Moon, Mars, or even asteroids, while a nascent
endeavor today, will become a driver for more
space-capable states or consortiums in the future.
35
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
A China National Space Agency graphic depicting the Proposed Chinese-Russian International Lunar Research
Station. The individual elements are 1 lunar surface tracking & command station; 2 survey module; 3 mobile
survey module; 4 leaping module; 5 lunar orbit module; 6 test platform; 7 Russia’s Luna-27; 8 relay module;
9 assembly robot; and reconnaissance robot.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Image Source: China National Space Administration (CNSA)
New Competition for Space Beyond Earth's Orbit
Deep-space operations beyond Earth orbit, sometimes called xGEO,
587
are focused on scientic mis-
sions and exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies. Spacecraft in xGEO are much harder to
track and characterize, and could threaten U.S. or allied high-value satellites.
588
Adversaries could also
place operational or reserve satellites in deep space so they are much harder to monitor for later use
in lower orbits.
589
Space exploration initiatives are also opportunities
for many nations to cooperate and benet from
scientic discoveries and technological innovation.
This trend will expand and feed the presence of
nations beyond Earth orbit on a level greater than
that already demonstrated by the operation of
interplanetary probes to date.
During the past two decades, foreign competitors
have looked to lunar missions as major demonstra-
tions of technological sophistication and national
strength. Other nations have been involved in
human spaceight—more than 40 nations have
orbited astronauts with Russian or U.S. human
spaceight missions.
582,583
Many nations have con-
tributed to the scientic knowledge of Earth with
deep-space probes and missions to the Moon and
Mars.
584,585,586
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
36
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Challenge to Space
Operations: Debris
and Orbital Collisions
The probability of collision between massive dere-
lict objects in LEO is rising and almost certainly will
continue to rise until at least 2030 as a result of frag-
mentation events such as collisions or battery explo-
sions, ASAT testing, and a rapidly increasing num-
ber of space launches worldwide.
590,591,592,593,594,595
The collision risk is to all civilian, commercial, and
government satellites of all nations. This adds to the
diculty of ensuring safe space operations and the
overall stability of the space environment.
Debris in Orbit. Collisions between and explosions
of massive derelict objects almost certainly will con-
tinue to add to the amount of space debris in orbit.
As of January 2022, more than 25,000 objects of at
least 10 centimeters in size were tracked and cata-
loged in Earth’s orbit to include active satellites.
596,597
The primary risk to spacecraft in orbit is from uncat-
aloged lethal nontrackable debris (LNT), which are
objects between 5 millimeters and 10 centimeters
in size. An estimated 600,000 to 900,000 pieces of
uncataloged LNT are in LEO.
598
Prior to 2007, most debris came from explosions
of upper stages of SLVs. Today, nearly one-half
of all cataloged debris are fragments from three
major events: China’s destruction of its own defunct
weather satellite in 2007, the accidental collision
between a U.S. communications satellite and a dead
Russian satellite in 2009, and the 2021 Russian Nudol
ASAT test.
599,600
Threats of Massive Object Collision. Of the cataloged
objects, there are nearly 1,300 massive—greater than
the size and weight of an automobile—derelict objects
in LEO that pose a unique threat to LEO space oper-
ations. These objects approach each other within 5
kilometers daily, some passing well within 1 kilometer
monthly, at 10–15 kilometers per second.
601
Computer rendering of tracked objects greater than 10 centimeters in Earth’s orbit. Red, yellow, and
green objects are representations of active satellites in the GEO orbital belt and in MEO. [Note: The
objects are not drawn to scale; the objects are approximately 10,000 times greater than actual size.]
37
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Massive Derelict Cluster Collision Probabilities
Cluster*
In-Cluster
P
C
**
(Per Year)
In-Cluster
P
C
Increase
by 2030
No. of
Likely
Catalogued
Fragments
LNT Likely
Produced
Comments
C615 ~1/280 5–7% ~5,500 ~80,000
Short-lived debris
(years to decades).
Near many satellites.
C775 ~1/715 2–3% ~4,500 ~70,000
Moderate-lived debris
(decades).
Near many satellites.
C850 ~1/800 8–15% ~15,000 ~225,000
Long-lived debris
(many decades).
Fewer satellites than
C775 or C615.
C975 ~1/120 16–26% ~3,500 ~55,000
C1,500 ~1/5,000 ~1% ~6,000 ~75,000
Very long-lived debris
(many centuries).
Not near many satellites
* Cluster number represents orbital radius to the center of the cluster in kilometers, for example C850 is centered at 850
kilometers in altitude
** P
C
is probability of collision
A collision between these objects almost certainly
would create 3,500–15,000 cataloged fragments
and 55,000–225,000 LNT fragments, whereas a typ-
ical satellite breakup generally creates about 250
pieces of cataloged debris.
602
The annual probability
of collision for massive derelict objects clustered at
1,500 kilometers is 1 in 5,000 and for separate clus-
ter objects at 850 kilometers in altitude is 1 in 800.
Although the debris contribution for a collision at 850
kilometers would nearly double the LEO catalog pop-
ulation (i.e., generate ~15,000 trackable fragments),
the debris from a collision at 1,500 kilometers would
remain in orbit potentially for thousands of years.
Threats Posed by Debris. Space debris can cause
damage and destruction to satellites and crewed
spacecraft, as well as increase costs if satellite manu-
facturers add additional shielding to withstand small
fragment impacts and fuel to allow for more frequent
avoidance maneuvers. The cost of any maneuvers
increases fuel usage, adds to operational complex-
ity and expense, and shortens spacecraft lifetimes
which may require more space launches to main-
tain the same level of capability. Between 1998 and
2022, the ISS, in LEO, maneuvered at least 30 times to
avoid potential collisions with orbital debris.
603
With
an expected increase in large constellations of sat-
ellites and space debris, there is higher potential for
satellite collisions, particularly in LEO.
604
Orbital Lifetime of Debris. The time that debris
remains in orbit depends largely on its size and alti-
tude— the smaller objects are and the higher they
orbit, the longer they remain in space. Fragments
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
38
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
from explosions and collisions will tend to be smaller
and exist in lower orbits, and therefore, will have
shorter orbital lifetimes than abandoned payloads
and rocket bodies. Atmospheric drag acts as a natu-
ral cleaner by causing most debris at lower altitudes
to reenter Earth’s atmosphere and burn up. Some
intact objects at 500 kilometers can remain in orbit
for about 10 years. As the altitude gets closer to
1,500 kilometers, derelicts and debris can remain for
more than 10,000 years.
605
Orbital collisions tend to occur at high relative
velocities (i.e., greater than 25,000 miles per hour
in LEO and disperse fragments into many dierent
orbital altitudes). A collision of two objects at 975
kilometers—the most likely of the collision proba-
bilities at about 1 in 120 chance per year—would
leave many fragments in orbit for more than a
thousand years.
606
Postmission Disposal (PMD). In 1993, the United
States set debris guidelines for space operators,
which were adopted by many nations and the
UN-aliated Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordi-
nation Committee. In LEO, all objects were to be
placed in orbits allowing for their eventual decay
within 25 years of the end of mission. The usual
PMD maneuver placed objects at or below 650
kilometers.
607
However, even if international and
national guidelines were made legally binding,
mitigation thresholds were made more stringent,
or if compliance were even close to 100 percent;
there would still be a formidable debris problem
from the remnants of the rst 63 years of space
operations.
608,609
While U.S. compliance is higher,
current worldwide compliance with this guideline
is well under 50 percent. The increase in the num-
ber of objects in orbit has implications for policy-
makers worldwide and is encouraging the devel-
opment of space debris remediation technology.
39
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
The advantages space provides will drive some
nations to improve their ability to access and oper-
ate in space. Additionally, some nations will pursue
new and improved counterspace capabilities to tar-
get the perceived U.S. and allied reliance on space-
based assets.
Space services will continue to proliferate world-
wide as technological and cost barriers fall and
international partnerships for space support
increase. State, non-state, and commercial actors
will increasingly gain access to data and services
emanating from space.
610,611
The number of space
launch companies and satellite service providers
will expand at least through 2025. And with more
groups—commercial, academic, and even private—
now able to reach orbit, the growth of satellites and
debris in space is expected to increase. This growth
of orbital objects will drive a need for more satellite
tracking—commercial and government—to help
distinguish threats from nonthreats, and to predict
and prevent collisions which will prove to be an
even greater task.
612,613
China and Russia value superiority in space. As a
result, they will seek ways to strengthen their space
and counterspace programs, and determine ways to
better integrate them into their respective militaries.
Both nations are also seeking to broaden their space
exploration initiatives—together and individually—
outside Earth’s orbit with plans to explore the Moon
and Mars during the next 30 years. Lunar explora-
tion by China and Russia aims to expand their scien-
tic knowledge and prestige. If successful, it will likely
lead to attempts by China and Russia to exploit the
Moon's natural resources.
Iran and North Korea will focus on increasing their
capabilities in the civil and military domains to
counter space-based services such as communica-
tions and navigation.
614
Both will maintain their abil-
ity to conduct EW against adversaries and theoreti-
cally could use their missile and SLV advancements
to target orbiting satellites.
The combination of increasing counterspace capabil-
ities—especially those of China and Russia—a gen-
eral growth in numbers of space objects, and the
proliferation of requirements for space-enabled ser-
vices will make space an increasingly competitive and
crowded environment for the foreseeable future.
As the number of spacefaring nations grows and
space and counterspace capabilities become more
integrated into military operations, the U.S space
posture will be increasingly challenged and on orbit
assets will face new risks.
Deep space operations will pose potential challenges
to space assets due to the inherent diculty in track-
ing and monitoring spacecraft at distances beyond
GEO.
615,616
Moreover, the growing incorporation of
dual-use technology will continue as the develop-
ment and testing of government and commercial
satellite servicing spacecraft increases—some with
potential counterspace capabilities.
617
OUTLOOK
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
40
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
APPENDIX:
Space and Counterspace Concepts
Satellite C2 Architecture
Satellite C2 architecture uses TT&C to communicate
with and control satellites. The control center uses
an uplink to deliver commands to a spacecraft. The
spacecraft sends data via a downlink to a ground
station with the necessary antennas, transmitters,
and receivers to receive the data. Some satellite
constellations use relay satellites, which enable
communication between satellites outside the
reception area of a ground station.
618
Any component
of the architecture is vulnerable to attack, ranging
from physical vulnerabilities of a ground site to
EW disrupting the connection between the space
segment and the operator.
Remote Sensing
Remote sensing—generally called ISR—satellites col-
lect images, electronic emissions, and other data of
the Earth’s land, sea, and atmosphere. Civilian and
commercial applications are used for activities such
as environmental monitoring, urban planning, and
disaster response.
High demand for this data and falling costs for capa-
ble technology have spurred the rapid growth and
proliferation of these satellites. A decade ago, foreign
ISR satellites numbered nearly 100, and by January
2022, that number reached more than 550. ISR sat-
ellites support a variety of military activities by pro-
viding signals intelligence, enabling battle damage
assessments, and assisting military operations.
619,620
They have reduced the ability of all countries to per-
form sensitive military activities undetected.
Some countries’ militaries use space-based ISR. For
example, militaries use space-based sensors to aug-
ment terrestrial platforms as part of their missile
attack warning networks and can enable defensive
or oensive operations in response. Space-based
sensors usually provide the rst indication of a mis-
sile launch, and ground-based radars provide fol-
low-on information and conrm the attack.
Satellite Communications
Global communications networks rely on commu-
nications satellites for worldwide voice communi-
cations, television broadcasts, broadband Internet,
mobile services, and data transfer for civilian, mil-
itary, and commercial users worldwide. SATCOM
systems are rapidly deployable, expandable, and
increasingly aordable as the demand for services
continues to rise globally.
621
Today, most communications satellites operate in
GEO more than 36,000 kilometers above the Earth.
This distance provides wider coverage of the globe
with fewer satellites; however, it is more expensive
to place satellites in orbit at this distance. To reduce
cost and gain new markets, SATCOM service pro-
viders have proposed future constellations with
tens of thousands of satellites in low and medium
altitude LEO.
622
Better technology promises greater
aordability, eciency, and exibility for civilian
government, and military users worldwide.
Satellite Positioning,
Navigation, and Timing
Satellite navigation constellations provide PNT data
that enable civilian, commercial, and military users
to determine their precise location and local time.
623
Satellite navigation services—with applications in
navigation, munitions guidance, communications,
agriculture, banking, and power supply—are critical
41
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
to military and civilian users worldwide.
624
Advances
in satellite navigation technology oer foreign coun-
tries improved military situational awareness and
accuracy in precision-guided munitions.
625
The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent U.S. military
operations illustrated the value of the U.S. GPS sat-
ellite navigation system for troop movement, force
tracking, and precision munition delivery.
626
This
prompted other countries to develop their own sat-
ellite navigation systems. Today, satellite navigation
constellations of China, Russia, the European Union
and the United States oer global coverage, and
Japan and India operate regional systems.
627,628,629
The
rise of foreign satellite navigation services reduces
dependence on GPS and provides worldwide users
multiple satellite navigation options.
630,631,632
Space Launch Capabilities
Space launch is the ability to deliver payloads into
space. SLVs place satellites in orbit to deploy, sustain,
augment, or reconstitute constellations in support of
military, civilian, or commercial customers.
633
Many countries developed space launch capabil-
ities to compete in the international market or to
advance national security strategies that require
domestic access to space. Many commercial entities
are attempting to enter the launch industry with the
assistance of a state with established launch capa-
bilities. Some commercial entities are independently
developing space launch means.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
42
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Space Situational AwarenessSpace Situational Awareness
SPACE-BASED
RADIO
FREQUENCY
OPTICS
RADAR
LASER
2008-26371
Space situational awareness (SSA) is the detection
and characterization of a space object, including its
location, and the ability to track it, identify it, and pre-
dict its future location.
634
Terrestrial and space-based
sensors search the sky for foreign satellites and
record their orbits, allowing for the prediction of their
orbits and determination of the object’s function and
operational status. This continuous process is the
rst in a sequence of steps that potential adversaries
will use to target satellites, attack space assets with
counterspace weapons, and assess the eectiveness
of those attacks. Countries without advanced space
tracking sensors can attain basic SSA by purchasing
commercially available data.
Cyberthreats to Space Systems
635
With sophisticated knowledge of satellite C2 and
data distribution networks, actors can use oensive
cyberspace capabilities to enable a range of revers-
ible to nonreversible eects against space sys-
tems, associated ground infrastructure, users, and
the links connecting them. Satellite command and
data dis tribution networks expose space systems,
ground infrastructure, users, and the links connect-
ing these segments to cyber threats.
43
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Electronic Warfare
636
TARGET COMSAT
UPLINK JAMMING
TRANSMITTER
JAMMER
RECEIVER
TRANSMITTER
EARTH STATION/
DOWNLINK SITE
TARGET COMSAT
DOWNLINK JAMMING
JAMMING SIGNAL
INTENDED COMMS SIGNAL
JAMMING COMBINED WITH THE
INTENDED COMMS SIGNAL
MOBILE
JAMMER
DOWNLINK
JAMMER
2008-26372
Foreign competitors are able to conduct electronic
attacks to disrupt, deny, deceive, or degrade space
services. Electronic warfare includes using jamming
and spoong techniques to control the electro-
magnetic spectrum. Jamming prevents users from
receiving intended signals and can be accomplished
by two primary meth ods: uplink jamming and down-
link jamming. Uplink jamming is directed toward the
satellite and impairs services for all users in the satel-
lite reception area. Downlink jamming has a localized
eect because it is directed at ground users, such
as a ground forces unit using satellite navigation
to determine their loca tion. Spoong deceives the
receiver by introducing a fake signal with erroneous
information. EW can be challenging to attribute and
distinguish from unintentional interference.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
44
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
DIRECTED ENERGY
WEAPONS
HIGH-POWER
MICROWAVES
2011-27066
Directed energy weapons are designed to produce
reversible or nonreversible eects against space
systems to disrupt, damage, or destroy enemy
equipment and facilities.
637
Directed energy weap-
ons systems include lasers, high-power microwave
weapons, and other types of radiofrequency weap-
ons. Reversible eects include temporarily blinding
optical sensors to deny imagery of targeted military
forces. Nonreversible eects include permanently
damaging or destroying sensors or other satellite
components, which causes the operators to lose
data and time and face the burdens of replacement
or reliance on lesser assets.
Directed-Energy Weapons
45
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Ground-Based ASAT Missiles
GROUND-BASED
KINETIC ENERGY THREATS
2011-27066
Antisatellite missiles are designed to destroy sat-
ellites without placing the weapon system or any
of its components into orbit. These systems typi-
cally consist of a xed- or mobile-launch system,
a missile, and a kinetic kill vehicle. These weap-
ons could also be launched from aircraft or ships
at sea. Once released, the kinetic kill vehicle uses
an onboard seeker to intercept the target satellite.
Ground-based ASAT missile attacks are more eas-
ily attributed than other counterspace weapons
because launches are detectable, and their eects
can create orbital debris.
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
46
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
LASERS
HIGH-POWER
MICROWAVES
CHEMICAL
SPRAYERS
RADIOFREQUENCY
JAMMERS
KINETIC KILL
VEHICLES
ROBOTIC
MECHANISMS
2008-26374
Orbital or space-based weapons are satellites that
can attack other spacecraft, delivering temporary
or permanent damage. These systems can include
radiofrequency jammers, kinetic kill vehicles, lasers,
robotic mechanisms, chemical sprayers, and high-
power microwaves. Some of these systems—such as
robotic technology for satellite servicing and repair
or space debris removal—have peaceful uses but
can also be used in ASAT operations.
Space-based Weapons
47
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
Glossary of Acronyms
AGM missile range instrumentation ship ISS International Space Station
APOSOS
Asia-Pacic Ground-Based Optical Space
Object Observation System
KZ Kuaizhou
APSCO Asia-Pacic Space Cooperation Organization LEO low Earth orbit
ASAT antisatellite LM Long March
BACC Beijing Aerospace Control Center LNT lethal nontrackable debris
BMEW
ballistic missile early warning MEO medium Earth orbit
C2 command and control MODAFL
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces
Logistics
C4ISR
command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
CLTC
China Launch and Tracking Control
(PLA SSF SSD)
NSD PLA SSF Network Systems Department
CNSA China National Space Administration PLA People’s Liberation Army
DEW directed energy weapon PMD post-mission disposal
ESA European Space Agency PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
EW
electronic warfare, also referred to as
“electromagnetic warfare”
QUESS
Quantum Experimentation at Space
Scale
GEO geosynchronous Earth orbit SAR synthetic aperture radar
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System SASTIND
State Administration for Science,
Technology, and Industry for National
Defense
GPS Global Positioning System SATCOM satellite communications
HEO highly elliptical orbit
SLV space launch vehicle
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
SSA space situational awareness
ILRS International Lunar Research Station SSD PLA SSF Space Systems Department
IRGC-ASF
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps –
Aerospace Force
SSF PLA Strategic Support Force
ISA Iranian Space Agency TT&C telemetry, tracking, and control
ISON
International Scientic Optical
Network
xGEO
deep space orbits beyond 35,000 kilo-
meters, but in the Earth-Moon system
ISR
intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance
XSCC Xian Satellite Control Center
ISRC Iranian Space Research Center
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
48
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
1
Greenemeier, Larry; 8 February 2016; “GPS and the World’s First
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2
Office of the Director of National Intelligence; 13 February 2018;
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3
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4
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8
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uments/SIA_SSIR_2020.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.
9
United Nations Conference on Disarmament; 10 October 1967;
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10
United Nations Conference on Disarmament; CD/1839; 29
February 2008; “Letter Dated 12 February 2008 from the Perma-
nent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent
Representative of China to the Conference On Disarmament
Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting
the Russian and Chinese Texts of the Draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of
the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use
of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)’ Introduced by the
Russian Federation and China”; https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol-
=en/CD/1839. Accessed 2 August 2021.
11
United Nations Conference on Disarmament; CD/1985; 12 June
2014; “Letter dated 10 June 2014 from the Permanent Representa-
tive of the Russian Federation and the Permanent Representative of
China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Acting
Secretary-General of the Conference transmitting the updated
Russian and Chinese texts of the draft ‘Treaty on Prevention of
the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or
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Accessed 2 August 2021.
12
UK Ministry of Defense; 11 November 2015; National Security
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, p. 19;
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tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_
SD_Review_web_only.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2021.
13
UK Ministry of Defense; 28 March 2018; National Security
and Capability Review, p. 19; https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf. Ac-
cessed 2 August 2021.
14
UK Ministry of Defense; 17 June 2020; Toward a Defence Space
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15
Lye, Harry; 2 April 2020; “Will the UK get a Space Command?”
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16
Chuter, Andrew; 15 January 2020; “Former Fighter Pilot Picked
to Lead British Military’s Space Command”; Defense News; https://
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August 2021.
17
EuroNews; 13 July 2019; “France’s Macron announces creation
of French Space Force”; https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/13/
france-s-macron-announces-creation-of-french-space-force. Ac-
cessed 2 August 2021.
18
Blenkin, Max; 3 February 2020; “Germany signs up for multi-
national Combined Space Operations Initiative”; Space Connect;
https://www.spaceconnectonline.com.au/operations/4116-germa-
nysigns-up-for-multinational-combined-space-operations-initiative.
Accessed 2 August 2021.
19
Miles, Cody, Maj.; 11 February 2020; “German delegation visits
Vandenberg, discusses future of space operations”; Combined
Force Space Component Command Public Affairs; https://www.
spacecom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/2081290/ger-
man-delegation-visits-vandenberg-discusses-future-space-coop-
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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
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67
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
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635
Joint Chiefs of Staff; 26 October 2020; Joint Publication 3-14:
Space Operations (10 April 2018, Incorporating Change 1), p. I-3,
II-16.
636
Joint Chiefs of Staff; November 2021; DoD Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, p. 71.
637
Joint Chiefs of Staff: November 2021; DoD Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, p. 64.
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CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN SPACE
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