CDL(2015)056
51. It is a matter of balancing the partly antagonist constitutional values of popular
sovereignty and the rule of law whether to allow for rule-of-law induced barriers
against constitutional revision, or for judicial scrutiny. Most Constitutions have placed
a prime on popular sovereignty in this context. The Belgian proceedings are well
within the corridor of diverse European approaches to this balancing exercise and do
not overstep the limits of legitimate legal solutions.”
104. As pointed out in that Opinion, in some states constitutional courts are able to review
constitutional amendments under certain circumstances, as for instance in Austria, Bulgaria,
Germany or Turkey. Article 288 of the Constitution of Portugal provides substantial limits for
constitutional amendments and their conformity with these limits can be controlled by the
Constitutional Court. In 2009, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic annulled a
constitutional amendment shortening the term of office of the Chamber of Deputies. A
special case is the adoption of the Constitution of South Africa, which was certified by the
Constitutional Court as being in conformity with constitutional principles agreed beforehand.
105. In Austria, the Constitutional Court is able to examine constitutional provisions as to
whether they are in compliance with the fundamental principles of the Constitution. For
instance, in 2001, the Austrian Constitutional Court declared void a constitutional law provision
as it prevented the Constitutional Court from controlling the constitutionality of that provision. In
Bulgaria, constitutional amendments can be reviewed as to whether they change the “form of
state structure or form of government”. The Fundamental Law of Germany contains
unamendable provisions and the Constitutional Court can review whether these provisions
have been infringed. 87 In Turkey too, the Constitution contains unamendable provisions.
Article 148 of the Turkish Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court is limited to control
the procedure of adoption of constitutional amendments, but it seems that the Court has a
wider interpretation of its power to review constitutional amendment. In all these cases, the
constitution has an inner hierarchy (unamendable provisions or basic principles) and ‘ordinary
constitutional law’ is reviewed against these higher provisions or principles.
106. Such an inner hierarchy is not a European standard, although it is a feature that arises
more and more in States where Constitutional Courts are competent to annul unconstitutional
laws. […]”
CDL-AD(2013)012, Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
“216. The Constitutional Court is involved in the revision process in two ways: first, in order
to ascertain that the proposal does not affect any matters whose amendment is
prohibiteD(Article 142, 1st paragraph), and second, to verify that the formal procedures for
amending the Constitution have been complied with (Article 117, 1st paragraph, 3rd bullet
point). In such cases the initiative for referring the matter to the Constitutional Court falls
exclusively to the Speaker of the Assembly of People’s Representatives. For laws and
treaties, it is the President of the Republic who is competent (Article 117, 1st paragraph, 1st
and 4th bullet points) (See Chapter V). This difference in treatment should be justified.
217. Moreover, it is essential to enable a given number of members of the Assembly (i.e. the
opposition) to refer a matter of constitutional revision to the Constitutional Court, as the
Speaker of the Assembly, who in virtually all situations will belong to the same party as the
heads of the executive, will rarely be inclined to bring the amending law before the Court.
218. The procedure provided for in Article 142 is, however, difficult to understand. First of all,
the Constitutional Court must ascertain whether the amendment relates to matters which
cannot be amended. This decision can be taken only on the basis of the finalised
“constitutional draft law”. Next, the Assembly of People’s Representatives must approve “the
principle of the amendment” by an absolute majority and subsequently pass the amendment
by a majority of two thirds “without prejudice to Article 141” (the non-amendable clauses).
The sequence of these three steps does not seem logical: the decision in principle by the