ment’’ or ‘‘change,’’ both of which one also often expects to
see, redundantly, in any denition like this one.
14
This assumes the Lease originally demised raw land.
The valuation of Landlord's leased fee estate raises many is-
sues, including nuances such as how to deal with downzon-
ing or upzoning since the Commencement Date.
15
For this and other value-related provisions, the Lease
should set appraisal procedures.
16
Mezzanine lenders may want protections like those of
Leasehold Mortgagee, but this language does not provide
them. Landlord may argue that a mezzanine lender is ef-
fectively an equity investor and should rely on its rights as an
equity investor rather than bother Landlord. Landlord may
want to limit the amount, purpose, or type of loan(s) that
Leasehold Mortgages secure. For long-term ground leases,
such limitations are generally not market standard or ap-
propriate, at least after Tenant has completed initial
construction/development. Once Tenant has reached that
point: (a) any Leasehold Mortgage of any size to any Lease-
hold Mortgagee merely creates a possible future Foreclosure
Event and a possible future Lease transfer; (b) Landlord
should not care; and (c) even if overleverage creates some
theoretical possibility of slightly impairing or temporarily
deferring Landlord's rental income, Landlord's concerns are
not compelling. Tenant will usually agree that Leasehold
Mortgagee must: (1) be ‘‘institutional’’; (2) have a minimum
net worth; and (3) meet other objective and reasonable
criteria. These concessions will cause denitional issues,
complexity, and risk of obsolescence.
17
Landlord may also want copies of: (a) the unrecorded
loan documents; and (b) future amendments. Neither request
seems justied.
18
Leasehold Mortgagee will usually tolerate a somewhat
narrower permitted use. Some argue that the breadth of the
use clause merely aects the value of the Lease rather than
its nanceability. That argument may be correct, assuming a
narrower use clause remains broad enough so Leasehold
Mortgagee can still easily resell the Lease after a Foreclosure
Event.
19
Landlord may also want to assure that, even if the
Sublease is at market, Subrent does not decline over time and
Subtenant agrees to pay Subrent upon request (and any
Sublease termination payments) directly to Landlord.
20
Landlord (and its Fee Mortgagees) may hesitate to
‘‘nondisturb’’ (or more often ‘‘recognize’’) all future Sub-
tenants, even under the conditions stated. Landlord may
argue that once the Lease terminates, Landlord should re-
cover clear possession of the entire Premises, without having
to deal with any bits or pieces of Tenant's failed plan for the
Premises. Subtenants that make substantial investments in
their space (and Tenant and Leasehold Mortgagee) will feel
otherwise, and will usually win this discussion.
21
The possibility of a Loss and its variations often
consume many pages in a Lease. The parties can negotiate
and ne-tune this topic, and create new categories, distinc-
tions, and conditions, to whatever degree they want or can
stand. Of all the issues these Leasehold Mortgagee Protec-
tions cover, the treatment of a Loss may be the one least
suited to a ‘‘one size ts all’’ resolution, but also the one
where cost-benet considerations most cry out for it. These
Leasehold Mortgagee Protections make a valiant eort. One
lawyer has proposed, not entirely as a joke, that the govern-
ment should: (a) prohibit all condemnation clauses; (b)
require any condemning authority to compensate each holder
of an interest in the condemned property for the separate
value of that interest; (c) collect a minuscule fee from each
real estate transaction to establish a condemnation under-
compensation protective fund; and (d) use that fund to make
whole any real property owner ever undercompensated for a
condemnation.
22
Even if Landlord has agreed to allow just anyone to be
Leasehold Mortgagee, Landlord can legitimately set stan-
dards for who may hold Loss Proceeds.
23
On the issue of a temporary condemnation, silence will
usually suce.
24
Tenant may want to cap or narrow these expenses, or
treat them as a risk of ownership.
25
Leasehold Mortgagees often want Loss Proceeds to go
rst to repay all Leasehold Mortgages in full. This may be
unreasonable, based on the following arguments. A condem-
nation clause should give each party a package that reects
the value and relative risks/benets of its position under the
Lease if the Lease had continued. Neither party should nd
itself in a better position (wealthier) after a condemnation
than before. Absent condemnation, Landlord would hold a
low-risk high-priority relatively xed annuity (much like a
rst fee mortgage, see, e.g., ‘‘Special Report: CMBS:
Moody's Approach to Rating Loans Secured By Ground
Leasehold Interests,’’ October 23, 2001). In contrast, as
holder of a higher-risk and lower-priority interest in the real
estate, Tenant (and its mortgagees) would bear the risk of
‘‘rst loss’’ if the value and cash ow of the property could
not adequately support Landlord, Tenant, and their lenders.
To do justice to these positions after a single unexpected
‘‘liquidation’’ of the Premises because of a Loss, Landlord
should be paid rst, but only to the extent of the value of
Landlord's low-risk annuity under the Lease, including the
reversion. Tenant should own what's left: the risk of inade-
quate Loss Proceeds, and the possible windfall of excessive
Loss Proceeds. In response to these issues, some Leases say
Landlord and Tenant share Loss Proceeds in proportion to
the relative values of their positions. Landlord may fear that
any formula tied to the value of Landlord's position at the
moment of condemnation may undercompensate Landlord if
a condemnation occurs during high interest rates or an anom-
alous real estate market, such as the market that existed in
1991. This undercompensation is much like the loss a
mortgagee suers under 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 506(a) and
1129(a)(7), which let a debtor ‘‘cram down’’ a mortgagee
based on current adverse circumstances - temporary impair-
ment of value of the collateral—at the moment of a bank-
ruptcy ling, even though the mortgagee thought it had
bought into the real estate for the long haul. The condemna-
tion formula can set a oor for Landlord's share of the award,
taking into account such factors as the remaining term, a
maximum discount rate, and a minimum projected residual
value. Any such protection will create a corresponding risk
for Tenant and Leasehold Mortgagee (a ‘‘zero-sum game’’).
Some of this risk may be insurable.
26
Landlord may want to add a decision deadline. Without
one, the courts will infer a ‘‘reasonable’’ time, creating toler-
able uncertainty. If a Lease is fully nonrecourse, then: (a)
Tenant has a termination option at all times; (b) a further
termination option might be a waste of words, so long as
Tenant must unambiguously leave behind all Loss Proceeds
THE REAL ESTATE FINANCE JOURNAL/SPRING 2003
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