Becker (1957) pioneered the idea that workers who face discrimination in the labor market must per-
form better in order to earn the same wage as other workers.
5
We suggest that a similar performance premium is demanded of female politicians when
there is sex discrimination in the electorate.
6
If voters are prejudiced against women, then a woman
must be better than the man she runs against in order to win.
7
Moreover, if women anticipate dis-
crimination by voters, or simply underestimate their own qualifications, then only the most formida-
ble women will run for office to begin with. In either case, our prediction that sex-based selection
will lead the women in office to perform better, on average, than the men flows naturally from the
literature on political agency, which focuses on two issues: moral hazard and selection.
In moral hazard models of elections, originating with Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), the
desire to be reelected in the future motivates politicians to exert effort while in office. Citizens vote
retrospectively, reelecting the incumbent only if his performance is above a threshold level chosen to
maximize the incumbent’s incentive to work and hence the voter’s ex ante expected utility. Other
contributions that focus on elections as sanctioning devices for inducing effort from politicians in-
clude Austen-Smith and Banks (1989), Seabright (1996), and Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997).
A second body of theory conceives of elections as devices for selecting high-quality politi-
cians, or ―good types,‖ into office (e.g., Zaller 1998, Gordon, Huber, and Landa 2007). In this view,
voters use information gleaned from campaigns and from incumbents’ performance in office as sig-
nals about intrinsic characteristics of candidates, such as talent or honesty. Elections select good
types and filter out bad types, but they do not alter politicians’ behavior in office.
5
For a recent survey of the economics of discrimination, see Rodgers (2006).
6
It may seem that a more obvious analogy is with racial discrimination in politics. However, the use of race-conscious
districting confounds the problem. We return to this issue at the end of the paper.
7
Technically, some voters might reverse discriminate, that is, give preference to female candidates. Our prediction still
holds as long as the proportion that discriminates is greater than the proportion that reverse-discriminates. It is worth
noting that the greater the level of discrimination by voters, donors, and gatekeepers, the greater should be the observed
quality differential for women who win elections. Of course, if discrimination is strong enough, it is possible that no
quality advantage will be sufficient to overcome it, in which case we should not observe women winning elections.